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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on the legal regulations governing the Nigerian capital market. 
Nigeria is described as one of biggest economies in Africa, endowed with natural and 
other resources that could be exploited to boost the economy of the country.  There is 
however, a need for infrastructural development and job creation that can stimulate 
economic growth. The execution of these projects requires the free-flow of capital. 
The capital market serves various purposes to a country, principal amongst these is 
that it facilitates the free-flow of short and long term equity and debt capital to 
corporations and governments that use it to carry out capital-intensive projects that 
subsequently enhances the economy. In view of this, it is imperative that a capital 
market is efficient in its structure and operations so as to attract investors. This is tied 
to the realisation that capital markets thrive on investor confidence.  
This thesis, drawing on rules and practices in the United Kingdom, focuses on 
key problems affecting the Nigerian capital market, including information asymmetry, 
insider trading and inertia in the enforcement of regulations relating to the capital 
market. The issues highlighted, though not exhaustive, represent foundational and 
fundamental challenges with the current system in Nigeria. Using a mix of doctrinal 
and comparative analysis, the thesis argues that the subsisting regulation of the capital 
market in Nigeria lacks in many respects requisite legislative and enforcement tools to 
deal with the problems highlighted. As such, redressing these problems along the 
lines of the recommendations contained in this thesis would prove to be a crucial step 
in achieving sustainable financing for corporations in Nigeria as well as a viable 
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1. The Nigerian Capital Market and Economic Growth 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Success in capital accumulation and mobilisation for development varies amongst 
countries. It is largely dependent on domestic savings and inflows of foreign capital.  
To avoid economic downturn, countries promote effective resource mobilisation by 
developing their capital market.  
The capital market is considered the bedrock of growth and development of 
modern national economy because it can attract investors to invest in the economic 
subsectors. The importance of a capital market cannot be undermined as research has 
shown that there is a positive relationship between capital accumulation and real 
economic growth.1 Economic development is described as the measure of a country’s 
wealth and how it is generated.2 Large and small companies serve as the primary 
channel of businesses in a society and in order for them to promote economic growth 
they require funds to stay afloat. Similarly, governments require funds to carry out 
capital-intensive projects that will be beneficial to the inhabitants of the country. The 
capital market serves as a viable mechanism to generate funds for businesses and 
governments.  
A number of factors have been attributed as determinants for capital market 
success, such as the provision of legal regulations governing the capital market, the 
																																																								
1 J. Schumpeter, Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Lepizig: Dunker & Humblot, 1912. (In 
English: O. Redvers, A theory of economic development, (Harvard University Press 1934); J.E. Stiglitz, 
‘Capital market liberalization, economic growth and instability’, (2000) 28 World Development, 1077; 
R. Levine and S. Zervous, ‘Stock markets, banks and economic growth’, (1988) 88 American 
Economic Review, 554; L. Alfaro, A. Chanda, S. Kalemli-Ozcan and S. Sayek, ‘FDI and economic 
growth: the role of local financial markets’, (2004) 64 Journal of International Economics 107 
2 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/geography/development/contrasts_development_rev1.sht
ml> accessed 12 September 2016. 
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political framework of the country etc.3 However, a general consensus that has 
developed in recent years is the fact that when investors are confident in the capital 
market there is the propensity for them to invest more in the market.4 This is because 
the capital market is a sensitive environment that thrives on investor confidence 
generated by operational efficiency and the prevailing regulations of its operations.5 
Developing investor confidence is not an easy task; it stems from a continued effort 
by the operators and regulators of the capital market to ensure that the market is run 
smoothly by providing adequate and accurate information as well as ensuring that 
investors will receive returns on their investments.  
Several factors have been identified as responsible for investor confidence. 
Amongst these is the provision of legal rules governing the market, political structure 
of the country and the endowment in terms of resources of the country etc.6 This 
thesis argues that legal regulations are largely accountable for investor confidence. 
This is borne out of the reasoning that when laws/regulations governing the 
operations of the market and those protecting investors’ interests are in place and 
efficient, there would be willingness to invest.7 This willingness is developed by the 
belief that when investors invest in the capital market they know they are legally 
protected if anything goes wrong. Furthermore, it is arguable that investors are 
primarily interested in well-run companies and countries with sound macroeconomic 																																																								
3 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’, (1998) 106 The 
Journal of Political Economy 1114; M. Roe, ‘Legal origins, politics and modern stock markets’, (2006) 
120 Harvard Law Review 463 
4 K. G. Palepu, P. M. Healy, V. Bernard and E. Peek, Business analysis and valuation: IFRS Edition, 
(Thomson Learning, 2007) 21 
5  A. Aliyu, ‘Managing capital markets crimes: the role of Nigeria’s Securities and Exchange 
Commission’ (2014) 19 Journal of Humanities and Social Science 56. 
6 R. La Porta, et al (n 3); M. Roe (n 3); M. Pagano and P. Volpin, ‘The political economy of finance’, 
(2001) Oxford Review of Economic Policies 506; R. Rajan and L. Zingales, ‘The great reversals: The 
politics of financial development in the 20th century’ (2003) Journal of Financial Economics; W. 
Easterly and R. Levine, ‘Tropics, germs and crops: how endowments influence economic 
development’ (2003) 50 Journal of Monetary Economics 7. 
7 R. La Porta, et al (n 3). 
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policies rather than enforcement regimes. For example, debt investors would rather 
extend capital to a company they are convinced would repay the capital plus interest 
rather than solely rely on security.8  For laws/regulations to efficiently enhance 
investors’ confidence, there are several factors that ought to be available and function 
effectively. Amongst these are, statutory rules that provide a regulatory framework 
and encourage/mandate prescribed practices. Concurrently, timely and adequate 
enforcement mechanisms are important to enhancing investor confidence.9  
 
The Nigerian capital market is described to have functioned at its peak until its 
collapse in 2008.10 In the last quarter of 2007, the Nigerian capital market was ranked 
Africa’s best performing market.11 Its all share index value of 100 in 1984 increased 
to 57,990 at the end of 2007, increasing to 58,580 in first quarter of 2008.12 It 
accumulated 12.6 trillion Naira (equivalent of $84 billion) around the first quarter of 
2008.13 At its peak, its total market capitalisation amounted to 21.4 trillion Naira 
(Equivalent of 150 billion US dollars).  The global economic meltdown and other 
peculiarities eroded the capitalization to about 5.4 trillion Naira ($36 Billion) in the 
fourth quarter of 2009, which subsequently saw the all share index drop from 
																																																								
8 T. N. Parsons, Lingards bank security documents, (6th Edition, LNUK 2015) 
9 It is important to note that this thesis does not by any way postulate that the other factors are 
irrelevant as it explains in the next chapter that a market will inevitably perform better if all three 
factors are present. This thesis aligns its argument around legal regulation as a result of it being the 
focal point. 
10 C. U. C. Ikebudu, ‘Mismanagement of emerging stock markets; Analysis of the role played by 
‘Legislative Infidelity’ a norm of international Jurisprudence in N8.1 Trillion ($60 Billion) Crash of the 
Nigerian Stock Market’ Theses and Dissertations, Golden Gate University School of Law, 2011, Paper 
27, 2. 
11 J. Kew and M. Patterson, Nigeria becomes world’s market on bank losses’, (Bloomberg, 1 April 
2009) <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aSechJpKP2yo> accessed 9 
December 2014 
12 Punch Editorial Board, ‘Preventing another capital market crash’, Punch Newspaper (Nigeria, 17 
October 2013) <http://www.punchng.com/editorial/preventing-another-capital-market-crash> accessed 
9 December 2014 
13 O. F. Oladipupo, ‘The crash of the Nigerian Capital Market: Explanation beyond the Global 
meltdown’, (2010) 4, International Business Management 37 
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31.450.78 to 23.206.23.14  Recent developments within the Nigerian capital market 
suggest that criminal practices led to its collapse in 2008. Some of the practices 
included insider trading.15 In view of this and to avoid further mishaps, it is important 
that the Nigerian capital market is effectively regulated. Moreover, such regulation 
could drive economic growth by creating the medium to generate capital for projects 
that are beneficial to its inhabitants as well as achieving the necessary scale and 
sophistication to be relevant in the transformation of the economy and achieving 
national development aspirations.16 
It is important to note that until recently, the Nigerian economy was Africa’s 
leading economy. 17  However, this is no longer the case with the economy in 
recession.18 The reason for the recession is largely attributable to the drop in oil prices 
that has affected major oil producing countries. The recession has led to decline in the 
demand for stocks as well as loss of investors’ funds of approximately 14 billion 
Naira.19 It has also led to a price hike in every sector including the capital market, as 
stockholders are not willing to sell their stocks at a reduced rate.20 This thesis argues 
that if the capital market functioned effectively, there is the likelihood that this 
recession would have been avoided, as there would be capital available for the 
exploration of other sectors that will generate some revenue for the country. This 																																																								
14 ibid 
15 Thisday Newspaper Editorial Board, ‘Preventing insider dealings in a rebounding stock market’, 
Thisday Newspaper (Nigeria, 30 April 2013)  
16 SEC Nigeria, ‘Nigerian capital market master plan; 10 year plan 2015-2025’, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 3.2.1 
17 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-26913497> accessed 16 July, 2016 
18 D. M. Doya, ‘S. Africa’s economy regains rank as Africa’s biggest on rand’, [website], August 10, 
2016, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-10/south-africa-s-economy-regains-rank-as-
africa-s-biggest-on-rand> accessed 24 August 2016 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-37045276> accessed 24 August 2016 
19 C. Anuforo and C. Obienyi, ‘Stockworld: How recession affects capital market activities’, The Sun 
News (Nigeria, 31 October 2016) <http://sunnewsonline.com/stockworld-how-recession-affects-
capital-market-activities/> accessed 3 April 2017 
P. Egwuatu and N. Nnorom, ‘Capital market: Investors lose N603.7bn to economic recession’, 
Vanguard (Nigeria, 2 January 2017) <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/01/capital-market-investors-
lose-n603-7-bn-economic-recession/> accessed 3 April 2017 
20 C. Anuforo and C. Obienyi (n 19) 
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argument is tied to the realisation that the Nigerian economy is largely dependent on 
the proceeds from the crude oil sector. 
Considering this context, this thesis focuses on certain rules and regulations 
governing the Nigerian capital market. These provisions are compared with similar 
provisions in the UK, with the objective of identifying problems associated with the 
Nigerian rules as well as suggesting possible reforms that are aimed at enhancing 
investor confidence and making the market more efficient. Other than the importance 
of legal regulations, another factor that is important is the issue of enforcement of 
these laws. In describing the importance of enforcement. According to John Austin, 
“…laws without sanctions are mere words”. 21  Having laws without adequate 
enforcement mechanisms makes them ineffective, thus diminishing regulatory 
compliance 
Before delving into the problems associated with the legal provisions 
governing the Nigerian capital market, the next section briefly highlights what a 
capital market is, its function and importance and analyses the historical development 
of the legal structure of the Nigerian capital market. 
 
1.2. Introduction to capital markets 
The capital market is a framework of institutions that arrange for the sale and 
purchase of long-term financial assets, such as shares, government stocks, debentures 
etc.22 It is part of the financial system that is primarily involved in raising capital by 
dealing in shares, bonds and other long term or short-term investments.23 It serves as a 
medium through which large and small businesses access equity and debt capital 																																																								
21 J. Austin, The province of jurisprudence determined, (London, 1832) Lecture 1. 
22 A. Omojola, Capital market operations, (Credible associates limited, Nigeria, 2006) 16 
23 F. J Fabozzi, and F. Modigliani, Capital markets: institutions and instruments, (4th Edition Pearson 
International Edition 2009) 10 
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directly, thus reducing their dependence on bank-based financing.24 The market serves 
as the cornerstone of any financial system by providing funds needed for financing 
not only business and other economic institutions but also the programmes of 
government as a whole. It grants individuals and institutions the accessibility to 
corporate bodies and government parastatals that direct their savings towards capital-
intensive projects.25 
The capital market is divided into two sectors, the primary market and 
secondary market. The former deals with issuing of new stocks and bonds directly 
from companies to investors, businesses and other institutions.26 The latter is where 
investment banks, private investors and other firms resell their equity and debt 
securities to investors.27 It is noteworthy that capital market trade is different from 
regular day-to day trade. Trading in securities comes with the risk of dealing with 
entities that putative investors have no other means of getting information on other 
than that provided by the entities themselves. In view of such an arrangement where 
potential investors are made to rely on disclosure by the company, trust is implicit and 
very important.  
1.2.1. Functions and importance of capital markets 
In attaining sustainable growth and development, there must be effective allocation of 
capital to enable businesses and the economy harness their human material and 
manage resources for optimal output.28 When the capital market is thriving in an 
efficient manner, there is likelihood the economy will grow.  If capital resources are 
																																																								
24 E. Ferran and L. Chan Ho, Principles of corporate finance law, (2nd Edition Oxford University Press, 
2014) 59 
25 A. M Chisholm, An introduction to international capital markets, (2nd Edition Wiley & Sons Ltd, 
second edition, 2009) 2 
26 R. Veil, European capital markets law, (Hart publishing Ltd 2013) 75 
27 ibid 76 
28 E. O. Ogunleye and P. A Adeyemi, ‘The impact of stock market development on economic growth in 
Nigeria’, (2015) 6 Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development 21 
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not provided to economic areas especially industries where demand is growing and 
which are capable of increasing production and productivity, the rate of expansion of 
the economy often suffers.29 
Developed economies explore two channels through which resources are 
mobilised in the bid to ensure economic growth and development. They are money 
and capital markets.30 Developing economies on the other hand tend to place more 
emphasis on the money market with little consideration for the capital market.31 This 
is particularly harmful because when economies develop, more capital is required to 
meet the rapid expansion and align with global innovations. The capital market in this 
instance serves as a viable tool to mobilise and allocate savings towards 
developmental resources that are critical to the growth of the economy.32 Based on the 
role of a capital market towards the development of a country’s economy, this thesis 
enlists the following as the functions and importance of the capital market. 
First, as highlighted above, a capital market has the ability to spur economic 
growth.33 Economic growth hinges on an efficient and effective financial sector that 
pools domestic savings and mobilises capital for productive projects.34 When such a 
system is absent, productive projects that carry developmental agenda will be ignored 
because they are usually capital intensive. 
																																																								
29 T. S. Osinubi, ‘Does stock market promote economic growth in Nigeria?’  Department of Economics 
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lagos, Nigeria  
30 A. Demirguic-Kunt and R. Levine, ‘Stock market, corporate finance and economic growth: An 
overview’ (1996) 10 The World Bank Review 229. 
Money market is different from capital market as it is a market where financial instruments with high 
liquidity and short maturities are traded. Essentially, it is used as a means for borrowing and lending in 
the short term. 
31 M. O. Nyong, ‘Capital market development & long-run economic growth: Theory, evidence and 
analysis’, (1997) First Bank Review 13. 
32 H. I. Alile, ‘The Nigerian stock exchange: Historical perspective, operations and contributions to 
economic development,’ (1984) 2 Central Bank of Nigeria Bullion, Silver jubilee 65. 
33 IOSCO, ‘Objectives and principles of securities regulation’, (2010) OICU-IOSCO 
34 CBL Economic Review, ‘Importance of capital market as an instrument of economic development’, 
(2009) CBL Economic Review 2 
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Second, it connects the monetary sector with the sector for production of 
goods and services otherwise known as the ‘real sector’. This has been considered to 
facilitate growth in the real sector because it provides sustainable capital by which 
investors can buy and sell securities efficiently.35 
Third, it promotes long-term savings that is subsequently channelled to long-
term investment.36 This is achieved by enabling the contractual savings industry such 
as companies, private pension funds and social pension insurance systems to mobilize 
long-term savings from small individual households.37 
Fourth, it promotes infrastructural development by channelling savings into 
investments through the efficient transfer of funds from individuals, corporations and 
governments that have excess funds. Infrastructural development is important for 
sustainable growth and development as it generates competitiveness of domestic 
industries. With such competition, there is the chance for such industries to compete 
with their global counterparts, thus steering the momentum towards global 
integration. Furthermore, infrastructural development can lead to increased domestic 
productivity and subsequent upsurge in exportation. 
Fifth, capital markets promote public-private sector partnerships by 
encouraging the private sector to participate in productive investments.38 With the 
possibility of resources diminishing especially in an economy where the focus is on a 
primary source, the capital market can assist the public sector in closing the resource 
gap as well as complement its effort in financing essential socio-economic 																																																								
35 A. Omojola, (n 22) 
36 C. A. Yartey, ‘The determinants of stock market development in emerging economies: Is South 
Africa different’, (2008) IMF Working Paper 5 
37 D.S. Balami, ‘The role of the capital market in the economy’, (Proshare, 13 August 2015) 
<https://www.proshareng.com/news/Capital-Market/The-Role-of-the-Capital-Market-in-the-
Economy/28259> accessed 4th July 2016. Contractual savings industries are savings institutions that 
obtain their funds through long-term contractual arrangements and invest these funds on the capital 
markets. It is inclusive of insurance companies and pension funds.  
38 ibid 
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development through raising long-term project based capital. This might be beneficial 
for smaller companies that require capital to execute projects, but do not have access 
to capital market/desired bank finance. 
Sixth, an efficient capital market has the potential to attract both foreign direct 
investors and foreign portfolio investment. This is very important to supplementing 
domestic savings levels, thus facilitating the inflow of foreign financial resources into 
the domestic economy.39 
 
Nigeria is categorised as a developing country and operates a mono-revenue 
economy with its primary source of revenue being crude oil.40 At the point when 
Nigeria was categorised as the apex economy in Africa, the sectorial contribution are 
as follows: agriculture 31.20%, crude petroleum and natural gas 28.70%, solid 
materials 0.20%, manufacturing 2.70%, telecommunication and post 1.80% finance 
and business services 1.70%, wholesale and retail trade 18.80%, hotel and restaurants 
0.40%, construction 1.70%, others 13.00%.41 As a result of political instability, 
corruption and poor macroeconomic management, there was a failure to diversify the 
economy that subsequently led to large reliance on the capital-intensive oil sector.42 
There have been suggestions for the diversification of the economy of the country as a 
solution to the large reliance on crude oil, which could subsequently lead to economic 
development.43 This thesis submits that if the capital market works efficiently, there is 
the propensity for development in other sectors such as finance, business services, 																																																								
39 An efficient capital market is defined as one where the prices fully reflect the available information. 
This concept serves as the bedrock for this thesis and is discussed further in Chapter Two 
40 U. Nnakenyi, ‘Diversifying Nigeria’s sources of revenue: An urgent developmental need’, iclass 
Nigeria, [blog], 2nd April, 2015 <http://iclass.ng/blog/index.php?entryid=2203> accessed 1 September 
2016 
41 <http://focusafrica.gov.in/sector_profile_nigeria.html> accessed 20 September 2016 
42 ibid 
43 O. I. Ifeanyi, A. A. Nwuba, and B. Ndibe, ‘Diversification of the economy: A panacea for Nigerian 
economic development’ (2015) 2 International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and 
Development, 477 
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construction etc. because there will be proficient allocation of capital for these sectors 
that can subsequently lead to development and an improved economy. 
The above demonstrates that there are several factors that make the capital 
market an important branch of the financial system as a whole and it goes further to 
illustrate the connection between the capital market and economic growth of a 
country. For a capital market to function effectively, there is the continuous need for 
regulation and sanctions to avoid fraudulent acts and malpractices. The importance of 
this cannot be over-emphasised. The next section introduces the legal structure 
governing the Nigerian capital market and its evolution. 
 
1.2.2. History and evolution of the legal structure of the Nigerian capital 
market 
Nigeria was under British colonial rule until 1960 when it gained independence. Prior 
to gaining independence, the government sought funds for running the local 
administration and the primary sources of fund generation were agriculture and 
mineral mining. 44  These sources were inadequate in meeting growing financial 
obligations. Consequently, the administration decided to reform the system of revenue 
mobilisation, taxation and other payments. Additionally, there was the need to raise 
funds from the public to cover temporary shortfalls in funds availability. This 
necessitated the establishment of a financial system with infrastructure that would aid 
its take off pending the development of an organised private sector.45 Consequently, 
the government developed the capital market in Nigeria. It is noteworthy there were 
traces of some less formal market arrangements for the operation of a capital market. 
Examples include, a 10-year Local Loan Ordinance for the floatation of the first three 																																																								
44 E.B Osaze, Capital markets: African and Global, (Bookhouse Company Nigeria 2007) 55 
45 ibid 
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hundred thousand-naira government stock with management vested on the accountant 
general in 1946. Furthermore, in 1957, the General Loan and Stock Act as well as the 
Local Loan (Registered Stock and Securities) Act were promulgated. Additionally, in 
1958, the Central Bank of Nigeria was established. These legislations were aimed at 
establishing a legal and infrastructural framework for the takeoff of a viable securities 
market in Nigeria. In 1959, the Central Bank of Nigeria issued the first Nigerian 
Treasury Bills, which were meant to provide an avenue for the investment of short-
term liquid funds in Nigeria and assist in providing the government with funds 
pending receipt of its own revenues.46 
 
1.2.3. Lagos Stock Exchange 
The Lagos stock exchange was incorporated on September 15, 1960 as a private 
limited liability company, limited by guarantee under the provisions of the Lagos 
Stock Exchange Act 1960. The Act ensured that the stock exchange had monopoly 
over the business of share dealings in the country, with the aim of ensuring that 
potential investors were protected by a self-regulatory organisation that proposed 
standards that would be adhered to by members. Additionally, it conferred the 
opportunity on the Central Bank to deal directly in securities. It opened up for 
business with 19 listed securities made up of 3 equities, 6 Federal government bonds 
and 10 industrial loans.47  
The Lagos Stock Exchange Act was enacted with the primary aim of placing 
the stock exchange under some government control. Impliedly, the Lagos stock 
exchange was only operational in Lagos.48 By the mid-1970s there was the need for 																																																								
46 ibid 
47 E.B. Osaze (n 44) 
48 One of the largest city in Nigeria and the African continent. It is regarded as one of the most 
populous urban agglomerations in the world. It is the major financial center in Africa as well as houses 
	 21	
an efficient financial system for the entire nation, which led to a review of the 
operations of the Lagos stock exchange. This review documented some problems 
associated with the market such as the huge amount of currency in circulation that 
was held outside of the banking system, unsatisfactory demarcation between the 
operation of commercial banks and the emerging class of merchant banks as well as 
the extremely shallow depth of the capital market.49 In response to these problems, the 
government accepted the principle of decentralisation but opted for a National stock 
exchange. With the need for further growth of the economy, there was constant 
demand for more capital and the only way to get this capital was through the 
establishment of a National stock exchange with its services expanded to individuals 
and corporations in other part of Nigeria.50  
 
1.2.4. The Nigerian Stock Exchange 
Subsequent to the above, in 1979, the Lagos Stock Exchange Act was transformed 
and designed the basis for the creation of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. It was the 
foundation for trading in long-term securities needed for financing the industrial 
sector and the economy at large. This expansion established other branches of the 
stock exchange in Lagos, Kaduna (1978), Port Harcourt (1980), Yola (2002), Onitsha 
(1990) and Abuja (the current Federal Capital Territory), thus increasing the 
geographical scope of investment activity in the country.  
The Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) is currently the center point of the 
Nigerian capital market with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) serving as 																																																																																																																																																														
one of the largest and busiest ports on the continent. It was one time the capital of Nigeria and often 
referred to as the commercial capital of Nigeria.  
49 L. Olawoye, ‘Impact of capital market on economic growth of Nigeria’, (Lekan Olawoye, 11 
December 2011)  
<http://lekanolawoye.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/impact-of-capital-market-on-economic.html> accessed 6 
July 2016  
50 ibid 
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the apex regulatory body. The stock exchange currently has about 180 listed 
companies.51 Most of the listed companies at the exchange have foreign or multi-
national affiliations and represent a cross-section of the Nigerian economy, ranging 
from agriculture and manufacturing to services.52 
Operations within the market are conducted on two levels, the primary and 
secondary level. The former is where securities are created. It is the market where 
firms sell new stocks and bonds for the first time. It is synonymous with initial public 
offerings (IPOs).53 The latter is what is referred to as the stock market. This is the 
market where investors trade amongst themselves. In this market investors trade on 
previously issued stocks. 
 
1.2.5. Regulation of the Nigerian capital market 
At its inception regulation of the capital market was essentially through self-
regulation by the NSE and provisions of the Lagos Stock Exchange Act 1960 and in 
some rare instances through the provisions of the Companies Act 1968. Additionally, 
the Central Bank of Nigeria also played an informal role in the regulation of the 
market. The NSE set up the market for trading in securities, management of operation 
efficiency as well as implemented a listing requirement and other rules that every 
company or authority wishing to participate in the market either as a trader or issuer 
of securities must comply with. 
In response to the problems identified above the government promulgated the 
Securities and Exchange Commission Act 1988, which established the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) as the apex regulatory organization for the capital 																																																								
51 <http://www.nigerianstockexchange.com/Issuers-section/listed-securities/listed-companies> accessed 
20 September 2016 
52 A. Aliyu (n 5) 57 
53 IPOs are when the private company sells stocks to the public for the first time. 
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market.54 This was as a result of a recommendation of the Financial System Review 
Committee (FSRC) that was set up by the Federal Government to review capital 
market activities and proffer ways of developing the market in order to cope with 
challenges. 55  The SEC was saddled with the responsibility of developing and 
regulating the market in order to maintain proper ethical standards and 
professionalism. Furthermore, the responsibility to review and approve mergers, 
acquisition and combinations between or amongst companies was placed on the 
SEC.56 Additionally, the privatisation and commercialisation Decree No. 25 was 
promulgated providing for the privatisation of some enterprises in which the Federal 
Government of Nigeria has equity interest and the commercialisation of Federal 
Government wholly owned enterprises. This exercise is credited with having attracted 
more companies to list their shares in the Nigerian Stock Exchange.57 It should be 
noted that although the origin of the SEC dates back to 1962, its complete emergence 
was only actualized in 1980. 
In 1999, the Investments and Securities Decree No. 45 became the Investment 
and Securities Act 1999 (ISA) by virtue of section 315 of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) 1999. 58  Subsequently, the ISA 1999 was 
repealed and replaced by the ISA 2007, which was a product of a long process of 
																																																								
54 O. Sunday, E. Ewah, E. Atim, E. Esang and J.U. Bassey, ‘Appraisal of capital market efficiency on 
economic growth in Nigeria’ (2009) 4 International Journal of Business and Management 221 
55 Okigbo Committee of 1976 
56 ibid 
57 E. B Osaze (n 44) 
58 The CFRN 1999 by virtue of section 1(1) is the supreme law and its provisions have a binding force 
on the authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Section 315 allows for 
modifications of an existing law as may be necessary. The principal effect of this is that it becomes an 
Act of the National Assembly to the extent that it is a law with respect to any matter on which the 
National Assembly is empowered by the constitution to make laws. Such modification becomes valid if 
the appropriate authority at any time by order makes such modifications in the text of the existing law 
as they deem necessary or expedient to bring that law into conformity with the provisions of the 
constitution. 
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consultation for the reform and modernisation of the rules governing capital market 
transactions.59  
Separately from the provisions of the ISA, there are traces of laws in other 
legal provisions that have an impact on the capital market. Amongst such are, Central 
Bank of Nigeria Act 2007 as well as the Banking and other Financial Institutions Act 
2004 (BOFIA), which regulates the activities of banks, including their investment in 
the capital market, as well as their use of the market to raise funds.  Additionally, the 
Federal Ministry of Finance provides supervisory roles by formulating periodical 
monetary policy guidelines. Recently, the ministry introduced the new whistleblowing 
scheme aimed at improving public and institutional governance. Whistleblowing is 
defined as a deliberate non-obligatory act of disclosure that gets into public by a 
person who has or had privileged access to data or information of an organisation 
about non-trivial illegality or wrongdoing whether actual, suspected or anticipated 
which implicates and is under the control of that organisation to an external entity 
having power to rectify the wrongdoing.60 Although it is a relatively recent concept, it 
has led to the recovery of significant sums of money laundered and stolen by 
politicians.61 This thesis recommends that this policy be encouraged and promoted in 
the capital market, as its operation is still considered relatively foreign to Nigerians.62   
Furthermore, the ISA introduced a fund that is aimed at protecting subscribers 
against loss and damage arising from the default of issuers and their agents. This fund 																																																								
59 The ISA 2007 is divided into 18 parts dealing with various issues in the capital market. 
60 P. B. Jubb, ‘Whistleblowing: A restrictive definition and interpretation’, (1994) Journal of Business 
Ethics 77, 83 
61 Y. Adegoke, ‘Nigeria’s anti-corruption unit finds $43 million cash in Lagos apartment’, (CNN, 14 
April 2017)  
<http://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/13/africa/efcc-recovers-funds-nigeria/index.html> accessed 26 June 
2017 
62 J. Onyekwere, ‘Whistleblowers act is unknown to lawyers, says Akpomudje’, The Guardian 
(Nigeria, 24 November 2015) <https://guardian.ng/features/whistleblowers-act-unknown-lawyers-says-
akpomudje/> accessed 25 June 2017  
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is known as the Investors Protection Fund (IPF).63  It requires a securities exchange or 
capital trade point to establish and maintain a fund that shall be administered by a 
Board of Trustees on its behalf. The fund consists of all monies paid to the Board of 
Trustees by the dealing members of the securities exchange and capital trade point, 
interest, profits accruing from the fund money recovered by the board and other 
monies lawfully paid into the fund.64 These are kept in a separate bank account in 
Nigeria pending investment or application. The fund is required to be audited with 
balance sheets kept and is not to fall below the minimum amount approved for a 
securities exchange or capital trade point.65 If it does, the Board of Trustees is 
required to take steps to make up the deficiency. It could do this by directing that an 
amount equal to the deficiency be transferred from other funds to the investor 
protection fund or determine the amount to be contributed by each dealing member if 
there are sufficient funds to be transferred to the fund. Persons that have suffered 
pecuniary loss can claim compensation from the fund and take appropriate judicial 
proceedings against the securities exchange or capital trade point to establish the 
claim. The claimant is usually entitled to the actual pecuniary loss suffered including 
reasonable costs of disbursements incidental to making and proving his claim less the 
amount or value of all monies or other benefits received or meant to be received by 
him from the source other than the fund in reduction of the loss.66 Furthermore, 
interest is payable on the amount of compensation at 5% per annum commencing 
from the date of defalcation.67 This is commendable, especially in instances where 
investors’ compensation is delayed. Compensation claims are determined by a 
securities exchange, capital trade point, SEC or the Investment and Securities 																																																								
63 ISA 2007, s.198 
64 Rules and Regulation of the SEC 2013, rule 203 (4) 
65 ISA 2007, s. 205 
66 ibid, s.213  
67 ibid s.213 (7) 
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Tribunal (IST). An aggrieved investor is required to make a claim for compensation 
in the first instance to a securities exchange or capital trade point, which verifies and 
determines the amount and extent to which the clam will be allowed within 30 days. 
If verified the aggrieved investor will be paid within 14 days of such verification by 
the securities exchange or capital trade point. The statutory time limit for verification 
and bringing the action is commendable if complied with, as they are capable of 
advancing the legitimate interests of investors. Where the claimant is dissatisfied with 
the determination made by the securities exchange or capital trade point, the matter is 
taken to the IST or Administrative Proceedings Committee (APC) of the SEC on the 
failure of the securities exchange or capital trade point to provide suitable redress.68 
The statutory minimum that must be paid to the credit of an Investor 
Protection Fund on the establishment of a securities exchange or capital trade point 
shall be approved by SEC from time to time.69 Conversely, the board of trustees shall 
have the discretion to determine the amount or minimum amounts to be contributed 
by each dealing member firm to the fund, subject to the approval of the securities 
exchange or capital trade point. In 2007, the SEC capped the amount recoverable at 
200 000 Naira and more recently in 2013 removed the cap to a sum determined by the 
Board of Trustees.70 This becomes problematic because, by interpretation, it means if 
the amount claimed by the investor is less than the limit, the claimant will recover his 
claims in full, but where it exceeds the limit, the claimant will only be compensated to 
the extent that his claim falls within the set limit. In the UK, the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme (FSCS) provide a maximum compensation for firms in default 
of £85,000. A similar benchmark in Nigerian law is desirable to check the incidence 																																																								
68 ibid s.284 (1)(a)(III) 
69 ISA 2007, s.207  
70 E. O. Nwosu and C. Ngozi, ‘Legal framework of Nigeria’s investors protection fund’, (2002-2010) 9 
Nigerian Judicial Review 48, 57; Nigerian Stock Exchange Investor Protection Fund Rules 2013, r.4.04 
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of misappropriation and abuse of the fund as well as under compensation.71 Although 
the creation of this fund is a good move in the protection of investors’ of interests, this 
thesis argues that its application is not convincing. The cases of Boat Nigeria Limited 
v Nigerian Stock Exchange72 and Ezemgbe v Nigerian Stock Exchange73 serve as 
illustrations of the application of the fund in a manner that is unreasonable and puts 
the credibility of the fund to question. 
 
The participants of the capital market are the operators who act as 
intermediaries between the provider of funds and the fund users, amongst which are, 
the securities exchange, brokers, dealers, issuing houses, jobbers, registrars, trustees, 
investment advisers, fund/portfolios managers etc. The SEC regulates these 
participants through the provisions contained in the Rules and Regulations of the 
SEC.74 The SEC through its Rules and Regulations as well as the provisions of the 
ISA 2007, regulates public offerings of securities as well as disclosure of required 
information to guide investors in making a decision to invest or not.75  
Section 13 (d) of ISA necessitates the registration of securities of public 
companies to be offered for subscription or sale to the public. 76  Additionally, 
registered public companies with securities in the market are required to file with the 
SEC on a periodic or annual basis and on a specified format, its audited financial 
																																																								
71 ibid 
72 Unreported suit no IST/OA/03/07 
73 Unreported suit No. IST/OA/06/06 decided by the Investments and Securities Tribunal in 13th 
December 2006; Chapter 5, 5.2.2 for facts of the case. 
74 The SEC is charged with the overall control registration and regulation of investments and securities 
business in Nigeria as well as regulates the activities of capital market operators with the primary goal 
of maintaining a functional and sane capital market operations in Nigeria 
75 An investing company is charged with providing a prospectus that contains the financial statement of 
the issuer and every material information to the public.  
76 Also contained in Rule 106 of the Rules and Regulations of the SEC. It empowers the commission to 
monitor and regulate the shares of public quoted companies in Nigeria. 
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statement and other returns as may be prescribed by the commission.77 The ISA 2007 
grants the SEC the power to establish departments. One of such departments is the 
Administrative Proceedings Committee (APC) that serves as an ad hoc body that is 
convened to redress any wrongdoings in the securities industry and to impose 
penalties.78 There is also the establishment of the Investment and Securities Tribunal 
(IST), which is a specialized court charged with handling disputes referred to the 
SEC.79   
In relation to allotment of shares, issuing companies and issuing houses are 
responsible for this in accordance with the provisions of the SEC Rules and 
Regulations and SEC approval of such allotment.80 
From the above historical outline, it is evident that the Nigerian Capital market 
has developed at a rather slow and unsteady pace when compared to its international 
counterparts such as the UK and USA. The market is held out to be small, illiquid and 
volatile.81 Regardless of the increment in listed securities, trading activity is still very 
thin due to the reluctance of institutional and retail investors to trade in the secondary 
market.82 Another reason for the apparent reluctance to trade can be largely attributed 
to the lack of a coherent structure and absence or inadequate structure for protection 
of investors.83  
																																																								
77 ISA 2007, s.60-65 
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81 A. Babatunde and O. Olaniran, ‘The effects of internal and external mechanism on governance and 
performance of corporate firms in Nigeria’ (2009) 7 Corporate Ownership and Control 322 
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The SEC was established in 1979, almost 20 years after the NSE was 
established. Furthermore, the first comprehensive legal document providing rules and 
regulations for the conduct of operations in the stock exchange are contained in the 
ISA 1999, thus indicating that the stock exchange ran without a regulatory organ for 
almost two decades and for another two decades with a regulatory organ weakened by 
the absence of a comprehensive legal document to assist in the discharge of its 
regulatory system.84 
In view of the foregoing, this thesis postulates that, these reasons are largely 
responsible for the weak and illiquid nature of the market. This is further compounded 
by growth lapse and lack of adept rules capable of protecting investors. Based on the 
historical analysis above, one can only imagine the level of unruly acts that must have 
gone on within this period. Without doubt, this has the likelihood of affecting investor 
confidence and has the propensity to make them avoid the market all together.  
 
1.3. Scope of thesis 
This thesis examines the current legal provisions regulating the Nigerian capital 
market. It compares these provisions with similar provisions that are used for 
regulating the UK capital market with the end goal of identifying how to make the 
Nigerian capital market efficient. It is important to note at this stage that this thesis 
does not address every legal regulation governing the market. It identifies two major 
problems associated with the Nigerian capital market and explores prospects for 
reform of the rules regulating these issues. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the 
field that studies the importance of an efficient capital market towards achieving 
economic development. Primarily, this thesis explores the following: 																																																								
84 A. Sanda, S. A.S. Mikailu and T. Garba, ‘Corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial 
performance in Nigeria’ (2005) 149 African Economic Research Consortium 5. 
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 - Theory of an efficient market as well as the factors responsible for building an 
efficient and strong market - The impact of information asymmetry on investor confidence - The importance of regulating disclosure in capital market with its focal point 
on the legal provisions governing the Nigerian capital market as well as 
exploring prospects for reforms to meet their foreign counterparts. - The importance of reputational intermediaries in enhancing investor 
confidence. Furthermore, it examines the possibility of them being regulated 
as a guarantee for efficiency. - The importance of enacting efficient regulations prohibiting insider trading in 
the Nigerian capital market. Additionally, it compares the substantive legal 
regulation of insider trading in Nigeria with that of the United Kingdom, with 
prospect for reform. 
 
The findings and recommendations of this thesis will serve several purposes. Firstly, 
it will add to the sparse literature in relation to the importance of legal regulation of 
the Nigerian capital market. Secondly, it may educate the Nigerian government and 
lawmakers on the importance attached to enacting efficient rules to govern the capital 
market based on its importance as a thriving tool for economic development. This will 
be particularly useful as the Nigerian economy is currently in recession and no longer 
holds the position of Africa’s largest economy. Additionally and as mentioned above, 
it will highlight how an efficient capital market in Nigeria can serve as a viable 
mechanism to generate capital needed to explore other areas in the search for 
diversification of the revenue of the economy. Furthermore, it can be used as a 
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resource for the Nigerian government when enacting legal provisions governing the 
capital market. This thesis also seeks to identify the weak nature of the enforcement 
of these laws regulating the capital market in Nigeria.   
In order to achieve the aims of this thesis, the primary research question to be 
addressed is: 
“To what extent are the legal frameworks and enforcement procedures of 
the Nigerian capital markets effective as compared to those in the United 
Kingdom?’. 
In determining the efficiency of a capital market, one important factor that is taken 
into consideration is the provision of reliable information. The information disclosed 
to investors is an important factor utilised by investors when deciding on whether to 
invest. This to a large extent determines how efficient a market is. It has been said 
that the legal framework for an efficient capital market essentially mandates 
disclosure.85 To achieve this, there is the need for rules mandating companies listed in 
the market to supply legally adequate information to investors.86 
The issue of regulation is taken seriously in the UK and other developed 
countries. In recent times there have been sufficient literature on the impact adequate 
legal regulations will have on a capital market.87 To demonstrate the importance of 
legal regulation of capital markets, following the global financial crisis that 
highlighted the weakness in global governance especially in relation to the 
international architecture, the European Commission mandated a group of high-level 
financial experts to study, evaluate and assess the European financial situation. They 																																																								
85 R. Veil, (n 26) 210.  
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87 R. La Porta et al (n 3); R. Levine, ‘Stock markets, economic development and capital liberalization’ 
(1997) 3 Investment Company Institute; R. Levine, ‘Law, finance and economic growth’ (1999) 8 
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were tasked with making recommendations that are aimed at improving and 
reforming the system. One of their recommendations was the need to develop the 
legal and technical rules to ensure fast and effective mechanism for strong co-
operation and above all, consistent regulation to avoid the previous lengthy process of 
addressing issues to the European Court of Justice.88 
 
1.4. Structure of thesis 
This thesis is composed of six chapters aimed at answering the research question and 
the structure of the remaining chapters are highlighted in turn.  
Chapter two defines what an efficient capital market is. It explores different 
theories on the efficiency of a capital market by Eugene Fama. The work of Fama is 
explored because it is recognised as the leading empirical work on the efficient 
markets theory and its proponents have influenced public policy around the world.89 
Furthermore, it analyses three reasons that have been attributable to some countries 
having stronger capital markets than others. The reasons analysed are ‘Law and 
Finance, ‘Politics and Finance, and ‘Endowment and Finance’. 
Chapter three discusses the problem of information asymmetry. It highlights 
the effects it can have on capital markets as well as explores ways that it can be 
curtailed through disclosure and the presence of reputational intermediaries. It 
discusses the importance of regulating these concepts legally in a bid to achieving an 
efficient market. It compares the regulation of disclosure in Nigeria with that of the 
UK as well as enforcement mechanisms of the said regulation. Furthermore, it 																																																								
88 N. Kost De Severes, ‘The new European financial markets legal framework: a real improvement? An 
analysis of financial law and governance in European capital markets from a micro and macro-
economic perspective’ (2011) 7 Capital Markets Law Journal 31 
89 R. Sinquefield, ‘Eugene Fama’s efficient market is a sound guiding principle for investors and 
policymakers’, (Forbes, 17 October 2013) 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/rexsinquefield/2013/10/17/eugene-famas-efficient-market-is-a-sound-
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explores ways in which disclosure can be managed i.e. through the use of reputational 
intermediaries and how they can be regulated with the aim of achieving excellence in 
the capital market. 
Chapter four examines the problem of insider trading/dealing. It highlights the 
likely effects of the offence on the market and identifies the reasons attributable for 
traces of it in the Nigerian capital market. Furthermore, it compares the legal 
provisions prohibiting insider trading in Nigeria with that of the UK and recognizes 
that some of the legal provisions governing the Nigerian capital market are not 
capable of dissuading market participants and corporations from engaging in the act. 
It highlights the importance of these regulations and identifies prospects for reform of 
the provisions. Additionally, it compares enforcement of these laws in Nigeria with 
enforcement of laws regulating the act in the UK. 
Chapter five identifies some further issues relating to legal regulation of the 
Nigerian capital market. It explores the importance of the rule of law, efficient rules, 
awareness, enforcement mechanisms and the operation of corporate governance as 
important catalysts in developing efficient capital markets. 
 Chapter six concludes this thesis by giving a summary of the issues identified 
and highlights the importance of adopting the recommendations of this thesis in the 
bid to make the Nigerian capital market more efficient. 
 
1.5. Research Method 
This thesis applies both ‘doctrinal’ and ‘comparative analysis in achieving the aim of 
the thesis. It is important to highlight that this thesis employs a mix of inter-
disciplinary research due to the reliance of economics/sociology literature in 
propelling its arguments. 
	 34	
1.5.1. Doctrinal Methodology 
Doctrinal analysis is applied in this thesis because it is regarded as the traditional 
methodology used for research in law.90 It basically concerns the formulation of legal 
doctrines through the analysis of legal rules.91 It has been defined as research aimed at 
solving uncertainties and gaps in existing law by analysing and giving systematic 
exposition of principles, rules, and concepts governing a particular field or 
institution.92 It usually has three main goals, which are to describe, prescribe and 
justify. 93  This basically connotes describing the current legal regulation and 
identifying possible loopholes, prescribing prospects for reform or amendment and 
justifying the reasoning for the prescription with cogent and applicable explanations. 
The key steps for doctrinal research can be grouped into four stages. Firstly, 
analysing legal issues in order to identify the issue or issues that need further research. 
Secondly, determining the relevant law that is applicable to the issue or issues. 
Thirdly, the facts in terms of law are analysed with an aim to fuse the issues with the 
applicable rules. Finally, having conducted the analysis, the research comes up with a 
probable conclusion based on the facts established and the law considered.94 In 
applying this methodology to this thesis, it is rightly identified that in running the 
capital market in Nigeria, there are some regulatory issues associated with the market 
that tends to be affecting the reputation of the market as a viable place to invest. This 
is evident from the fact that investors allegedly avoid the Nigerian capital market as it 
																																																								
90 A. K. Singhal and I. Malik, ‘Doctrinal and socio-legal methods of research: merits and demerits’ 
(2012) 2 Educational Research Journal 252. 
91 P. Chynoweth, Legal research, in A. Knight and L. Ruddock, Advanced research methods in the 
built environment, (Wiley-Blackwell 2008) 29 
92 J. M. Smits, ‘What is legal doctrine? On the aims and methods of legal-dogmatic research’, 
Maastricht European Private Law Institute, Working paper, No.2015/06, p.5 Available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2644088> accessed, 8 August 2016 
93 ibid p.8 
94 ibid 
	 35	
is held out to be illiquid and weak.95 This thesis highlights the legal regulations 
charged with making the market a viable place for investment and asserts that the 
legal regulations are either not sufficient or are not being applied in the right way. 
This is as a result of the regulations not being available or not being sufficient. It 
makes some recommendations on how to make these legal regulations function more 
efficiently based on comparison with similar provisions in the UK.  
 
1.5.2. Comparative Analysis 
This thesis also utilises comparative analysis by comparing the legal provisions 
regulating highlighted issues in the Nigerian capital market with similar provisions 
contained in the UK. Comparative analysis is described as the investigation of rules 
and procedures not of one system in isolation but in harness with the examination of 
the equivalent rules and procedures in at least one other system.96 It is the study of the 
similarities and differences between the laws of two or more countries or between two 
or more legal systems. The aim of most comparative studies is to imply some form of 
comparative law by making some part of the domestic law more coherent by external 
comparison. When attempting to improve a legal system, it is important to analyse the 
other side of the border especially if the area aimed at been improved is already 
thriving in the other country. However, importing solutions from other countries may 
not necessarily work all the time because of a difference in context. 
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Comparative legal research has gained considerable popularity recently 
because it has profited from the efforts to harmonize the law of the member states of 
the EU.97 It can be carried out in three ways 
i) Descriptive comparative law 
ii) Comparative history of law 
iii) Comparative legislation or comparative jurisprudence.98 
This thesis applies the third category, comparative legislation, which represents the 
effort to define the common basis on which present national doctrines of law are 
designed to attach themselves as a result of both the development of the study of law 
as a social science and of the legal consciousness. 
Although this method has been utilised often in recent times, it is important to 
note that there have been some identifiable disadvantages accorded to this mode of 
research. Firstly, it is seen as superficial as it is hard enough to know in detail one 
branch of the law of one system, as well as the history of that branch and its 
relationship with that of another system.99 Secondly, there is the possibility of getting 
the foreign law being used wrongly.100 Error of law has been held out to be more 
common in comparative law than in any other branch of legal study mainly because 
the understanding of the foreign law depends on the writings of others including other 
comparatists.101 It has been held that too often, little knowledge is derived from too 
few original sources and too frequently linguistic deficiencies interpose a formidable 
barrier between the scholar and his subject.102 Thirdly, the systems chosen for study 
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may have no proper relationship, thus making the conclusions insignificant. 
Additionally, systems may be examined at different points in their evolution103 
This thesis applies the comparative analysis method because firstly, both 
countries are common law countries and possess similar companies act. Historically, 
Nigerian laws particularly the legal rules governing economic organisation have been 
adopted from the UK both in its systemic and single-rule variations. In particular, the 
first Company Law in Nigeria was the Companies Ordinance of 1912, which was a 
local enactment of the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 of England, and the 
current Companies and Allied Markets Act is largely modelled on the U.K Companies 
Act 1985.104  
In view of the above, this thesis submits that the application of comparative 
analysis in this thesis is beneficial in numerous ways that are identified in turn. 
Firstly, by comparing the laws in Nigeria and the UK, it serves as an instrument of 
learning as the information of the laws in the UK can lead to better understanding and 
possibly the need to implement the same in the Nigerian capital market.  It serves as a 
way in which the laws regulating the Nigerian capital market can be enhanced by 
application of the relevant sections compared with that of the UK. This can serve as a 
way to improve the legal system. Furthermore, this thesis highlights some loopholes 
in the legal regulations of the Nigerian capital market. These problems have been 
experienced by the UK at some point and they have updated their legal regulations to 
cater for these issues whilst the Nigerian legal regulations are mostly unchanged. It is 
important to note that there are already traces of legal regulations similar to those in 
the UK regulating the Nigerian capital market. However, these laws have not evolved 
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with current trends to meet the prevailing issues concerned with adept regulation and 
efficient enforcement. 
In the next section, the doctrine of ‘Legal transplants’ is discussed. It is 
important to highlight this theory because this thesis puts forward several 
recommendations based on how these issues have been tackled in the UK, with a view 
of adopting same in Nigeria. 
 
1.6. Legal transplants 
A legal transplant involves moving a rule or a system of law from one country to 
another.105  It is an artefact of globalisation, in that legal knowledge transcends 
borders and enables lawmakers, regulators, judges and lawyers to discover and import 
legal solutions for local problems in the global market of legal ideas.106 The core 
purpose of legal transplants is to enable countries to compare their laws with those in 
other countries. The country seeking to ‘transplant’ laws may have a particular area 
that it hopes to improve.  
Comparison has been described as an instrument used to falsify or verify the 
relationship between two phenomena.107 Different countries in their search for best 
practices have utilised this method by comparing their laws with similar laws in other 
countries with a view to importing some of the rules from the other country especially 
if it has worked well. For example, in the search to counteract congestion in inner 
cities, countries draft relevant rules in consideration of the London congestion 
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regulations; utilising results produced by the application of the congestion zones in 
London.108 
Legal transplants are commonplace.109 It was used to shape several European 
countries in the late 18th and 19th century.110 It is diffusionism based (i.e. a means to 
spread the legal provisions) and is the most common source of legal developments. 
The history of a legal system is largely filled with legal materials from other legal 
systems and of assimilation of materials from outside of the law.111 Such legal 
transplants range from the wholesale adoption of an entire system of laws to copying 
of a single rule.112 The current trend of legal globalisation creates fertile grounds for 
transplants from legal systems not only within the region or country of reception but 
also further afield.113  
As identified in this chapter Nigeria is currently in economic recession.114 
Studying the legal regulations of the capital market in Nigeria is beneficial at this 
stage because if the stock market operates efficiently there is the possibility of 
generating capital that can be used to explore other areas in an attempt to diversify the 
economy. Additionally, if demand for law is high, there will be high voluntary 
compliance and such countries invest in the legal institutions necessary to uphold any 
legal order. 
Some writers may argue that the rules utilised in the United Kingdom for 
regulating their capital market may not necessarily work in Nigeria. This thesis argues 
that this is unlikely to be a problem as the reception of a transplanted law is possible 																																																								
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and still easy even though the receiving society is much less advanced materially and 
culturally.115 Nigeria as a country is classified as a developing country, compared to 
the UK that is already developed. Furthermore, common law migrated quite naturally 
into Nigeria because it was a British colony.116 It is important to note that the Nigerian 
judicial system has its blueprint from the UK. Moreover, lawmakers in developing 
countries are always keen to improve the potential of their countries to attract capital 
due to intensified international competition.117 In view of this, they tend to compare 
their provisions with other countries provisions with a view to improve theirs to attain 
international standards. 
In view of the foregoing, this thesis submits that the suggestions and 
recommendations highlighted in this thesis will function well in the regulation of the 
Nigerian capital market as evidence indicates that transplantation of legal codes into 
Nigeria began as far back as the nineteenth century.118 The legal rules governing 
economic organisation is a primary example of the transplant phenomenon both in its 
systemic and single-rule variations. It has been identified in this chapter that Nigerian 
company laws regulations have largely been based on UK company laws.  There are 
also traces of Nigeria borrowing laws that have been successful in other countries, for 
instance the Australian mode of industrial arbitration.119 Moreover, the transplanting 
of legal rules have been held to be socially easy regardless of any opposition there 
might be either from the bar or the legislature as they move easily and are accepted 
into the system without so much difficulty.120 However, the process of transplanting 
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regulations might face some challenges as Nigeria has been described to exude 
attributes of an ineffective legal system because the transplant of UK corporate laws 
have not been efficacious. 121  The reasons allied to the foregoing include the 
ineffectiveness of the judiciary, operation of corruption and lack of enforcement of 
these laws.122 
The suggestions advanced in this thesis will be beneficial, as these laws will 
help create some firmness in the regulation of the Nigerian capital market. At this 
stage in Nigeria, an efficient capital market will be beneficial to the country as it has 
the propensity to spur economic growth. This is borne out of the argument that 
economic performance and inefficient governance in Nigeria has been attributable to 
weak laws and legal institutions.123 
Although evidence indicates traces of transplanted regulations governing the 
capital market in Nigeria, there is also evidence that indicates dearth of management 
of the economy in Nigeria, which basically postulates that these laws have been 
ineffective or not applied properly.124 This is unfortunate because Nigerian corporate 
governance law is regarded as one of the most sophisticated in the African region. 
However, paradoxically, there are still reports of corporate fraud, shareholders rights 
being disparaged, and the judiciary being ineffective in tackling these dangerous 
developments.125 
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In order to succeed, a legal transplant must be accepted to the general and 
legal culture in which it is inserted.126 For the law to be effective, it must be 
meaningful in the context in which it is to be applied so citizens have incentive to use 
the law and to demand institutions that work to enforce and develop the law.127 When 
countries are faced with drafting instructions for new legislation, they turn to 
countries with a similar legal system, language and legal tradition that are familiar to 
theirs because of the need to harmonise the chosen solutions with international 
practice.128 
It has been argued that there is the likelihood for countries that transplant laws 
to suffer from what is referred to as the ‘transplant effect’.129 Furthermore, there is 
also the argument that countries that have developed their own laws have a 
comparative advantage to countries that have transplanted because internal 
development can take advantage of new solutions as economic agents develop in 
response to new challenges for existing constraints. 130  This thesis refutes these 
arguments and argues that this is not applicable to Nigeria because internal 
development has not being practised in the country. Most of the legal regulations are 
transplanted and amended to suit its applicability in the country. Additionally, this 
thesis provides that the suggested rules will work efficiently in the Nigerian Legal 
System when it applies to the capital market because there are already traces of rules 
governing the Nigerian capital market that are similar to those contained in the UK. 
Moreover it has been held that transplant of laws may be more receptive and grow if 
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it has familiarity with the legal system that it uses as a model for borrowing.131 This 
would be evident in Nigeria as the legal system has its blueprint from the UK due to 
colonial ties with the country. There is also the argument that the fact that countries 
share a common root is no guarantee of a successful transplant. For example most 
European countries have their legal systems developed on the basis of the Roman 
Law; however, they have developed distinct legal systems in subsequent years.132 This 
thesis argues that this will not be applicable to Nigeria and the UK because, other than 
the fact that they have common roots from the past, there are laws from the UK that 
are embedded into the Nigerian corporate legal and judicial sphere. These laws were 
transplanted from the UK to Nigeria. Their perceived ineffectiveness is tied to the fact 
that the laws have not evolved or have not been updated as practiced in the UK. 
 
1.7. Conclusion 
This thesis addresses the regulation of two primary issues affecting the Nigerian 
capital market. They are information asymmetry and insider trading. It is important to 
note that these two issues by no means cover all the problems associated with the 
market. But these two problems are major issues that prevent the capital market from 
attaining its full potential. Their importance is further accentuated by the fact that 
investor confidence is currently low due to the twin factors of the 2008 market crash 
and lack of investor protection regulations. 
																																																								




2. THEORIES OF AN EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKET 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Economic development is imperative for the continued survival of a country. In an 
attempt to ascertain what determines economic growth, several theories have been put 
forward and one of them postulates that a country with an efficient capital market is 
likely to have a developed economy.1 An argument for this notion is that a country 
with an efficient capital market possesses the pre-requisite capital for major projects if 
efficiently allocated, which in turn has the likelihood to enhance development in a 
country.2 Investors are inclined to invest when they are confident in the market 
structure by virtue of being provided with accurate information as well as being 
guaranteed to a reasonable extent that they will receive returns for their investments in 
form of dividends or interests and will not be expropriated of their investments.3 
Establishing an efficient capital market rests on a complex network of legal 
regulations and market institutions that create an avenue for investors to receive 
adequate and correct information about the value of a company’s business.  
This chapter identifies and discusses the different theories of an efficient 
market. Furthermore, it examines other reasons/theories that have been put forward as 
to why some countries have stronger capital markets than others. The theories 																																																								
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analysed are ‘law and finance theory’, ‘politics and finance theory’, and ‘endowment 
and finance’. 
2.2. Efficient Capital Market Theory 
As early as the 1960s economists had begun empirical research on what constitutes an 
efficient capital market. One of the first people to come up with the theory as to the 
efficiency of a market was Paul Samuelson in 1965.4 However, in 1970 Eugene Fama 
in his seminal article defined an efficient capital market as one where prices always 
“fully reflect” available information.5 He stated that an efficient capital market was 
“one where the necessary information is available to all market participants with no 
transaction cost”. He stated further that all participants of the market agree on the 
implication of current information for the current price and distribution of future 
prices of each security.6 Hypothetically speaking, an efficient market is one in which 
a trader cannot improve his overall chances of speculative gain by obtaining 
information about companies whose securities are in the market and evaluating that 
information intelligently in determining which stocks to buy and sell.7 This theory 
implies that security prices adjust rapidly to new information in an unbiased manner 
and prices change randomly.8 The notion of price changing in a random manner 
postulates that if every other thing is equal with the flow of information unimpeded 
																																																								
4  P. Samuelson, ‘Proof that properly anticipated prices fluctuate randomly’ (1965) Industrial 
Management Review 6.2 
5 E. Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A review of theory and empirical work’, (1970) 25 Journal of 
Finance 383 
6  ibid 387 
7 D. R. Fischel, ‘Efficient capital market theory, the market for corporate control and the regulation of 
cash tender offers’, (1978) 57 Texas Law Review 4 
8 B. Lev, Financial statement analysis: A new approach, (Englewood cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Inc, 
1974) 
	 46	
and immediately reflected in stock prices, then tomorrow’s price change will reflect 
only tomorrow’s news and will be independent of price changes today.9  
Efficiency of a market is a result of competitive efforts of securities analysts 
and investors who strive to earn superior returns by identifying misplaced securities 
that are either over valued or undervalued.10 This theory has gained significant 
cognizance and is regarded as the blueprint for an efficient capital market. 11 A likely 
explanation for the continuous recognition of this theory is the fact that information is 
of paramount importance to investors when deciding to invest.12 If the information 
depicts reliability, there is the propensity for investors to invest. Additionally, a 
market that shows change in circumstances for stocks will attract more investors 
because it can be argued that nothing is hidden from investors. 
The importance of this theory is fundamental to this thesis as it explores the 
proponents that are a crucial element to the proper functioning of the Nigerian capital 
market. Additionally, this is central to eradicating information of asymmetry and the 
prohibition of insider trading.13 In establishing this theory, Fama proposed three tiers 
of market efficiency; weak form efficiency, semi-strong form efficiency and strong 
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2.2.1. The Weak Form of Market Efficiency 
This connotes a market where little or no information is available or reflected on 
security prices. In this form, prices cannot be predicted by an analysis of past prices.14 
It suggests that the movement in share price on any one particular day is not 
correlated with the share price the next day hence, making it impossible to predict 
new share price movements from old share price movements.15 The consequence of 
this is that investors cannot earn abnormal returns.16  
This theory was developed from the ‘random walk’ theory, which suggests 
that the past movement or trend of a stock price or market cannot be used to predict 
its future movements (i.e. the prices develop randomly and are not deducible from 
past prices).17 It indicates impossibility of outperforming the market without assuming 
additional risks. Critics of the random walk theory argue the possibility of 
outperforming the market by carefully selecting entry and exit points for equity 
investments. 18  The economies that fall under this tier are characterized by 
unavailability of up-to-date information and inability to follow rapid and/or consistent 
change of share prices. The test to determine the weak form of market efficiency is 
the examination of the interrelationship between current and past stock prices.19  
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Research indicates that the Nigerian capital market is efficient in the weak form.20 
Prices in the capital market are fixed daily based on the demand and supply 
mechanism as well as on performance information documented either in periodic 
reports or brief by the managing director of a company to the dealing members of the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange. 21  Prices in the secondary market are determined by 
considering quantitative and qualitative characteristics. The former entails studying 
the fundamentals of a company by analysing its earnings record, earning projections, 
asset structure, dividend record, growth records, cash flows etc. The latter involves 
judgment on the future projection of the company, judgment on equality of 
management, quality of the products of the company, monetary and fiscal policies of 
government etc.22  
Regardless of the above methods of price determination, the market is 
considered weak because companies still complain about their shares being 
undervalued. The principal reason for this is that technical analysis or other forms of 
security analysis based on historical prices appear to be valueless in the Nigerian 
capital market. This is further accentuated by the fact that stockbrokers are not 
sufficiently familiar with companies’ operations to enable them put a fair price on the 
company’s shares.23 Other factors considered include inadequate information flow in 
the stock market, inefficient communication system, inadequate understanding of 																																																								
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financial information by Nigerian investors, low level of automation in the country 
and interference by the regulatory authorities in the determination of secondary 
market prices. 24  Furthermore, prior to public offers and announcements in the 
Nigerian capital market, there is usually an erratic price movement that often has 
minimal effect on pricing but creates the possibility of price volatility.25 This is 
because prior to the information being made public through an official announcement, 
it had already arrived in the market, thus creating the possibility for overestimated 
prices of stock.26 Further reasons for classifying the Nigerian capital as weak includes 
the fact that the SEC adopts a lacklustre attitude towards abnormal financial activities 
and does not monitor the market closely to enable it grow and achieve optimal 
maturity as well as the inadequacy in risk management and market discipline that 
results in greed and bad choices.27 A consequence of these factors is the inefficiency 
of the market that paves way for individuals to reap abnormal returns.28 These reasons 
are partly responsible for lack of depth in the market, because investors will not be 
encouraged to invest in a market characterised with inadequate and inaccurate 
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2.2.2. The Semi- Strong Form of Market Efficiency  
In this form, share prices adjust to publicly available information rapidly in an 
unbiased fashion, thus no excess returns can be earned by trading on that 
information.29 In this form neither fundamental analysis nor technical analysis will be 
reliable to produce excess returns.30 Further, as current market prices reflect all 
publicly available information, no one can consistently outperform the stock market 
to earn abnormal returns. It recognizes that insiders could outperform the stock 
market because of their possession of private information. 
The test for the semi-strong form has been described as event studies, where 
the reaction to announcement of a new piece of information both during the days prior 
to and after the event is analysed. 31 An adjustment to previously unknown news that 
ought to be reasonable in size and instantaneous is also analysed.32 If there are any 
such adjustments, it would suggest that investors had interpreted the information in a 
biased fashion and hence in an inefficient manner.33 These tests concentrate on the 
ability of the market to anticipate stock price changes before new information is 
formally announced.34 
A tough question that resurfaced in the years following Fama’s theory is the 
meaning of publicly available information. When is information publicly available? 
Which information is public?35 It has been stated that for the efficient capital market 
hypothesis put forward by Fama to be plausible, it has to provide clear explanation of 																																																								
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what is meant by publicly available information.36 Some scholars define publicly 
available information as information available to an investor at zero cost.37 This thesis 
concurs with this definition and adds that such information in addition to being 
available at zero cost should be easily accessible by prospective investors for it to be 
categorised as public information. Furthermore, making such information available on 
accessible platforms such as the internet and other databases will be beneficial to 
support this theory. Public information includes inter alia, past prices, data reported in 
a company’s financial statement (such as income statements, filing before the SEC, 
annual reports etc.) earnings, dividends announcements, announced merger plans, 
financial situation of a company’s competitors, expectations regarding 
macroeconomics etc. However, it is important to note that public information need 
not be only of a financial nature.38  
The rationale behind this theory is that all things being equal, investors should 
not be able to profit consistently by trading on publicly available information. 
However, the identification of publicly available information is not precise and 
information in a capital market is not labelled to indicate the shares it affects or does 
not affect.  
 
2.2.3. The Strong-Form Market Efficiency 
This theory provides that all relevant information (i.e. information that will enable an 
investor make a decision if to invest) whether publicly or privately held are made 
available to investors.39 This model of the efficiency theory postulates that profits 																																																								
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exceeding normal returns cannot be made regardless of the amount of information 
that investors have access to. It is the most compelling form of the efficiency theory 
but it suffers one substantial setback, the emergence of insider trading.40 Large 
markets are efficient in the weak and semi-strong form, but not the strong form due to 
the secrecy of insiders, who are privy to information that can modify prices. When 
such information is kept from the investing public or utilised before it is scheduled for 
public consumption, the strong form efficiency becomes unattainable.41  This theory 
posits that any barrier preventing private information from becoming public 
information or the operation of insider trading makes this theory unattainable.  
To affirm this theory, the market needs to exist where investors cannot 
consistently earn excess returns over a period of time. Academics have not been able 
to carry out test for this form as performed in other forms because of the secrecy of 
inside traders.42 This tier of the theory has largely been developed by observing 
market reactions prior to the announcement of an important piece of news that insider 
dealing has occurred on such a large scale as to alter the prices of shares. 
 
2.3. Criticism of the Efficient Market Theories 
The efficient capital market theory is considered a maintained hypothesis.43 Decades 
after its emergence there have been different theoretical and empirical works with 
findings that contradict the efficient market theory entirely or which sought to show 
that its case has not been proven. Different arguments against the theory have 
emerged to which this thesis now examines. 																																																								
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First, it was argued that the theory assumes that all market participants have 
the same expectations about future securities markets, i.e. they arrive at a rational 
expectation forecast thus making it impractical because trade in securities implies the 
existence of different expectations and, as such, the essence of trade would be 
defeated if participants had similar expectations.44 
Second, although share prices adjust to new information, it is not as 
instantaneous as put forward in the hypothesis.45 Price convergence to value has been 
described as a much slower process.46  Furthermore, the manner in which news is 
interpreted is not addressed in the theory. Although there is the possibility of equal 
access to information by virtue of modern technology, interpreting the information 
may be a challenge. Not every investor understands the information given to him or 
her and the effect of the inability of average retail investors to utilise information 
disclosed has been well documented. 47  This argument implies that interpreting 
information may take some time and generate costs. Retail investors that are not 
financially knowledgeable may employ skilled personnel to explain the content of the 
information to them and the time used for interpreting information is vital when 
defining the various stages of efficiency.48 
Third, although the theory indicates that it will be self-defeating to make 
excessive profits out of public information in an efficient market, it however does not 
cover why profit as such is not a sustainable phenomenon.49 Entrepreneurial profit is 
described as the eagerness of buyers to outbid others who are equally anxious to 																																																								
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acquire shares in limited supply.50 It has been argued that planning and research 
cannot guarantee profits as profits emerge when an entrepreneur discovers that the 
prices of certain factors are undervalued relatively to a potential value of the products 
and if such an entrepreneur acts on this, he is likely to make profits.51 
Fourth, the emergence of behavioural finance has also been used to criticise 
the theory. Behavioural finance studies the effect of psychological, social, cognitive 
and emotional factors affecting the economic decisions of individuals and the 
consequence for market prices, returns and resource allocation.52 The focal point is on 
why market participants make irrational systematic errors contrary to the rational 
assumption of market participants. Such errors are said to affect prices and returns as 
well as create market inefficiencies.53Academics discovered some behaviour that 
cannot be explained by the efficient market theory. Whilst the theory presented what 
an ideal situation should be, the real world proved to be a different scenario in 
contrast to the theory. Furthermore, behavioural finance introduced the emergence of 
anomalies in securities market by proposing psychology-based theories to explain the 
said anomalies. These anomalies are empirical results that seem to be inconsistent 
with maintained theories of asset-pricing behaviour.54 They indicate either market 
inefficiency or inadequacies in the underlying asset-pricing model.55  
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Criticism of the efficient capital markets hypothesis indicate the possibility of 
determining the prices of securities in a market thereby refuting the proposition that in 
an efficient capital market prices are decided randomly. Whilst there is some 
substance in these criticisms, this thesis argues that they have not completely 
discredited the provisions of the efficient capital markets hypothesis. If the capital 
market thrives on investor confidence that is generated by information disseminated 
to investors, then the propositions of the efficient capital market theory have a solid 
standing. The idea of an efficient market has been misunderstood and interpreted to 
mean that prices are always perfect. This notion is not possible, as room should be 
provided for mistakes to be made in the market.56 Moreover, humans/investors are 
typically responsive to incentive risks. Like with every other thing, errors are 
inevitable in dealings, hence, this thesis concedes to the argument that markets can be 
efficient regardless of the fact that the market sometimes makes errors in valuation, 
that the participants are irrational or even if the prices exhibit greater volatility then 
can apparently be explained by fundamentals such as earnings.57 
Anomalies and statistically predictable patterns that are significant in stock 
returns are asserted to have been uncovered.58 However, these patterns have been 
considered not to be robust and dependable in different sample periods. 59 
Furthermore, some of the patterns based on fundamental valuation measures of 
individual stocks may simply reflect better proxies for measuring risk. 60  The 
anomalies found in conventional theories appear to contradict each other in some 
instances. Behavioural finance appears to be a collection of anomalies that can be 
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explained by market efficiency. However, evidence from these anomalies does not 
suggest the abandonment of the efficient market theory.61 
Although the provisions of the efficient market theory are not free from 
criticisms, this thesis argues that it addresses to a considerable extent what determines 
the efficiency of a capital market. Furthermore, evidence from the categorisation 
acknowledges that it is almost impossible for a market to be efficient in the ‘strong 
form’. This is a result of the process it takes information to be made available as well 
as the auspices of insider trading 
In addition to the theory, this thesis recommends that it is important that 
adequate protection is accorded to investors by way of rules and regulations that are 
also used to monitor the market. From the definition of an efficient capital market, 
when a market is efficient, there is the likelihood that there will be investors, which in 
turn creates the likelihood for unforeseen errors due to the nature of capital market 
operations. In such an instance, investors will be keen to invest in a market that 
accords them protection in the event of any mishaps. Although this is not completely 
absent because of the proponents of the theory of law and finance, this thesis submits 
its inclusion makes the theory complete. 
 
2.4. Further reasons for Strong Capital Markets 
This thesis has aligned its argument to the consensus that a propelling factor for 
economic development is the strength of the financial system that serves as the 
lifeblood of the economy. It coordinates and allocates capital to building the 
necessary infrastructures needed in a country. It also represents the economic strength 
and development of a country because of opportunities created for investment. Stock 																																																								
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markets must function effectively to achieve its goals, as no work ethic will be 
sufficient for misallocation of capital.62 If these assertions are true, then it would be 
beneficial to understand how to engineer economic growth or at least how to provide 
the necessary tools that will lead to economic growth.63 Other than the efficient 
market theories highlighted above, several theories have emerged as to what leads to 
the development of a strong capital market. Amongst these theories are the ‘law and 
finance theory’, ‘politics and finance theory’, and the ‘endowment and finance theory’ 
etc. Each theory has propelled reasons why it is to be considered the most important 
factor to develop a strong capital market. This section analyses these theories by 
evaluating the arguments put forward for the superiority of one theory over the other. 
 
2.4.1. Law and Finance. 
The Law and Finance theory postulates that the laws provided by a country for the 
protection of investors is the reason some countries have bigger capital markets than 
others.64 It examines the difference between laws governing security markets in 
common law jurisdictions and civil law jurisdictions.65 This theory analyses the 
quality of shareholder and creditor rights and postulates that common law countries 
provide shareholders and creditors with the strongest protection, whilst French civil 
law countries provide the weakest, with German civil law countries falling in 
between. It also analyses enforcement of these rights and hypothesise that 
Scandinavian and German civil law countries provide the highest enforcement 
procedures and mechanisms, with common law countries next and French civil law 																																																								
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countries providing the least. The findings of the research, which is propelled by the 
work of La Porta and others, are broken down into three categories (shareholder rights 
and protection, creditor rights and enforcement) that are discussed in turn below. 
 
2.4.2. Shareholder rights and protection  
First, they consider laws in countries that allow voting by proxy, which will be mailed 
and counted. They find that it is permitted in 39% of common law countries, 5% of 
French civil law and absent in both German civil law and Scandinavian countries.66  
Second, they consider rights attached to shares by examining the one-share, 
one-vote.67 Their findings suggest that one-share, one-vote is mandated in 17% of 
common law countries, 29% French civil law countries with low and high voting 
shares, as well as founders’ shares with extremely high voting rights.68  33% in 
German civil law countries practice it but absent in Scandinavian countries.  
Third, they considered laws requiring shareholders to deposit their shares with 
the company or financial intermediaries prior to shareholders meeting. This is used to 
block outsider capital that can exert influence over the corporate governance of the 
company.69 Prior to shareholder meeting, shares are not blocked in common law and 
Scandinavian countries. It is blocked in German civil law countries and 29% of 
French civil law countries.70 
Fourth, they considered the laws provided by countries to protect minority 
shareholders against perceived oppression by directors. Laws protecting minority 
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shareholders such as right to repurchase shares, challenge the decision of directors 
etc. are provided in 94% of common law, 29% of French civil law, with half of the 
German civil law countries having these mechanisms and no Scandinavian country 
possessing these laws.71 
Fifth, they analysed the provision of cumulative voting where each share 
entitles a shareholder to as many votes as there are directors to be elected.72 This gives 
minority shareholders the ability to elect some board members even if the majority 
shareholders are opposed to it by merging their votes for a select member or 
director.73 Their findings indicate that common law countries rarely permit cumulative 
voting, whilst 19% and 17% of French and German civil law countries permit it, 
however, it never happens in Scandinavian countries.74 
Sixth, they considered the doctrine of shareholders pre-emptive rights to buy 
new stock of share as protection from dilution.75 This principle was developed in the 
case of Gray v Portland Bank.76 Their findings indicate that this is embedded in 44% 
of common law countries, 62% of French civil law countries, 75% of Scandinavian 
countries and 33% of German civil law countries.  
Seventh, they analysed the required share capital needed to call an extra 
ordinary shareholders meeting.77 The higher the percentage of share capital required, 
the tougher it is for minority shareholders to conduct such a meeting to challenge 
management of a company. 9% is required in common law countries, 5% in German 																																																								
71 ibid 
72 D. Larcker and B. Tayan, Corporate governance matters: a closer look at organizational choices 
and their consequences, (2nd edition Pearson Education 2016) 65 
73 S. Bhagat and J. Brickley, ‘Cumulative voting: the value of minority shareholder voting rights’, 
(1984) 27 Journal of Law and Economics 339 
74 R. La Porta et al (n 64) 1127 
75 Dilution in this instance refers to the reduction in the ownership percentage of a share of stock 
caused by the issuance of new shares; H. Drinker, ‘The pre-emptive right of shareholders to subscribe 
to new shares’, (1930) 43 Harvard Law Review 586 
76 3 Mass. 364 (Mass.1807) 
77 This meeting is usually called when there are serious issues to be determined. 
	 60	
civil law countries, 15% and 10% respectively in French civil law and Scandinavian 
countries.78 
Lastly, they considered the right to mandatory dividend. This rule necessitates 
the need for companies to pay out a certain fraction of their declared earnings as 
dividends. It is considered a restrictive measure used to prevent shareholders from 
diverting corporate assets.79  However, it is not free from criticism, as it has been held 
to reduce internal funds available for firms to invest possibly leading to the loss of 
valuable projects.80 It is practiced in 11% of French civil law countries, 5% of 
Scandinavian countries and absent in both common law origin and German civil law 
countries.81  
 
2.4.3. Creditor rights  
Other than shareholder rights, La Porta and others also considered the issues below 
pertaining to creditor rights.82 This is done with its focal point on when the company 
goes into insolvency. Insolvency was utilised because by definition, the company 
would typically have insufficient assets to meet all its liabilities. 
First, they investigated the reorganisation process when a company goes 
bankrupt. This involves the restatement of assets and liabilities as well as holding 
talks with creditors in order to make arrangements for repayments.83 When a company 
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is functional they have two types of creditors, senior secured creditors84 and junior 
unsecured creditors.85 During bankruptcy, the former generally takes priority when 
repayment is being carried out. Furthermore, there is usually an automatic stay on the 
assets thereby preventing secured creditors from getting possession of loan 
collateral.86 This is considered a form of protection for unsecured creditors, managers 
and it prevents the company from automatic liquidation. Their findings postulate that 
incidence of automatic no stay of assets is evident in 72% of common law countries, 
26% of French civil law countries, 67% German civil law and 26% of Scandinavian 
countries.87 
Second, in an ideal arrangement, when a company is insolvent, secured 
creditors are given priority because the money they lend to the company is 
collateralised.  This is not guaranteed in some countries, where secured creditors are 
placed behind government and workers who possess priority over them when it comes 
to paying off debts.88 Their findings postulate that secured creditors are paid first in 
89% of common law countries, 65% of French civil law countries, whilst German 
civil law and Scandinavian countries ensure that secured creditors are paid first. 
Third, during bankruptcy, there is the tendency for managers to unilaterally 
file for reorganisation without the consent of the creditors. This grants substantial 
power to the management of the company, and can subsequently lead to delay in 
creditors getting their money back. Although it is arguable that in some instances this 
may not necessarily be a bad thing as there are sometimes urgent actions that need to 
																																																								
84 Senior secured creditors are creditors or lenders that take collateral for the extension of credit, loan or 
bond issuance. They have senior protection in bankruptcy because they have specific assets that 
collateralize their loans. 
85 Junior unsecured creditors do not have the benefit of any security interests in the assets of the debtor. 
86 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 43. Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc (No 1) [1990] EWCA Civ 
20 
87 R. La Porta et al (n 64) 1135 
88 ibid 
	 62	
be taken to prevent further loss of assets. Their findings postulate that managers are 
precluded from arranging reorganisation in 72% of common law countries, 42% of 
French civil law countries, 32% of German civil law countries and 75% of 
Scandinavian countries. 
Fourth, during reorganisation, some countries allow management to remain 
pending the resolution of the reorganisation procedure, whilst some countries replace 
management by appointing a neutral party usually by the Court or by the creditors. 
Their result postulate that management is not allowed to remain in 78% of common 
law countries, 26% of French civil law countries, 33% of German civil law countries 
and 45% of Scandinavian countries. 
Finally, they utilized the existence of a legal reserve requirement as a remedial 
creditor right. This requirement necessitates the need for firms to maintain a certain 
level of capital to avoid automatic liquidation. Their findings postulate that this is 
hardly ever used in common law countries except in Thailand.89 A legal reserve 
requirement is available in 21% of French civil law countries, 41% of German civil 
law countries and 15% of Scandinavian countries having the same requirement. 
 
2.4.4. Enforcement of legal regulations 
They also assessed the provisions for enforcement of creditor rights through the 
competence of judicial systems, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, and 
likelihood of repudiation of contracts by Government. These proxies have been 
identified to affect national growth rates.90 Their findings postulate that Scandinavian 
countries accord the best law enforcement and German civil law countries closely 
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follow them. Common law countries are behind the leaders but ahead of French civil 
law countries.91 
They also analyse basic accounting standards and they find that 74% of 
Scandinavian countries, 69% of common law countries, 62% and 51% of German and 
French civil law countries respectively have high accounting standard 
Finally, they analysed ownership concentration in countries because when 
there is poor investor protection, ownership concentration becomes a substitute for 
legal protection. They postulate that there is concentrated ownership in 54% of French 
civil law countries, 43% of common law countries, 34% and 46% in German civil law 
countries and Scandinavian countries respectively. 
 
          2.4.5. Law and Finance in Nigeria 
Aspects of the law and finance theory exist in Nigeria. In relation to shareholder 
rights and protection, proxy voting is practised in Nigeria.92 However, the practice has 
been described as controlled by directors who become default donees of members’ 
voting rights. 93  This thesis commends the provision of proxy voting, as the 
shareholders, though not present, would still be in control of their votes. However, it 
is important to note that such a voting system could be improved through electronic 
modes of communication because Nigeria currently lacks an effective postal system. 
Section 116 of the CAMA provides for one-share-one-vote and prohibits the 
issuance of non-voting and weighted shares by providing that any share of a company 
that is presumed to carry more than one vote or does not carry any vote at a general 
meeting is deemed to carry one vote only. There are no provisions within the Nigerian 																																																								
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corporate regulatory regime that requires shareholders to deposit their shares before 
the annual general meeting. This is in line with the provision of Article 63 of The 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) that prohibits restriction of 
free movement of capital between member states and member states and between 
member states and third countries.94 In the case of Commission v UK (BAA) it was 
held that acquisition of shares carrying more than 15% of votes is a restriction on the 
free movement of capital between member states.95 
Section 300 of the CAMA provides protection for minority shareholders 
against illegal and oppressive conduct using injunctions, declarations, personal and 
representative actions as well as derivative actions. In relation to derivative actions, 
this thesis in chapter 4 highlights the fact that the application of the rules regulating 
derivative actions may not be practical and the penalty for failure to comply with an 
order of court may be insufficient.96 
Section 117 of the CAMA prescribes, by implication, that existing 
shareholders have pre-emptive rights to subscribe to new shares upon issuance by the 
company and this is to be contained in the articles of association of a company. This 
mitigates dilution of their interest. In relation to cumulative voting, section 226 (1) of 
the CAMA holds that when a member is entitled to more than one vote, s/he need not 
cast them all the same way, thus creating the possibility to cast all votes towards a 
director. 
Members holding not less than one tenth of the paid of capital of the company 
may requisition an extra ordinary general meeting.97 It is arguable that in comparison 
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to the UK requirement of 5% paid up capital, the Nigerian requirement is copious.98 
Additionally, section 380 of the CAMA provides for payment of dividends if the 
company can pay its debt when due.  
In relation to creditor rights, there are no provisions for automatic stay on 
assets, as a receiving order99 cannot be made against a company incorporated under 
the CAMA.100 The absence of this provision has been criticised and described to have 
the propensity to make it impossible to achieve reorganisation in Nigeria as investors 
can grab the company’s assets pending the obtainment of a moratorium because of 
delay or impossibility of getting the requirements.101  
When a company becomes insolvent, the CAMA prescribes that secured 
creditors with fixed charges are paid first, followed by secured creditors with floating 
charges and then unsecured creditors.102 Section 410 of the CAMA makes it possible 
for the directors of a company to petition for winding up, however, the courts and 
sometimes creditors appoint a liquidator.103 
            In relation to enforcement, this thesis highlights the fact that the enforcement 
of regulations in the Nigerian judicial system is not sufficient as meagre sums are 
usually awarded as fines with custodial sentences hardly ever used.104  
           Ownership structure in Nigeria is concentrated which gives an insight as to 
why minority shareholders are oppressed. Although countries such as Germany and 
Japan possess a concentrated ownership structure, the situation is different in Nigeria. 
The dispersed minority shareholders are unsophisticated with little knowledge of or 
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concern about the internal management of their corporations and few options are 
available to redress problems when it arises.105 The consequence of this is the ability 
of majority shareholders with few or no hindrances expropriating the benefits of 
control without regard to the interest of minority shareholders 
          Nigeria is categorised as an English common law country and operates the 
system where judges exert flexibility in their decisions. However, the proposed effect 
that this ought to have on the capital market as proposed by law and finance theory is 
not evident in the Nigerian capital market, as the market is categorised as weak. This 
is borne out the operation of corrupt practices, inefficient legal regulation and partly 
because not until recently, the country is known to operate a cash-based economy 
with over 90% of funds in circulation as opposed to a credit/cashless society.106 
Furthermore, research carried out on African countries indicates that law mechanisms 
shows broad support for financial development.107 These findings show only partial 
support for consensus that English common law countries provide better conditions 
for financial developments.108  
 
2.4.6. Criticism of the Law and Finance Theory 
Academics have questioned the accuracy of the Anti-Directors Rights Index (ADRI) 
utilised in developing the law and finance theory.109 It was held that ADRI result of 33 
of the sample countries used by La Porta ought to be corrected because they are not 
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distributed with significant differences between common and civil law countries.110 
As a result of this, the idea that the ADRI values were predetermined by legal origin 
was rejected.111 In rejecting the result of legal origins, some shareholder protection 
variable such as the one share-one vote and mandatory dividend were analysed and it 
was argued that the results do not correlate with the ADRI, as data utilised was 
inconsistent between countries.112  
Furthermore, the legal origins theory has been described as limited because a 
majority of the indices used only provide a cross-sectional view that described the law 
as it stood roughly in the second half of the 1990s.113 It is argued that, although the 
common law systems had stronger shareholder protection between 1995-2005, the 
civil law systems were catching up with the common law counterparts as the civil 
system was increasing the level of shareholder protection at a fast rate. Although it 
should be noted that this was considerably insufficient as the common law possessed 
the initial advantage. 114  In testing the link for an indication of stock market 
development by virtue of shareholder protection, there is apparently no link both in 
common law and civil law systems.115  
Further criticism of the law and finance theory was generated by the notion 
that institutions that monitor market activities matter for economic performance. 
“Institution” in this context is defined as rules of the game where the purpose or 
function is to minimise transaction costs associated with market activity. 116 
Additionally, shared beliefs that impart stability and order as well as agents’ 																																																								
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interactions have also been classified amongst institutions that spur economic 
performance.117 It is also argued that it is wrong to assume that those in power will act 
in the interest of the public when enacting and enforcing rules as the state is usually 
composed of agents and coalitions that are pursuing their own interests. 118  
 
In addressing these criticisms, La Porta et al asserted that there has been no 
substantial rejection of the importance of legal origins in shaping outcomes. The most 
cogent version of the critique acknowledged the importance of legal origins and the 
quality of the judiciary as an effect of financial development.119 Furthermore, they 
argued that the existence of approval and disclosure procedures such as fiduciary duty 
discourages them in common law countries. In contrast, evidence suggests that the 
bright line rules of civil law allow corporate insiders to structure legal transactions 
that expropriate outside investors.120 In relation to the argument that common law 
judicial decision making powers has the likelihood of leading to unlikely judgments, 
evidence was presented that shows that flexibility leads to financial development. It 
has been held that national legal rules protecting investors improve the ability of firms 
to develop company specific corporate governance mechanisms.121 They stated further 
that their findings do not indicate that politics is unimportant for either legal rules or 
economic outcomes, and that politics may provide the impetus for countries to revise 
their laws and regulations. However, the thrust of the legal origins theory is that such 
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in response to political demands countries will design reforms consistently with legal 
traditions.  
 
Developing a financial market rests on a number of factors. Investors would 
be more inclined to invest in a system governed by rules and regulations that provide 
some protection if issues arise and to a considerable extent, guarantees some rewards 
back either in form of dividends, etc. This may not be attainable if the market is 
tainted with corrupt practices or mismanagement. The findings of La Porta et al are 
well grounded, and this thesis synchronises with most of its findings vis-a-vis investor 
protection, but notes that this may not generally be applicable to the Nigerian setting, 
given that there are other factors that have to be taken into consideration and not just 
provision of laws alone. The next section addresses the theory of politics and finance, 
which is another reason attributable for the strength of a capital market. 
 
2.4.7. Politics and Finance 
The politics and finance theory connotes that economic function propels stock market 
through demands by large enterprises for capital that must be gathered from many 
sources. This process is held to only work when policymakers or private players build 
institutions that support stock markets and have sufficient political support that does 
not attack finance.122 Their function includes amongst others, protecting the private 
market, enacting rules and regulations that prohibit certain acts whilst conducting 
business in the market.123 In most instances they prescribe applicable penalties when 
the rules are not observed. Penalties include, suspension of trading license, fines and 
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expulsion from the market etc. The importance of these institutions cannot be 
overstated as their operation and presence in a market have the likelihood of 
generating some confidence in the investing public.124 Government’s role in the 
capital market is not limited to providing institutions. It imposes disclosure rules to 
ensure that firms in their quest for wealth do not exploit uninformed consumers.125 
They also interpret the rules since the judiciary is an arm of Government 
In most of the rapidly growing economies, the government has taken an active 
role in creating financial institutions, regulating them and in directing credit. These 
features aid in stabilising the economy and sustaining the solvency of financial 
institutions in ways that enhance growth prospects. However, it should be noted that 
limitations on market are greater in developing countries and as such it is 
recommended that government policies that are attentive to these limitations should 
be pursued.126 There has been the call for the diversion of thoughts of academics and 
policymakers towards the mechanism required to engineer economic growth as 
against focusing on the tools of traditional common law.127 It is stated that this will 
likely lead to the discovery of other tools that can propel economic growth that does 
not have any connection with the tools of common law.  
Historical sources suggest that the emergence of the London and Amsterdam 
financial markets can be ascribed to the rise of large trading monopolies with close 
links to the governments, which are described as the factors responsible for the 
financial innovations that led to the emergence of trading in shares as well as 
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strengthening investor’s property rights.128 The theory of politics playing a central role 
in market development is not peculiar to London and Amsterdam alone, as the theory 
has played a critical role in the emergence of various financial systems worldwide. 
 
2.4.8. Arguments for the Politics and Finance theory 
There have been various arguments supporting this theory, some of which are 
highlighted in turn.  
First, it was argued that the property protection efficacy attributed to the 
common law depends on the willingness of the legislature to accommodate it because 
if the legislature does not, the efficacy will collapse under political pressure.129  
Modern states are described to regulate the economy more than legal origin because 
legislature and its regulatory creations are central in defining economic rights.130  
Second, the law and finance theory is stated to be useful only in the right 
context, which is after polity that supports capital market is established.131 In view of 
this, it is argued that building legal structures in the midst of a hostile polity would 
waste resources and risk disappointment.132 
Third, it is argued that although common law judges are accorded some 
flexibility in reaching decisions, there are no substantial changes and even if it does it 
is described not to be so serious as to make much financial difference.133 It was argued 
further that if the law and finance theory is accepted, the other tools needed to provide 
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a strong financial market that is not associated with the common law would be 
missed.134 
Fourth, irrespective of common’s law fiduciary duty requirement, the 
importance of institutions provided by the government cannot be discredited as the 
fiduciary function has been shifted to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). Furthermore, it has been argued that regulators now do much of the work that 
can be done by judges of common law in relation to fiduciary duties.135 Taking an 
example from the USA, American common law judges were once described as 
unwilling to protect minority stockholders.136 It is argued that the threats of the SEC 
and not common law ensured the courts toughened up on insider trading that was 
permitted in most states with common law origin in the early 20th century.137  
Fifth, it has been argued that civil nations can also develop institutions to 
protect minority stockholders the way common law countries are presumed to, thus 
making it wrong to conclude that the common law has an inherent structural 
advantage over the civil law in building financial markets.138 This highlights the 
importance of institutions such as the SEC, which is established by polity.139  
 
The law and finance theory has been described as an extension of the politics 
and finance theory as law is the practical application of politics in society and the 
development of its control within the financial system demands a separate study from 
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the politics and finance theory.140 This description is better explained by the views of 
legal positivists that assert, “law is the command of the uncommanded 
commander”.141 It has been argued that legal origin does not stop a nation from 
developing the institutions that capital markets need and if a nation does not develop 
these institutions, there is usually something else at play but not legal origin.142  
Furthermore, although common law fiduciary duties are described essential for 
developing stock markets, they may be ill suited for developing nations, because 
simple rules would be easier to enforce than complex fiduciary standards.143 
In recent years the importance of politics to the financial system has been 
demonstrated through schemes enacted by some countries in the wake of several 
financial scandals in some countries.144 These schemes were aimed at enhancing 
transparency via regular accounting with the sole purpose of enhancing investor 
confidence. They contain rules for self-regulation through a code of conduct together 
with a ‘comply or explain’ rule, although, others require substantive rules to be in 
place. For example, the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 in the USA was 
aimed at enhancing disclosure rules. 145  It increased sanctions and penalties for 
falsified disclosure.146 Other countries have also provided rules of conduct in the 
belief that market efficiency will cause the quality of a company’s disclosure to affect 
the price of its stock. Examples of these “rules” include the UK’s Cadbury report 
1992, Higgs report on corporate governance 2003, Spain’s Aldama report 2003, 
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European Union Winter report 2017, France’s Vienot Report 1995, The Nigerian 
Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 etc. 
 
In fortifying the importance of politics to the market the concept of ‘natural 
state’ and ‘open access state’ was also analysed. The natural state is described as 
characterised with limitation of access to economical innovations and provides order 
through the political system that generates rents that are used to stabilise the political 
system and limit violence in the pursuit of social stability.147 Developing countries are 
categorized under the natural state.148 An example of a country in natural state was 
Mexico in the 18th century where the wealthy elite created legal and political barriers 
to entry in the banking industry. The financial system was the political machine for 
the ruling class and when institutional innovations were built their use was reserved 
for the enterprises of the few well-connected financiers.149  
The open access states are characterised with free and open access to 
economic and political organisations with a sustainable rate of economic growth and 
development. Evidence suggests that only a dozen of the contemporary countries are 
open states with examples such as the United States of America, the major EU 
Countries and Japan.150   
 
Capital markets of developing countries have less market capitalisation 
because of the political constraints placed on financial intermediaries who pave the 
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way for poorly defined property rights and government regulatory policies.151 To stop 
this, the government in power must be desirous of enhancing the economy rather than 
catering for greedy needs. In this regard a case can be established for the Nigerian 
capital market because it is evident that the government though desirous of 
implementing institutions that will be beneficial to the growth of the market, they 
have arguably not been efficient in this regard due to auspices of corrupt practices 
evident both in the government and the institutions. There are allegations of financial 
impropriety levelled against individuals in charge of institutions connected to the 
capital market.152 Furthermore, in some instances, the substantive provisions of these 
institutions need to be updated to match international best practices. This could be 
unachievable when the individuals chairing the capital markets committee in the 
Nigerian Senate and Federal House of Representatives do not possess the required 
knowledge in these areas.153 This becomes problematic, as they do not appreciate the 
need to provide the institutions that will take the market to the next level. 
Additionally, these individuals fail to attend trainings that will keep them abreast of 
occurrences in the ever-evolving financial industry but the keep the funds allocated 
for themselves.154 This arguably is liable for the lack of implementation of cogent 
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The politics and finance theory has been criticised by some academics.  
According to North:  
“Throughout most of history and in much of the present world, institutions 
have not provided credible commitment necessary for the development of low 
cost transacting in capital and other markets. There is therefore, little 
evidence to support the view (apparently implicitly held by many economists 
doctoring the ailing economies of central and eastern Europe) that the 
necessary institutions will be the automatic outcome of getting the prices right 
through elimination of price and exchange controls”.155 
 
The arguments propelling the importance of politics to the development of 
capital markets has sufficient credibility because, regardless of the provisions of the 
law governing market dealings, these laws have to be enacted by polity. Institutions 
enacted by polity such as the SEC provide rules that specify norms and practices of 
market participants. In view of the foregoing, this thesis submits that the government 
has a large role to play in the running of the markets and its presence cannot be 
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2.4.9. Endowment and finance 
The endowment hypothesis holds that environment directly influences the quality of 
law, labour and production.156 It is argued that sufficient endowments and natural 
resources lead to productivity, thus generating the need to develop industries to 
facilitate production, which has the likelihood to generate investment opportunities.157 
Additionally, it has been argued that environment shapes economic development 
directly by influencing the inputs directed towards production.158 
The endowment theory proposes that the location of a country is essential to 
its economic development.159 It is argued that merchants examine the environment 
(climate and terrain) of a state to determine the possibility of trade in a particular 
region.160 Tropical environments are characterised with poor crop yield, weakening 
diseases and endowments that cannot effectively employ productive technologies 
developed in temperate zones.161 A landlocked country is not open to trade, which 
limits its access to large economic markets as well as its ability to exploit economies, 
consequently lowering its productivity and leading to lack of investment 
opportunities.162 
States located in environments not conducive for development of industries 
are likely to experience stagnated economic growth. Research indicates that tropical 
countries have a lower GDP because research and development in these countries are 
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considerably less because of minimal western investment. 163  Countries with 
temperatures and humidity that are consistently high year-round, encounter difficulty 
when trying to motivate workers because the climate is not as conducive as a more 
temperate climate. Furthermore, countries close to centres of development and trade 
will have a better market to trade goods in and will be open to foreign investment.164 
Landlocked countries may be disadvantaged because their immediate trade is with 
countries they are surrounded by thus limiting trade prospects with a small number of 
investors as well as reducing the flow of capital.165 
The suggested way to fix this problem is by rectifying the geography towards 
globalisation paying attention to development of international transportation, global 
governance as well as research and development.166 
 ‘The Institutional Endowment Theory’ was developed by this theory and 
postulates that the endowment theory is based on three building blocks. 
First, different colonisation strategies are accountable for the type of 
institutions developed in countries. For example, European powers created institutions 
to promote economic welfare referred to as ‘settlers’ colonies’. The other type is ‘the 
extractive states’ that had little or no interest in the establishment of institutions to 
protect private property and check the power of the state.167 The colonisation process 
of Nigeria places it in the category of extractive states.168 This can arguably be 
considered accountable for the economy’s stagnation as it is argued that Africa’s 
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relative poverty is primarily the result of the form taken by European colonialism.169 
Europeans were settling for extraction rather than settling themselves and introducing 
the kind of institutions that was responsible and economic growth in colonies of the 
European settlement in North America and Australia.170 
Second, the feasibility of settlement influenced the colonisation strategy. 
Areas with diseases favourable to colonialists where deemed the settlers colony and 
had institutions that will promote long-run economic development enacted, whilst 
those with unfavourable disease environment formed the extractive states with 
minimal or no attention to such institutions.171 
Third, the institutions established to aid in economic development persist till 
date.172 The reason for their presence till date has to do with the emergence of the 
place. For instance, when authoritarian institutions are extracting resources from a 
colony and it gains independence, the rulers tend to use these institutions to their own 
advantage and profit. Examples given in this regard are Sierra Leone, Senegal and 
Congo.173 
 
Endowments have been an important element in developing economic 
institutions, which includes capital markets throughout the colonial and modern 
times.174 The colonisation of European powers in the 16th century favoured both the 
rich and the poor. Developing countries have grown wealthy, while certain developed 																																																								
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countries have become poor because the developing countries were established in a 
way to cater for economic growth, while the established institutions within the 
developed countries were left unmolested.175 
 
 Nigeria is richly endowed with different resources such as gas, tin, iron ore, 
coal, limestone, niobium, zinc, arable land etc.176 However, irrespective of these 
resources, research indicates that most of the country’s wealth is largely dependent on 
crude oil with the country still importing different commodities that can be produced 
in the country.177 These other sectors are not sufficiently explored because of the 
presumption of lack of capital. In recent times there has been the call for 
diversification of the economy and development of the other sectors.178 Following the 
proponents of this theory, the Nigerian capital market can attain its full potential 
because of the presence of these resources if adequately managed. If properly 
explored, this thesis submits that it can lead to substantial development of the 
economy through the creation of sufficient industries.  This will subsequently lead to 
exportation of produced and services. 
The organisation of the society provides a better explanation for economic 
growth because of the incentives that the institutions offer to obtain investments.179 To 
measure economic growth what must be analysed is the institutional quality, enduring 
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quality of institutional and colonisation strategy of the European settlers.180 Countries 
endowed with natural resources possess one of the perquisites to engage in trade. If 
well managed, they can export some of these products thus increasing the GDP. This 
has the potential to equate the rate of import.181 Furthermore, if well managed, there 
will be advent of companies being developed to cater for these endowments that can 
subsequently generate investments because it becomes competitive which has the 
likelihood of leading expansion and comparison with their international counterparts. 
 
2.5. Conclusion. 
This thesis acknowledges the various arguments that have emerged for the 
development of a strong and efficient capital market. However, this thesis asserts that 
in determining the strength of the capital market, no single theory can be solely 
attributable to the success and subsequent strength of the market as all three theories 
discussed above have a part to play when developing a strong and efficient capital 
market.  Whilst the provisions of law are very important for investor protection, the 
laws have to be enacted by legislators. Furthermore, when government enacts laws, 
they still need the institutions that will facilitate the operation of the law. Furthermore, 
the endowment and finance theory have highlighted the importance of the location of 
a country as well as the natural resources of the country in determining economic 
growth. A country that has no natural resources will have no industries developed 
neither would there be foreign investors. In view of this, this thesis submits that with 
all three working concurrently, there is the possibility to establish a strong capital 
market. 
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Relating these theories to Nigeria, this thesis submits that the emergence of 
political factors in building the capital market is of paramount importance. This is 
because the laws governing the market and attempting to protect investors are not 
particularly credible as established by this thesis in the subsequent chapters. The 
importance of this cannot be undermined because if there are credible rules, investors 
will invest. In several instances, legal practitioners and other experts have approached 
the Senate and the Federal House of Representatives with likely solutions to the 
problems faced by the capital markets and also with a view to making the market 
more efficient. 
The importance of politics can also serve as a catalyst for jurists to act well. 
Nigeria is rated one of the most corrupt countries in the world. If the government is 
desirous of stopping corruption in the capital markets, it will implement rules that will 
compel jurists to carry out their functions efficiently and effectively. Indeed 
government has to implement laws that provide good remuneration as well as grants 
some incentives to judges. This would likely help them resist temptations to be 
corrupt. Furthermore, severe penalties should be enacted against judges that collect 
bribes or act in an unprofessional manner. The power of the government is also 
extended to creating and empowering of efficient institutions that monitor, enact rules 
and enforce necessary actions in the market. The importance of these institutions 
cannot be undermined as they usually aid in the smooth running of a securities 
market. Example of such an institution is the SEC. 
In view of these, this thesis posits that if the Federal Government of Nigeria 
enacts credible laws as well as establishes and empower credible institutions, there is 
the likelihood of the securities market growing. However, this is not the case at the 
moment because the polity of the Nigerian government does not exactly support the 
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capital market. This is not borne out the fact that they do not want the capital market 
to be developed or intend to hinder economic development, but because the persons in 
charge of securities market committee both at upper house of the National Assembly 
(Senate) and lower house of the National Assembly (Federal House of 
Representatives) are not aware of the importance of the enacting credible laws as well 
as creating and establishing credible institutions in for the market.182 This thesis 
submits that for a capital market to efficiently grow, it is of paramount importance 
that these theories work together i.e. supporting polity that encourages the securities 
market growth which would lead to the enactment of credible rules that can be 
utilised in protecting investors and also setting a standard of operation of such 
markets.  
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3. Information Asymmetry and Disclosure 		
3.1. Introduction 
Investing in business could be an arduous affair for investors. This is partly because 
entrepreneurs have superior information of the business and sometimes overstate their 
value, thus placing the onus of extracting relevant and reliable information on their 
putative investors. 1  Furthermore, entrepreneurs sometimes expropriate the 
investments of investors in a manner investors are not aware of.2 
Companies seek investors’ funds through various marketing strategies, whilst 
investors request for information about the issuers and securities to serve as a guide 
when deciding to invest.3 Information is of sacrosanct importance in capital market 
transactions as buyer behaviour is largely dependent on the information available 
before and after purchase.  In meeting the needs of the investors, companies provide 
them with the offer prospectus and documents that ought to enable an investor make 
an informed assessment of the securities.4 Information sought varies but generically 
includes information about a company, what they do, what they require the funds of 
the investor for, the fiscal health of the company, how and when prospective investors 
would receive dividends. Providing information to investors is crucial, but of more 
importance is the provision of credible information. It is hackneyed that some 
companies provide falsified, misleading, misstatements or omit important information 
which would portray the company as performing well by relevant indices in an 																																																								
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attempt to attract potential investors.5 Accordingly, investors commit themselves to 
companies they assume they have sufficient knowledge of based on the information 
provided. When investors become aware that the information provided to them is 
incorrect there is going to be lack of trust in the system; thus generating the possibility 
of instituting legal actions against such companies for misrepresentation as witnessed 
in cases like Hedley Byrne v Heller & Partners Ltd.6 
This chapter focuses on the challenge of information asymmetry and how it 
makes a market less favourable for investment. Furthermore, the concept of disclosure 
is analysed with emphasis on how it is regulated in Nigeria compared to the UK in a 
bid to promote credible dissemination of information to investors. The final part of 
this chapter highlights the operation of reputational intermediaries otherwise known 
as gatekeepers or watchdogs and how they assist in reducing information asymmetry 
 
3.2. Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry in the capital market is described as when corporations listed 
in the capital market have more information about their financial status and relevant 
information about their business than they disclose to prospective investors.7 It serves 
as a barrier between issuers of common shares and public investors.8 The seminal 
work of George Akerlof introduced this problem.9 He utilised the market for used cars 
as an example of the problem of quality certainty. He describes how interaction 
between quality heterogeneity and asymmetric information can lead to the 
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disappearance of a market where guarantees are indefinite. 10 In recent years, 
information asymmetry has gained awareness because countries are desirous of their 
financial markets attaining efficiency and the effects it has on a capital market is not 
desirable. Some of these effects are identified below. 
First, investors could offer less for shares than the original asking price 
because they believe the market is tainted with falsified disclosures, thus, generating a 
negative effect on corporations that want to list in the market for the first time and 
corporations that have not falsified information.11  
Secondly, it reduces the confidence investors have in the market when they 
become conscious of the likelihood of receiving falsified information, thus making 
them seek for the required information from sources that can be costly and sometimes 
incorrect.12  
Thirdly, it leads to the co-existence of high and low quality goods and services 
in the market, which places the strenuous task on buyers to determine the quality of 
goods and services offered to them.13  
Fourthly, it hinders the possibility of achieving an efficient market described 
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Nigeria’s capital market can arguably be classified as a market suffering from 
information asymmetry. Research indicates that information asymmetry, amongst 
other factors is a prominent challenge faced by individual investors in the Nigerian 
capital market.15  It has been argued that one of the reasons the Nigerian economy has 
not developed as much as the market is because of what is referred to as development 
trap occasioned by prevalent insider trading, asymmetric information amongst other 
anomalies. 16  Investors facing transparency challenges are not confident in the 
Nigerian capital market because of the belief that they are disadvantaged in the 
market owing to inadequate and unevenly distributed information between investors, 
subsequently leading to few insiders having access to material facts.17 This has been 
described as one of the reasons for illiquidity in the market.18  
The advent of delayed disclosures, misstatements, and fraudulent disclosures 
have affected the Nigerian capital market as the market is described as one where 
investors do not trust the system to trade.19 The rampancy of information asymmetry 
in the market is attributable to the deficiency of market compliance, which is 
exacerbated by the lack of automated processes.20 Furthermore, research indicates that 
a reason for the volatility of the market is attributable to the advent of information 
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asymmetry that subsequently prevents investors from investing.21 It is arguable that 
there is the propensity for investors to avoid a market that is tainted with practices 
such as information asymmetry. This is borne out of the fact that they would not want 
to lose their money invested and the possibility of this happening is increased when 
the information disclosed is incorrect or falsified.  
This thesis argues that information asymmetry is largely attributable for the 
alleged sparse concentration of investors in the Nigerian capital market and it was 
suggested that the way to avoid the continued operation of information asymmetry is 
for the SEC to develop adequate policies to prevent manipulation of information as 
they have significant effect on the market dynamics that can result in the nation’s 
macroeconomics stability.22 Information asymmetry is practiced in two principal ways 
identified in the next section. 
 
3.3. Types of Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry can occur in one of two ways, adverse selection, and moral 
hazard.  
3.3.1. Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection occurs when entrepreneurs do not share information they know to 
prospective investors leading to the supply of low quality securities.23 A market 
exhibits adverse selection when there is the inability of buyers to distinguish among 
products of different quality. Informed market participants make decisions that harm 
uninformed parties, thus exposing the market to the possibility of failure because 
insiders have more knowledge than outsiders about their own behaviour in conducting 																																																								
21 M. Anifowose, ‘Information asymmetric information on the stock return volatility in Nigerian capital 
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the firm’s affairs.24 It can also occur where the buyer is unable to observe the seller’s 
characteristics or the contingencies under which the seller operates.  
Entrepreneurs are alleged to omit important information to prospective 
investors in a bid to maximise earnings.25 Furthermore, when an entrepreneur is risk 
neutral, projects with negative expected returns are financed because he has some 
control over which projects are handed priority.26 This is considered a notable effect 
of market imperfection and a major source of investment reduction when investors 
become aware of this process of adverse selection.27 
It has been argued that perpetual adverse selection in a market can lead to 
excessive investment because the risks involved in trading are omitted thus leading 
investors to flood the market because of the belief that the investment is viable.28 This 
thesis argues that this postulation has the likelihood of achieving a contrary effect i.e. 
the market being sparsely populated. Investors that are risk averse as well as 
understand the chance of information being omitted will avoid the market due to the 
fear of the unknown thereby limiting the amount of investors in the market.29 The 
reluctance to invest is further intensified by virtue of fact that the goods in questions 
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3.3.2. Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard refers to a situation where a party is prepared to take more risk because 
he does not feel the consequences of his actions.30 It is the willingness of individuals 
or organisations to engage in riskier behaviour than they otherwise would because of 
a tacit assumption that someone else would bear part or all of the costs and 
consequences of the risk.31 It can be likened to insurance transactions where an 
insured party is willing to take certain risks because he knows that he does not bear 
the costs in the event of any loss.  
In capital markets, it is a situation where a party to a transaction takes more 
risks than he usually does because he is aware that he is insulated from risk and has 
more information about the transaction than the party who intends to fund the 
transaction.32 Sometimes companies take advantage of the fact that they are insulated 
from loss because the money they use for their businesses belongs to investors, thus 
generating the avenue to carry out risky business that may not necessarily be in the 
interests of the investor. This is further accentuated by the doctrine of separate legal 
entity established in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd.33 Judges are often reluctant to 
hold directors personally liable because to do so undermines the doctrine of separate 
legal entity and unduly interfere with directors’ commercial judgment.34 Furthermore, 
investor’s contracts are usually with the company and not the director. The issue of 
moral hazard has gained momentous awareness lately and there has been the call for 
its curtailment because, in the event of any unforeseen circumstances, private 
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creditors bear the loss and more of the burden of resolving emerging market crises by 
rolling over, rescheduling and reducing the value of their credits.35 The state also 
bears a share of this burden as it may be forced to engage in bailouts or quantitative 
easing schemes in order to provide cheap credit. 
Moral hazard is not a desirable feature of markets as it has the propensity to 
reduce average returns on human capital investment because profitable investments 
cross-subsidise the unprofitable investments in such circumstance.36 Furthermore, 
when a market is tainted with moral hazard, the principal-agent relationship is 
introduced.  This occurs where one person (agent) is able to make decisions on behalf 
of another person or entity (principal).37 The problem occurs when the agent acts in 
his own best interest rather than those of the principal. Owners of corporations 
sometimes select managers to run the business and in such a relationship there is the 
possibility of the interests of the principal and agent not being mutually aligned. The 
principal may seek to maximise their wealth via the sale of shares, whilst the manager 
may be working at his own best interest, e.g., seeking higher salary or attempting to 
improve his resume’. Managers oversee project evaluation process, and with the 
knowledge of the fact that owners are aiming at profit, managers can take extra risks 
to facilitate securing such desired profits.38 In some instances, they may make bad 
decisions that lead to a loss. Furthermore because there are limited penalties for 
selecting such risky projects, there is the propensity to engage in such risks. It is 
however important to note that in public companies with widely dispersed 
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shareholding, there is a measure of alignment between managers and owners’ 
interests due to share compensation schemes for employees and directors. This may 
reduce the moral hazard problem. 
It should be noted that the problem of moral hazard does not necessarily 
amount to fraud. Moral hazard does not necessarily involve illegal behaviour in most 
cases; it is the overzealous effort of managers to make excess profit for the company. 
An example of where fraud can be said to be involved is where owners or staff take 
excessive risks and corporate assets with prior knowledge that there would be 
compensation to the investor in case of bankruptcy.  
 
Information is most desired by prospective investors when they intend to 
invest in the capital market and as such the problem of information asymmetry should 
not be ignored. A market aspiring to compete with its international counterparts or 
develop in order to spur economic growth should not have such issues in its 
operations. This thesis proposes that the best way to curtail this problem is with 
adequate legal regulation, establishment and encouragement of norms and practices 
that would promote adequate disclosure as well as adequate enforcement mechanisms. 
The next section identifies and analyses the theory of disclosure in capital markets. It 
highlights the regulation of disclosure in Nigeria in comparison with the UK with the 





3.4. Disclosure  
Disclosure involves the publication of any economic information relating to a 
business enterprise, quantitative or otherwise, which facilitates the making of 
investment decisions.39 Ideally, it promotes delivery of accurate information in a 
timely manner about products traded in the capital market.40 It is also used to increase 
transparency by providing useful information to both internal and external users of 
financial reports whilst making business and economic decisions.41 The information, 
other than aiding the prospective investor to decide if to invest or not also assists the 
investor in evaluating the likely problems associated with a proposed investment.42 
Generally, disclosure involves exposing intricate details of a company’s 
operation, production and other important information relating to the company.  
Companies sometimes abstain from disclosure because the information disclosed 
could be used by competitors that are interested in the same line of business. 
However, this is not a good reason for non-disclosure. Disclosure is the price that 
companies pay for playing at the competitive and high-end of the market. In view of 
the foregoing arguments, it is important to highlight that disclosure does not guarantee 
that people will invest. This defeats the purpose for disclosure if the information can 
be utilised to the disadvantage of the company disclosing. This raises two important 
questions, why disclose, and how much should a company disclose? 
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One of the reasons that companies disclose information to investors is to 
facilitate and build confidence of investors in the products so they can invest. 
Disclosure could also serve as an element to reduce the cost of capital as companies 
with obscure information often have a high cost of capital or have to provide security 
for loans. Furthermore, companies disclose information by virtue of the provisions of 
law necessitating it as an obligation to trade in the market. This concept is known as 
mandatory disclosure, which is discussed in this chapter.43 The disclosure philosophy 
has been described as the most ubiquitous investor protection mechanism that has 
innumerable advantages.44 Some of these advantages are highlighted below. 
First, it serves as protection for investors as they are presented with adequate 
information of the deals presented to them as well as gives an insight to the business 
of the company. Investor protection is of paramount importance to a market and is 
regarded as the cornerstone of securities regulation.45 It is a feature of deep and 
vibrant securities market and also acts as an important component for the successful 
operation of securities market.46 It plays an indispensable role in bolstering investor 
confidence and retention. Disclosed information serves as a catalyst when prospective 
investors are deciding whether to invest. In serving its protective function, it can be 
used as evidence in a law court in the event of the disclosed information not matching 
what happens or where it appears there has been some falsification. 
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Second, it has a prophylactic effect by deterring corporate insiders from 
engaging in fraudulent, corrupt behaviour or mismanagement. 47  Furthermore, it 
reduces the agency problem because managers are denied access to exploit internally 
produced information on intangible unknown to other investors as the information is 
required to be disclosed.48 It levels the playing field amongst investors thus making it 
harder and costlier to be privately informed as there is availability of information in 
the public domain. This reduces the possibility of trading with a better-informed 
counter party and reduces the uncertainty about a firm’s value, which is generated by 
informational advantage that an informed trader might have. Competent disclosure of 
intangibles has the propensity to increase demand for securities of a company.49  
Third, because of improved transparency there is efficient allocation of 
resources. Reduced cost of capital has the likelihood to generate the real worth of 
securities because investors develop confidence in the securities market, consequently 
increasing liquidity for the shares of a firm.50  
Fourth, it leads to market efficiency and promotes corporate governance by 
providing investors with sufficient access to a firm, thus improving the market’s 
understanding of the firm’s value creating process and activities as well as the 
economic risks attached to the firms’ shares.51  
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In a bid to reduce information asymmetry, countries have adopted laws 
mandating disclosure hence compelling companies to disclose information favourable 
or otherwise that would assist an investor when making an investment decision. This 
has been described as a commitment device that is considered important when trading 
in capital markets.52 Without any form of commitment, firms have the likelihood to 
withhold or manipulate information presented to investors. The laws mandating 
disclosure vary from country to country and are usually supported with appropriate 
sanctions if the substantive rules are not observed.  
 
3.5. Mandatory disclosure 
Mandatory disclosure is the compulsory provision of information by companies to 
prospective investors.53 It is usually mandated by provisions of law or regulatory 
bodies and assists the decision process of investors when considering the securities 
offered by issuers.54 Countries mandate disclosure as a condition to operating in the 
market in attempting to make the market efficient and transparent. This is regarded as 
a simple way to regulate complex markets as well as promote investor autonomy.55 It 
is important to note that this issue concerns to a greater extent, average retail investors 
rather than institutional investors. 
As identified above, companies sometimes reveal only favourable information 
to investors whilst encouraging them to invest. Mandatory disclosure reduces this 
problem by acting as a communication tool between the discloser and the recipient as 
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well as compels delivery of both positive and negative information of a company. It 
also serves as a solution to information asymmetry and a mechanism used to boost 
investor confidence. However, it has also been described as a mixture of material 
assumptions that are usually difficult to comprehend.56 This description is tied to the 
fact that not all investors are familiar with the information disclosed thereby making 
comprehension of the terms expressed in disclosure documents difficult. Again, it is 
important to highlight that this issue concerns, to a greater extent, average retail 
investors rather than institutional investors. Furthermore, disclosure of overly 
sophisticated material to retail investors could act as a barrier to investment because 
they incur costs in seeking financial advice on the material that is not easily 
comprehendible. This arguably could defeat the purpose of disclosure. In an attempt 
to salvage this problem, it has been recommended that the information disclosed be 
sufficiently clear because prospective investors apply this information in making 
investment decisions.57 When the information contained in prospectus is delivered in a 
manner that is easy to comprehend, investors will be more inclined to accept and 
believe the contents of these documents. However, it is important to note that 
although most initial public offerings (IPOs) are targeted at institutional investors,58 it 
is important that prospectuses (offer documents) are delivered in a clear manner in the 
interest of retail investors.  
Mandatory disclosure is not cost free as issuers incur transaction costs whilst 
complying with disclosure.59 Data gathered by the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) indicated that the costs of drawing up a prospectus can sometimes 																																																								
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amount to over 10 per cent of the amounts raised in a small capital raising exercise, 
and of this, preparing the operating and financial review as well as the historical 
financial information can each cost in excess of 100,000 Euros.60 Costs incurred 
includes, assembling, analysing and summarising the information. Experts are 
employed to conduct these tasks because of the nature of due diligence involved in it 
thereby increasing the costs.61 Additionally, cost is also incurred when disseminating 
this information to a wide spectrum of investors. This unarguably has an impact on 
the price at which securities are offered as well as a bearing on the realisations form a 
capital offering because a high transaction cost may ultimately defeat the economic 
rationale of the offering.  
In view of the aforementioned, an important question that has emerged is if a 
price should be put for information disclosed? This question emerged by virtue of the 
fact that disclosure grants competitors an insight to the intricacies of the business with 
no guarantee of investment. Competitors can use such information to evaluate their 
chances of success in similar product developments and might even obviate their 
having to expend resources on product developments.62 It has been argued that if 
mandatory disclosure benefits competitors with no benefit for the company 
disclosing, the purpose would be unrewarding.63 There have been suggestions that 
companies should charge for the information they provide to investors.64 Charges are 
considered a compelling and reliable factor to providing accurate disclosure than the 
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external sources the investors will attempt to get the information from.65  Whilst this 
enhances the possibility of minimising the cost accrued by companies as well as 
placing value on information provided in the minds of the investors, this thesis argues 
that putting a cost on disclosure is not ideal in a developing country like Nigeria. The 
reason for this is that, due to the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria, there is the 
belief that market practices are not forthright.  This arguably has contributed to 
scarcity of investors in the system. If prospective investors are therefore asked to pay 
for information when they want to invest, there is the likelihood that they will avoid 
the altogether. Furthermore, assuming there are charges for disclosure, this thesis 
imagines that such charges will not be substantial, therefore competitors that are 
desirous of getting such information will pay for the prospectus and still not invest. 
Mandatory disclosure has gained significant cognisance in recent years and 
different writers have written in support of it. It is depicted to be the right mechanism 
with the propensity to alleviate managers’ incentives to suppress valuable information 
that is unfavourable.66 However, some writers are opined that disclosure should not be 
made mandatory for different reasons identified below. 
 
3.5.1. Criticism of Mandatory Disclosure 
First, as identified above, corporations spend money in making information available 
and in some cases they acquire costs without any returns as well as expose the 
intricacies of their business. 
Second, it has been described as a phenomenon that has not been confirmed as 
theoretical and empirical studies provide no more than a weak support for mandatory 
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disclosure.67 Research indicates that disclosure of certain information such as audited 
balance sheets, profit and loss statements, and proxy information prior to shareholder 
meetings and details on insider transactions resulted in significant positive abnormal 
returns to shareholders in the range of sixteen to eighteen per cent.68 In view of this, it 
has been stated that although the idea of mandatory disclosure provides truthful 
information and reduces the firm’s incentives to committing fraud or giving 
misstatements, it should not be made mandatory by law.69 
Third, it has been argued that there is no need for mandatory disclosure as 
firms voluntarily disclose their private information as a signal of their products 
quality.70 Firms will voluntarily disclose information so as not to be confused by 
customers with firms having lower quality products. Firms with high quality products 
have the likelihood of committing to a disclosure regime that credibly commits firms 
to full public disclosure. In the same vein, firms with product quality a notch below 
that of the high quality firms will voluntarily commit to a full disclosure regime so as 
not to be confused with firms with even lower quality.71 
Whilst the arguments are well founded in part, this thesis argues that they are 
not sufficient to call for the elimination of a mandatory disclosure regime and enlists 
the following as likely advantages of mandatory disclosure. 
First, mandatory disclosure limits the ability of a firm to remain silent. In 
developing this argument, the anti-fraud rule in the market is analysed along with the 
doctrine of mandatory disclosure and it was stated that in a world with an anti-fraud 
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rule but no mandatory disclosure system, firms would remain silent with impunity.72 
The distinction between failure to inform and misrepresentation is not particularly 
clear as the former may be considered implied representation that nothing has 
changed, thus the unlikelihood of there being an element of fraud. Furthermore, it can 
be argued that it improves anti-fraud laws as a rule against only fraud leads to the 
discovery of only little information about securities.73 
Second, mandatory disclosure can serve as a cost reduction mechanism. 
Information provided by corporate issuers may not be optimally verified thus leading 
to search for information from non-issuer sources, which can be expensive. 
Mandatory disclosure subsidises search costs to secure both greater quantity of 
information and a better testing of its accuracy.74 
Third, a substantial basis exists for believing that greater inefficiency would 
exist without mandatory disclosure because investors pursuing trading gains will 
incur excess social costs. Furthermore, even in an efficient market, there remains 
information that the rational investor needs to optimise his securities portfolio and 
such information is best provided by mandatory disclosure.75 
Fourth, mandatory disclosure can serve as an efficient mechanism to reduce 
the blame placed on credit rating agencies when there is a financial crisis. Credit 
rating agencies were held largely accountable for the financial crisis of 2008 as it was 
argued that investors placed too much faith in the rating agencies, which were held to 
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have failed in getting in right.76 Credit rating agencies also played a significant role in 
the European sovereign debt crisis in 2009.77  
 
Although mandatory disclosure is not a flawless securities regulatory 
mechanism, it is increasingly becoming the preferred regulatory approach amongst a 
set of imperfect alternatives. 78  It is presumed that the most obvious and 
straightforward way to achieve an efficient capital market is through the commitment 
of firms to the rules, especially in a country with weak legal infrastructure. It is 
important to note that there is no evidence indicating that firms in countries with weak 
legal infrastructure can in fact bind themselves by mandatory disclosure provisions or 
not to engage in opportunistic midstream switching through purely contractual 
devices such as supermajority voting rules in the firm’s charter.79 However, it would 
be injurious to a capital market if it were totally absent because there is the possibility 
of investors seeking for the information by other means that are not reliable. The 
effect of this is the collection of duplicated, wrong and falsified information.80  
In sub-Saharan African countries where financial illiteracy is pervasive, there 
is the absence of the required mandatory disclosure infrastructure in comparison with 
countries where there is sufficient literacy. These infrastructures include, a receptive 
public, information analysts, financial journalists and market intermediaries that help 
synthesise and simplify the information for investors. 81  This, arguably, can be 																																																								
76 E. Benmelech, ‘The credit rating crisis’ (2009) 24 NBER Macroeconomics Annual; Section 3.9.2 of 
this thesis for discussion on the operations of credit rating agencies in capital markets.  
77 M. Gartner, B. Griesbach, F, Jung, ‘PIGS or Lambs? The European sovereign debt crisis and the role 
of rating agencies’, (2011) 17 International Advances in Economic Research 3 
78 S. Brown-Hruska and S. Satwah (n 41) 138 
79 R. Romano, ‘The need for competition in international securities regulation’, (2001) 258 John M. 
Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics and Public Policy 4; E. Rock, ‘Securities regulation as a 
lobster trap: a credible commitment theory of mandatory disclosure’, (2002) 23 Cardozo Law Review 
675 
80 J. R. Macey (n 62) 411 
81 S. Brown-Hruska and S. Satwah (n 41) 137 
	 103	
considered accountable for the lack of development of capital markets in these 
countries. Regardless of the absence of these infrastructures, this thesis underlines the 
importance of enacting and enforcing laws that mandate disclosure as it would deter 
fraudulent activities as well as compel corporations to disclose accurate information. 
Countries have implemented different regulatory schemes in enforcing laws 
that mandate disclosure. They are empowered by legal provisions that investors can 
utilise in establishing liability against companies. The laws and regulations are 
imposed on a range of people involved in producing offer document such as issuers, 
directors etc. 82  Regulations are supported by sanctions such as suspension, or 
expulsion from the markets if not upheld. However, for completeness and prevention 
of issuers avoiding the market altogether, it is important that the severity of these 
sanctions be balanced to avoid undue restriction on issuers conduct, as excessive 
regulation and sanctions can result in less informative and untimely disclosure.83 
Stringent or lax enforcement can have a damaging effect on the capital market. 
Therefore, it is imperative that a balance is struck between investor protection, 
freedom of issuers and the ability of management to make decisions.84 The next 
section highlights how mandatory disclosure is regulated in Nigeria in comparison 
with the UK. 
 
3.6. Regulating Mandatory Disclosure in Nigeria 
The Nigeria-UK Capital Markets Projects in its inaugural reports identified the need 
to strengthen the integrity of the market by improving information disclosure, 
reduction of potential for manipulation, promotion of transparency and good 																																																								
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governance to improve standards and investors’ confidence.85 Furthermore, it is 
documented in the Nigerian Capital Market Master Plan that efforts will be directed 
towards ensuring that credible financial disclosure by adopting specific initiatives 
such as enforcing the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) standards 
with full compliance by all capital market participants as well as enhancing and 
enforcing shareholder value disclosure for public listed companies.86  
The provisions of the Rules and Regulations of the SEC 2013 and the 
provisions of the Investment and Securities Act 2007 (ISA) regulate disclosure in the 
Nigerian capital market. The substantive provisions of both regulatory instruments are 
highlighted in the next section. Additionally, the Code of Corporate Governance 2003 
in Nigeria also contains provisions that regulate disclosure such as the requirement for 
an audit committee of public listed companies whose principal function is to ensure 
compliance with the legal and regulatory requirement of the company’s financial 
statements.87 
 
3.6.1. Provisions of the Rules and Regulations of the Securities Exchange 
Commission (Nigeria) 2013, mandating disclosure 
Mandatory disclosure is effected by providing prospectus to prospective investors. A 
prospectus is a formal legal document that provides details about an investment that is 
offered for sale to the public.88 It ought to contain the relevant fact/s investors require 
to make investment decisions. Prior to the issuance of a prospectus for subscription of 
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securities of companies, government and its agencies in the Nigerian capital market, 
they are to be registered with the SEC.89 The requirements for registration are 
contained in s. 279 (2) (a) – (m) of the Rules and Regulations of the SEC. 
Prospectuses are to be filed either electronically or in printed form.90 The information 
to be contained in a prospectus is listed in s.288 (1) of the Rules and Regulations of 
the SEC. Amongst the contents of a prospectus is a property schedule listing landed 
properties and buildings the issuer possesses. It discloses issues such as tenure of 
lease, usage of the property and any relevant information. 91  Furthermore, the 
prospectus is required to comprise information about any liability, claims, pending 
litigation, unclaimed and unpaid dividends, and debtors.92   Additionally, it contains a 
caveat on risk factor that shall be contained and highlighted in the bold letter. 93  
The prospectus is not required to contain only favourable information about 
the business, as there is the requirement for it to contain likely risks associated with 
the business such as sectorial risks, political risks, currency risks, and environmental 
risks etc. It should also contain measures that will be used to address and/or mitigate 
risk factors.94 The issuer makes a sworn declaration that it has fully disclosed all 
material facts in the offer documents that is signed by the chief executive officer, 
company secretary and the chief financial officer of the issuer.95 When approved and 
duly signed by directors of the issuer and other parties to a public offer the prospectus 
together with offer documents shall be forwarded to the SEC for registration within 
48 hours of signing the prospectus. 96  An issuing house is required to file the 
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registration statement for offer of securities and prior to approval no securities shall 
be sold or offered for sale, as it is unlawful for any person to sell, make an offer for 
sale, or buy securities before the registration statement is filed or after it has been 
filed but not approved by the commission.97 The penalty for not adhering to this rule 
is a fine of five thousand Naira (equivalent of £9) for every day the default persists.  
Registered securities have a life span of six months and if they are not offered 
for sale within six months after registration, they have to be revalidated by the 
Commission when they intend to make an offer.98 This is done to cater for any 
changes that may have occurred within the time span for registration. 
In a bid to promote transparency of the dealings of the company, corporations 
are mandated to provide details of remuneration whether in cash or otherwise of each 
director.99 Information and details of amounts or benefits paid or intended to be paid 
or given to any promoter within the two years preceding the date of the prospectus 
shall be provided. Furthermore, any interest of a director either direct or indirect is 
required to be disclosed. 100 If directors sell their shares in the company or purchase 
shares in the company they are mandated to notify the SEC not later than 48 hours 
after such activity.101 The issuer, issuing house and reporting accountants (where 
relevant) shall report to the commission immediately the occurrence of any event after 
the submission of the prospectus which is likely to alter the contents of information in 
the offer documents or render the information in the prospectus misleading.102 
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3.6.2. Provisions of the Investments and Securities Act 2007 mandating 
disclosure  
In a similar way, but with less detailed provisions, the ISA 2007 also mandates 
disclosure in the Nigerian capital market. It provides that no person shall issue any 
form of application to deposit money for the purpose of subscribing to purchasing or 
in any way acquiring securities of a public company unless the form is issued with a 
prospectus.103 Contravention of this rule is deemed as an offence punishable with an 
imposed fine of 100 thousand Naira (equivalent of £200) on conviction.104 The Act 
requires prospectus to be registered with the SEC.105 The process of registration is not 
specified by the Act. However, it is provided that it shall be sent to the commission 
with every named director or his agent authorised in writing and having endorsed on 
it or attached any consent to the issuance of the prospectus.106 Approval by the SEC is 
important as no person is permitted to issue, circulate, publish, disseminate or 
distribute any notice, circular for advertisement to the public for offer for subscription 
to securities.107 The SEC only registers a prospectus that is dated, signed and has 
documents attached (if any).108 
Every prospectus indicates if a copy has been delivered for registration as well 
as specifies any document required to be endorsed on or attached to the copy so 
delivered.109 The date contained in a prospectus is taken as the date of publication 
unless there is proof discrediting this.110 If a prospectus contains a statement made by 
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an expert, it cannot be issued unless the expert has given his written consent before 
delivery of the prospectus and has not withdrawn his consent.111 The life span of a 
prospectus is six months. On the expiry of the sixth month no person shall make an 
invitation to the public to acquire or dispose of any securities of a public company.112 
3.6.3. Mandatory disclosure in the United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, they employ a mix of public and private enforcement 
strategies are employed to underpin the regulatory framework governing public 
issuance of securities and the admission of securities to trading in an organized 
market.113 
The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), Prospectus 
Directive, Prospectus Regulation, Companies Act 2006, and the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) regulate mandatory disclosure. Together they provide 
rules guiding companies when disclosing information in the securities market. The 
disclosure regime proposed by the Prospectus Directive and the Prospectus 
Regulation is considered a forum for maximum harmonisation. 114  The aim of 
harmonising these rules is for the standardisation of prospectus information, with the 
objective of developing standard information that should be contained in a prospectus, 
thus making it easier for investors to compare and evaluate strengths and weakness of 
different investment opportunities.115 The implication of harmonisation is that national 
authorities cannot adopt general rules requiring a prospectus to contain items of 
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information that are not included in relevant schedules and building blocks contained 
in the Prospectus Regulation 2017 (EU/2017/1129).116   
The standardisation objective is applied in the ESMA, which maintains 
recommendations for consistent implementation of prospectus requirements and it 
provides that those responsible for drawing up a prospectus must take into account the 
ESMA recommendations as part of determining the approval process.117 The Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) approves prospectus. 
In the United Kingdom a mandatory prospectus for securities may be drawn 
up in a single or tripartite document.118 A single mandatory prospectus contains all the 
relevant information in one concise document. A tripartite prospectus comprises of 
three documents, a registration document containing information relating to the 
issuer, a securities note that contains details of the securities to be offered or admitted, 
and a summary note. A summary note is compulsory regardless of whether the 
prospectus is drafted as a single or tripartite document.119 It is a key source of 
information for retail investors that should be drafted in a concise and non-technical 
language with an appropriate structure that conveys key information relevant to 
securities contained in the prospectus and when read with the rest of the prospectus 
should aid prospective investors in making the decision to invest or not.120 
The Prospectus Regulation 2017 prescribes detailed information that should be 
incorporated in a prospectus and how they are presented.121 A prospectus is to contain 
necessary information that will enable an investor make an informed assessment of:122 
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a) The assets and liabilities, financial position, profit and losses and prospects of 
the issuer of the transferrable securities of any guarantor and  
b) The rights attached to the transferrable securities.123 
 
The general obligation to disclose is not restricted to information known by persons 
responsible for the prospectus. It extends to information obtainable when the 
necessary enquiries are made.124 Information contained in one or more previously or 
simultaneously published documents that have been filed with the competent 
authority or which have been provided to that authority in accordance with regulatory 
requirements can be referenced.125 Information that is usually referenced includes, 
annual accounts and reports.126 
The contents of the prospectus are linked with the nature of issuer and the 
securities to be offered and the prospectus regulation draws a distinction between 
wholesale and retail investors with the former benefitting from a less onerous 
disclosure regime.127 Furthermore, there is the requirement for on-going disclosure, 
which requires particular types of information to be publicised whenever they 
occur.128 This ensures that the markets are updated with new developments and 
ensures efficient price formation as well as limits the possibility of insider trading 
because new developments become public knowledge thus limiting the opportunity 
for insiders to use private information for their own benefit. However, issuers can 
delay the public disclosure of inside information so as not to prejudice its legitimate 																																																																																																																																																														
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interest. For this to be viable, the issuer has to ensure that such omission will not 
mislead the public as well as ensure that the information be kept confidential.129 
The ESMA maintains a questions and answers document on prospectuses.130 
This document is regularly updated to answer questions posed by the public and 
competent authorities in relation to the practical application of the prospectus 
directive. Its purpose is to promote supervisory approaches and practices.131 This 
section is important because financial information is technical and complex and it 
seldom inspires investors because of information contained therein.132 Furthermore, 
businesses are becoming more complex with several entities, making it difficult to 
describe what they do in writing.  In view of this it is imperative that the necessary 
information be presented in a format that is comprehensible and easy to analyse.133 
Furthermore, the Prospectus Directive proposes that the language used in prospectus 
must be one accepted by its home state regulator as well as be made available in 
languages that are acceptable to the competent authorities in each of the host states or 
at the issuers choice of language that is customary in the sphere of international 
finance.134  
A prospectus that does not include the final offer price or the amount of 
transferrable securities must be filed with the FCA as soon as practicable. 135 
Additionally, after the approval of a prospectus and prior to the closure of the offer or 
admission to trading, if a new significant factor or a material mistake or inaccuracy 
arises, there is a directive-derived requirement for a supplementary prospectus.136 
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Significant factor in this instance includes any factor considered to be important in 
making an informed assessment of the kind mentioned in the general duty of 
disclosure.137 A supplementary prospectus provides sufficient information to correct 
any mistake or inaccuracy that gave rise to the need for it.138 It should be noted that 
where the relevant transaction involves both an offer and admission to trading in a 
regulated market, the relevant period that a supplementary prospectus may be 
required ends with the later on the closure of the offer when trading of the securities 
on a regulated market begins.139 These documents are submitted to the Financial 
Conduct Authority when listing in the capital market and they are valid for twelve 
months. This system aids in making the process of issuance more efficient and the 
first major United Kingdom securities offering to adopt this model was the flotation 
of Standard Life plc in July 2006.140 
A prospectus is approved by a competent authority of the issuer’s home state 
and then made available to the public before an offer of securities to the public or a 
request for admission of securities to trading on a regulated market.141 An approved 
prospectus is deemed to have a community scope, which entails that it is valid for 
public offers or the admission of securities to trading on a regulated market in any 
number of states within the EU.142 A prospectus is considered available to the public 
when presented in electronic form either on the corporation’s website, website of 
financial intermediaries or on the website of the market where they are to trade.143 
Where a prospectus is published by one of the electronic methods, a paper copy must 
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be delivered free of charge to those investors who request it.144 Published prospectus 
shall be available in electronic form for at least 10 years after publication in the 
websites listed above.145 
 
3.7. Enforcing Rules of Disclosure 
Countries use different approach in enforcing rules of disclosure. Securities 
legislation grants investors the right to sue under tort law or law of contract if they 
invest on the basis of falsified information.146 The investor is to establish that the 
issuer failed to reveal specific information mandated by law as against proving the 
issuers negligence.  
 
3.7.1. Enforcement in Nigeria 
In Nigeria, civil or criminal penalties are used to enforce the provisions of mandatory 
disclosure. Where a person is invited to subscribe for shares in a company and he 
relies on the information on a prospectus and eventually suffers loss, they are entitled 
to compensation.147 Compensatory actions can be instituted against directors, persons 
who consented to be named and are named in the prospectus as directors and 
employees of the company who participated in or facilitated the production of the 
prospectus and the issuing house and its principal officers.148 The regulations exclude 
liability for directors in certain instances; directors that withdraw their consent as 
directors before the issuance of the prospectus,149 directors that are unaware of the 
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issuance of the prospectus or done without their knowledge,150 and directors that 
notify in writing that a prospectus issued or about to be issued contains an untrue 
statement.151 The regulations also exclude liability against experts that give their 
opinion on certain issues contained in the prospectus.152 Where a prospectus includes 
an untrue statement or misstatement, any director or officer who authorised the 
prospectus can be held criminally liable and convicted to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding three years or a fine of not less than 1 billion Naira or both. If summarily 
convicted, he shall be liable to a fine of not less than 1 billion Naira or imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding three months or both. He can avoid such terms if he proves 
that the misstatement or untrue statement was immaterial or that he had reasonable 
grounds to believe and did up to the time of the issuance of the prospectus believe that 
the statement was true.153  
3.7.2. Enforcement in the United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, civil and criminal sanctions are applied when enforcing rules 
of disclosure. For civil actions, there is the option of rescission of contract or 
compensation claims. 
 
3.7.3.  Rescission of contracts 
Rescission involves unwinding the contract and placing parties back into their pre-
contractual position. 154  An investor that acquires securities on the belief of 
information provided by or on behalf of the other party that later turns out to have 
been false or misleading can seek for rescission of the contract by which he acquired 																																																								
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the securities.155 In instituting such action, the claimant must be within the class of 
persons to whom the false statement was addressed.156 When shares are offered to the 
public generally, this requirement should be easily satisfied since everyone is within 
the category of addressee. Furthermore, the statement complained must be a statement 
of fact and not law; intention or opinion and must have also come from the company, 
either directly or indirectly.157 Silence is not actionable as a general rule. However, a 
claim may lie if the effect of an omission is to render what is said false or 
misleading.158 
  It is important to distinguish rescission from repudiation of contract because 
these two terms are usually confused for each other and sometimes used as synonyms. 
Repudiation also known as anticipatory breach refers to refusal of a party to perform 
an obligation owed to the other party. It does not challenge the existence or validity of 
the contract ab initio, rather it challenges the continued existence or performance of 
obligations under the contract. In securities market transactions, when the investor has 
paid for the securities, there are no further foreseeable obligations on his part. In view 
of this, repudiation will not be ideal when seeking to enforce the disclosure regime 
because other than there being no further obligations on the part of the investor, it 
means there is still an enforceable contract. However, this thesis argues that there is 
nothing stopping parliament or a regulator from compelling performance of an 
obligation to disclose after breach of disclosure rules. This would be beneficial if it is 
to serve as a remedy for investors, however, the timing must be right. 
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A party seeking to rescind the contract must act promptly after the discovery 
of the fraud or misrepresentation. The case of Sharpley v South and East Coast Rly159 
established the importance acting promptly because if an investor performs an act that 
amounts to ownership after learning of an entitlement to reject, the right to rescind 
will be barred.160 
It is important to note that rescission cannot be sought against a company that 
has gone into liquidation because individual creditor actions are barred due to the 
principle of collectivity that operates in insolvency. However, the courts may give 
permission for such actions.161 This bar is applicable even while the company is in 
solvent liquidation.162 If the case is successful, the investor must notify the company 
that the shares are retracted and take steps to have his name removed from the register 
or any other actions practicable.  If the company disputes this, the company may 
apply to the court for rectification.163 
 
3.7.4. Compensation Claims 
An investor who has acquired shares on the basis of a false prospectus may seek 
financial compensation in addition to or instead of rescission. If there is a contractual 
relationship between the maker of the statements and the person seeking 
compensation, the innocent party may be able to seek compensation under the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 and may additionally have a claim for breach of 
contract.164 Section 90 of the FSMA 2000 provides the medium to statutorily claim for 
compensation exclusively in regards to prospectuses and listing particulars and lists 																																																								
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persons capable of instituting such claims. 165  Furthermore, failure to publish a 
required supplementary prospectus establishes the possibility of instituting an action 
for compensation by virtue of Section 90 (4). 
Persons that can be sued in this regard are listed by the Prospectus Rules to 
include, the issuer, directors of the corporation, persons that are liable for the 
prospectus etc.166 An issuer and its directors are not responsible if the issuer has not 
made or authorised the offer or request for admission to trading in relation to which 
the prospectus was published.167 Furthermore, a director is not responsible for a 
prospectus if it is published without his knowledge or consent. For such a director to 
avoid liability, he must, as soon practicable give reasonable public notice that it was 
published without his knowledge or consent.168 In the same vein, an offeror whom is 
not the issuer is not responsible for a prospectus where the issuer is responsible for it 
or the prospectus was drawn up primarily by or on behalf of the issuer, and the offeror 
is making the offer in association with the issuer.169 Furthermore, a person can be 
liable for only a part of a prospectus by indicating the parts of the prospectus he is 
accepting liability only to the extent specified if it is included in the form and context 
to which the person has agreed.170 
In establishing a claim for compensation, the burden is on the investor to 
prove a causal link between the inaccurate prospectus and the loss he suffered i.e. 
prove that he suffered loss as a consequence of wrong information he relied on to 
acquire shares. 171  However, if the investor knew he was presented with false 
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information his right to be compensated becomes lessened. 172  Nonetheless, the 
investor is not mandated to verify the accuracy of the information as well as prove 
that the person responsible knew of the incorrect nature of the information contained 
therein.173 However, he is to prove that the maker of the statement failed to act with 
sufficient care when instituting an action under section 90 of FSMA. For deceit 
claims the claimant shall prove that the maker of the statement knew it was false, did 
not have an honest belief in its truth or was reckless as to its veracity.174 
 
3.7.5. Criminal liability for defective prospectuses 
Sections 89-92 of the Financial Services Act 2012 makes it possible to institute 
criminal proceedings when a prospectus contains false information or conceals 
material facts. These sections make it is an offence to knowingly or recklessly make a 
statement that is false or misleading in a material respect or dishonestly conceal 
material facts in a prospectus.175 If they do this recklessly or with the intention to 
induce another person to enter into a relevant agreement, then criminal actions can be 
instituted. 176 Furthermore, it is prohibited to intentionally create misleading 
impressions as to the market price or value of investments in order to induce an 
investment decision.177 Anyone found guilty of these offences is liable to a maximum 
penalty of seven years imprisonment plus a fine.178 In R v Feld, the Court of Appeal 
upheld a six-year sentence against a director for offences relating to a rights issue 
prospectus under a statutory predecessor offence. In upholding the sentence, the court 
highlighted the vital importance of maintaining the confidence of the city and 																																																								
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financial institutions in the veracity of information contained in prospectuses and 
similar documents.179 
Criminal actions can also be instituted under the provisions of the Fraud Act 
2006. Failure to disclose information or by abuse of position is held to be a statutory 
criminal offence.180 In such instance, the act must have been done dishonestly with the 
intention of making a gain or causing a loss or risk of loss to another. The loss does 
not have to take place. Pursuing such a claim is rare because of the high standard of 
proof required in criminal law i.e. proof beyond reasonable doubt.  
 
The foregoing sections have highlighted the importance of regulating 
disclosure in capital markets. The regulatory provisions of Nigeria and the UK exhibit 
some similarities such as operating two or more regimes in regulating mandatory 
disclosure as well as the substantive rules governing the act contained in the rules. 
However, there are few exceptions. For example, some rules contained in the UK, are 
absent in the regulations in the Nigerian regulations. Furthermore, the laws mandating 
disclosure for corporations listed in the Nigerian capital market have been empirically 
researched and findings indicate that the Nigerian corporate reporting practices are 
weak.181 In 2004, the World Bank stated that Nigerian financial reporting practices are 
deficient in terms of listed companies.182 In the UK, the report of the Financial 
Reporting Council in 2015 indicates that a good level of corporate reporting is 
practiced by larger public corporations especially those in the FTSE 3500, with 
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boards responding well to new strategic report requirements. There are also examples 
of good reporting by smaller companies and AIM quoted companies but there are 
traces of errors in how they apply the IFRS.183 Furthermore, in 2016, a survey of 224 
stakeholders on behalf of the Financial Reporting Council indicate that corporate 
reporting is generally good, with 90% of the directors and auditors as well as 73% of 
investors expressing high confidence in the quality of corporate reporting.184 This 
thesis proposes the need to correct such assertions because the effects are detrimental 
to the capital market, as there is the likelihood both local and foreign investors will 
avoid the market if it is categorised as such. In the interest of growth, sustainability 
and economic development, disclosure should be made mandatory and adequately 
regulated. It should be encouraged as a norm guiding operators of the securities 
market in Nigeria. This will reduce occurrences of market abuse in the market as well 
as propel the market to be efficient. 
 In view of this, this thesis argues that the laws already established in Nigeria 
though commendable, have some loopholes that may be exploited, and discourage 
investors from investing in the market. The reasons for this argument are highlighted 
below.   
First, there are some important issues contained in one of the rules that are 
absent in the other. For example, the SEC Rules and Regulations make provisions for 
the declaration of director earnings whilst this provision is absent in the ISA. Such 
information can be used to establish liability against directors. Although the rules 
utilised in the UK share similar attributes, i.e. some laws are contained in one 																																																								
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provision and are absent in another this thesis submits that such practice in Nigeria 
may not be ideal. Nigeria is a developing country where there is some level of 
financial regulation ignorance. This coupled with the fact that there are no reported 
cases of these regulations being applied, highlights inertia in terms of enforcement, 
which can partly be attributed to lack of knowledge of these rules. This thesis 
proposes further harmonisation of both regulatory acts by providing a more detailed 
requirement for mandatory disclosure in both acts. In the alternative, this thesis 
proposes the streamlining of these regulations to be contained in one regulatory 
regime as against two. The ISA is an Act of the legislature that regulates capital 
market operations. It is arguable that the SEC Rules and Regulations are subject to it 
because generally an act of legislature supersedes the procedural rules of an executive 
organ. This makes it impractical that the rules contained in the SEC Rules and 
Regulations are not conspicuously available in the ISA. In view of this, this thesis 
proposes that both regulatory regimes should contain provisions for mandatory 
disclosure or in the alternative, reference where the provision is contained in the other 
regime. 
Second, neither the provisions of the SEC Rules and Regulations nor the ISA 
prescribe the extent to which disclosure is to be carried out. In comparing this to the 
UK, the FSMA provides that disclosure is not restricted to individual knowledge. It 
should be extended to things that would be known when searches are conducted 
diligently. Following the regulatory provisions in Nigeria, there is the possibility 
corporations will not search for information, as they are not mandated to by any 
regulation. This thesis recommends that the provision of the FSMA highlighted above 
be adopted into the SEC Rules and Regulations as well as the ISA. This will help in 
ascertaining what ought to have been disclosed by corporations in a court of law 
	 122	
should the need arise where there is insufficient disclosure. Although it is arguable 
that the provision of section 73 of the ISA caters for this, this thesis argues that the 
substantive provision of section 73 does not prescribe the extent to which information 
should be disclosed, it only provides a possible defence that can be employed by 
directors and persons in charge of a prospectus.185 
Third, the Nigerian regulatory regime is arguably more lenient in terms of 
enforcement than the UK. Persons that provide misstatements are liable to seven years 
imprisonment, whilst in Nigeria an individual who performs a similar offence is liable 
to three years imprisonment. Whilst this thesis commends the effort to have these 
rules in place, enforcing these laws should be given utmost importance. There are no 
recorded cases of any individual going to jail for provision of misstatement in 
disclosure. This leads to two assumptions, which are: the rules are good enough and 
individuals adhere to them or they have not been utilised. This thesis aligns it 
argument with the latter, as evidence from the Nigerian Stock Exchange/ SEC website 
show a list of companies that have either been suspended or had their license revoked 
by virtue of not providing quarterly reports or annual reports and no reports of 
indicating that there is no application of these rules that incarcerates individuals that 
have committed the offence. This coupled with the fact that Nigeria is known as a 
corrupt country makes this thesis align its argument that corporations listed in the 
stock exchange do not disclose honestly. In view of this, this thesis proposes that an 
austere approach towards such acts of malpractice in the market should be adequately 
penalised. Penalties such as imprisonment and seizure of assets that can be used for 
compensation for investors who have suffered loss should be applied. This has the 
possibility to bring some sterility to the market when applied appropriately. In relation 
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to fines, the SEC Rules and Regulations and ISA make provision for fines not less 
than 1 billion Naira (equivalent of approximately £2 million). This sum is unrealistic 
and potentially unenforceable. Whilst it is important to have rules governing the 
capital market, it is important to set realistic and enforceable rules. This thesis 
postulates that this is likely the reason there are no reported cases of individuals or 
corporations paying any such fines. Furthermore, the Nigerian penal system is known 
to award little to nothing as fines.186 In view of this, this thesis proposes more realistic 
sums to be imposed as fines, by the Courts.    
 
The foregoing suggests that there is the possibility for corporations not to 
adhere to adequate disclosure when listing in the Nigerian capital market. The 
criticisms underlined above, if addressed have the propensity to curtail wrong 
practices if properly implemented. Although these issues appear minimal, this thesis 
submits that for completeness it is important they be incorporated into the rules 
regulating mandatory disclosure in the capital market as it may cause more harm if 
they are absent. 
 
Although mandatory disclosure has been criticised its importance cannot be 
undermined, neither can the effect it has on the confidence of investors be 
emasculated. This thesis suggests that regardless of the criticisms, it would be harmful 
if it were absent in a capital market or not amply obeyed. It is arguable that there are 
some benefits being enjoyed by mandating disclosure as reports indicate that 
corporations are obeying the rules because of the stringent practices employed by the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange. In 2011, the stock exchanged reported to have suspended 																																																								
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48 firms listed for failure to publish annual reports on time. Furthermore, in 2012, it 
penalized 72 firms for not meeting the reporting requirement. This is held out to have 
led to greater compliance of disclosure in the market. 187  This is a welcome 
development and should be practiced more often with more stringent reparations for 
erring participants of the market, as there are still reports of corporations not 
observing mandatory disclosure in the market. In view of the foregoing, this thesis 
proposes the enactment of credible regulations and ample enforcement in a bid to 
ensure that corporations adhere to the rules. The next section discusses another form 
of disclosure utilised in capital markets known as voluntary disclosure. 
 
3.7.6. Voluntary disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure is the provision of information beyond requirements by a 
company’s management such as the generally accepted principles and SEC rules.  It is 
the provision of extra information that will be relevant to the decision making for 
investors. The information disclosed is determined by the firm’s corporate governance 
structure and ownership.188 The discretion exercised by privately informed managers 
or firms in disclosing information is beneficial because, rational market participants 
would otherwise interpret non-disclosure as unfavourable news and consequently 
discount the value of the firm’s assets.189 Studies have examined the economic 
consequences of voluntary disclosure and a common consensus is that it affects the 
market in several ways identified below. 
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First, it increases the confidence of investors in the market by reducing 
information asymmetry amongst informed and uniformed investors. 190  This 
confidence emanates from the belief that stock market transactions occur at a fair 
price due to companies voluntarily providing information that they are not mandated 
to provide by law.  
Second, it has the likelihood of generating more liquidity for a firm’s 
securities.191 Managers believe that voluntarily communicating information increases 
the overall liquidity of a company’s stock.192 Furthermore, it levels the playing field 
and reduces the amount of price protection that less informed traders apply when 
purchasing shares.193 
Third, it reduces a firm’s cost of capital by mitigating adverse selection 
problem in the capital markets. The lemons problem in capital markets creates the 
incentive for managers to voluntarily disclose to reduce the cost of capital.194 When 
disclosure is imperfect, investors bear risk of forecasting the future payoffs from their 
investment and if the risk is non-diversifiable investors will demand an incremental 
return for bearing the information risk. Consequently, firms with high level of 
disclosure and low information risk having lower cost of capital than firms with low 
disclosure levels and high information risk have.195 This reduces the information 
asymmetry between firms and investors thus enabling greater liquidity.196 That said, 
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evidence supporting this notion is contradictory because of difference in size of 
companies, presence of intermediaries etc.197  
The effects of voluntarily disclosing information are considered profitable to a 
corporation and the capital market. In view of the foregoing, a question that comes to 
mind is, why reveal information not mandated by law to disclose? This is crucial 
considering the likelihood that the intricacies of the company might be exposed. The 
next section highlights some reasons management of a company voluntarily discloses 
information.  
 
3.7.7. Reasons managers voluntarily disclose information to prospective 
shareholders 
In an efficient capital market, managers have superior information about their firm’s 
expected future performance than outside investors. If auditing and accounting 
regulations work perfectly, managers’ accounting decisions and disclosures would 
communicate changes in their firms business economics to outside investors.198 
Managers’ incentives for voluntarily disclosing information are identified below. 
First, shareholders hold managers accountable for stock performance because 
the managers oversee the running of the company. Furthermore, poor stock price 
performance is associated with CEO turnover.199 Dissident shareholders who wage a 
proxy fight for board representation frequently cite poor earnings performance as 
justification for proposed management changes.200 Therefore managers use voluntary 
disclosure to reduce the likelihood of undervaluation and to explain why there is a 																																																								
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poor performance earnings.201 Furthermore, they apply voluntary disclosure as a 
means of developing investor confidence with the view to raise capital for the 
company. This coupled with some compensation schemes granted to managers such 
as stock grant options202 and stock appreciation rights203 provide a likely explanation 
as to why managers voluntarily disclose information. 
Second, restrictions on insider trading provide managers with incentives to 
make voluntary disclosure to correct any perceived undervaluation prior to the 
expiration of stock option awards.204 In the same vein, if a manager is interested in 
trading in their stocks, they have the likelihood to voluntarily disclose private 
information to meet the restrictions imposed by insider trading. 
Third, managers employ voluntary disclosure to avoid litigation by 
shareholders. Managers in firms with bad earnings have an incentive to pre-disclose 
information to reduce the cost of litigation. This hypothesis presumes that in the 
absence of litigation managers have a reason to disclose good and bad news 
symmetrically as the Courts rationally focus on whether there was delay in the 
announcement of bad news.205 Research has also indicated that a firm’s decision to 
disclose information to investors is influenced by concern that such disclosures can 
damage their competitive position in product markets.206  
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Research on the effects of voluntary disclosure in Nigeria indicates that bigger 
firms tend to make voluntary disclosure compared to smaller firms.207 The study also 
found that better performing firms provide more corporate disclosure when measuring 
firm performance such as earning per share and dividend.208 It has been recommended 
that companies should engage in voluntary disclosure of information that is industry 
specific and useful to prospective investors.209 Furthermore, authorities charged with 
the responsibilities of regulating the information disclosed in financial reports and 
prospectus should review their disclosure requirement and incorporate voluntary 
disclosure items into them with the view of increasing transparency.210 
 
Adequate and efficient disclosure boosts the confidence of investors in a 
capital market and decreases liability on companies because investors are presented 
with further information to guide them when making the decision to invest. This 
thesis submits that the concept, if properly explored and regulated has the propensity 
to encourage prospective investors to invest their money in such markets.  
The Nigeria UK capital markets projects in its report of March 2015 
highlighted the need for transparency and eradication of manipulation in the capital 
market.211 A stringent disclosure regime was suggested as an improvement in an 
attempt to deter insider trading, information asymmetry and improve transparency in 
the capital market.212 The urgent call for transparency cannot be undermined, as there 
are unquantifiable benefits a capital market will gain by operating a transparent 																																																								
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market. Amongst these include, enhancement of investor confidence, which 
subsequently leads to a robust capital market. With a robust capital market, there will 
be sufficient capital to engage in projects that will aid in economic development.  
 
Mandatory disclosure is an important concept in a capital market that should 
be encouraged and enforced in countries with financial illiteracy and countries that 
are prone to fraudulent issuers. In the same vein, voluntary disclosure should also be 
encouraged, promoted and adopted as a norm, but should not be relied on as the sole 
means of disclosure accorded in a capital market especially in countries where 
financial illiteracy and corruption is pervasive.  
 
One major issue with disclosure emanates from the fact that there is no 
guarantee that the information disclosed is accurate. In view of this, there has been the 
need to adopt what is known as reputational intermediaries or watch dogs of the 
capital market to attest to the validity of information that is disclosed to prospective 
investors. The next section analyses the role of reputational intermediaries and the 
possibility of regulation. 
 
3.8. Reputational intermediaries 
Reputational intermediaries also called ‘gatekeepers’, or ‘watchdogs’ are professional 
agents that monitor management and alert shareholders to opportunistic behaviour by 
their managers.213 They are referred to as independent watchdogs of the capital 
market. They screen out flaws, identify defects and verify compliance with standards 
or procedures relating to investments. In a bid to reduce information asymmetry, they 
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act as an assurance instrument for investors by confirming that a company has 
complied with the relevant procedures prescribed by law and has not falsified 
information to investors. They are positioned to prevent wrongdoing by withholding 
necessary cooperation of consent.214 For example, an investment-banking firm can 
refuse to underwrite the issuer’s securities if it finds that the issuer’s disclosures are 
deficient.215   
They work with reputational capital, which is the quantitative measure of an 
entity’s reputational value in a community or a market place.216 They get reputational 
capital when they repeatedly carry out duties of vouching for the correctness or 
otherwise of a company’s disclosure. Entry into the field of gatekeeping is usually 
restricted and protected because new entrants possess no reputational capital to work 
with. Furthermore, reputational capital can be lost if an intermediary has condoned 
some form of wrongdoing, thus generating the perception that intermediaries will be 
loyal to investors because of the likelihood of losing reputational capital. They lend or 
pledge reputational capital to the corporation thus enabling investors or the market to 
rely on the corporation’s own disclosure or assurance where they otherwise might 
not.217 The next section identifies some reputational intermediaries, their functions, 
and possible regulation towards achieving an efficient capital market. 
 
3.8.1. Auditors 
An audit is a systemic process of objectively gathering and evaluating evidence 
relating to assertions about economic actions and events that an organisation making 																																																								
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the assertion has been engaged. It is used to ascertain the degree of correspondence 
between these assertions and the established criteria.218 Auditors conduct audits to 
verify the accuracy of financial records and accounting practices of a business or 
government.219  They check and verify financial statements as well as ascertain the 
correctness or lack thereof of the amounts contained in statement, liability and 
ownership of assets as well as check if the financial statement is in conformity with 
accounting standards. 220  In their capacity as intermediaries, they ensure that 
organisations provide accurate financial records and statements. They perform 
systematic and independent examination of data, statements, records, operations and 
performance for a stated purpose. It should be noted that an auditor’s task does not 
include deciphering if a company is doing well or substantiating the risks associated 
with the business or the likelihood of success.221 They are to report misstatement 
contained in financial statement disclosed by the companies as well as express any 
complaints.  
There are two types of auditors, internal auditors and external auditors. 
Internal auditors are usually employees of the companies they audit. They work in 
close range with the companies and are apprised of the intricate details of the running 
of the company.222 They promote disclosure and ensure that financial statements 
disclosed contains required information.223 External auditors are independent auditors 
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employed by companies or investors to audit the account of a company. They 
sometimes work directly or in conjunction with governmental agencies.224 
Verification by auditors can be used to enhance investor confidence when 
deciding whether to invest.225 However, this thesis argues that because it has been 
suggested that the verification given by auditors does not insure or guarantee the 
accuracy of financial statements, there is the likelihood of them performing their tasks 
in a mediocre manner because they know liability will not be on them.  
This thesis proposes that auditors should be held accountable, partly liable and 
should be able to be sued by investors if disclosure is incorrect, especially in instances 
where they could have detected such malpractices if they had performed their duties 
diligently. This is borne out of the thought that auditing financial statements is a 
sensitive task that should be conducted with the highest level of caution. This 
proposition does take into account the likelihood of mistake and deceit by companies 
been audited. In view of that, this thesis proposes that before liability can be 
established against an auditor/auditing firm, it should be proven that such 
misstatement or falsified information was one that an auditor ought to identify if he 
carried out his job diligently.  
Whilst this proposition above has the propensity to generate an upright attitude 
by auditors towards their duties, it is crucial to maintain a balance when imposing 
such rules to avoid auditors neglecting or evading jobs. For instance, it was argued 
that because of the fear of possible litigation auditors resist responsibility for 
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assessing the appropriateness of chosen accounting conventions, insisting that 
management has this responsibility.226 
A major concern in relation to the characteristics of auditors as gatekeepers is 
the issue of the independence and objectivity, which are qualities expected of an 
auditor. Other characteristics include detection of error, carrying out tests, giving 
opinions on the materiality of financial statements, reporting of material error and 
fraud. In view of these and based on the sensitive nature of their job, it is imperative 
that auditors are efficiently regulated to enable them operate within the ambit of the 
law.  
The collapse and eventual restructuring of some institutions within Nigeria 
and outside the country (e.g. Enron and WorldCom in the USA, Cadbury, 
Intercontinental Bank, Oceanic Bank, Fidelity Bank in Nigeria) and the subsequent 
implications of reporting by auditors have placed the profession under close 
scrutiny.227 Investors in Nigeria have lost several billions of dollars through the 
collusion of accountants and external auditors with company management and 
directors to falsify and deliberately overstate company’s accounts.228 
It has been suggested that contrary to the claim of protecting the public 
interest accountants and auditors may be partly responsible for the closure of some of 
these corporations in Nigeria even though the statutory provisions and acts relating to 
companies and professional bodies place the responsibility on accountants and 
auditors to detect and report cases of suspected fraud and accounting malpractices.229 
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Moreover, it is important to highlight the effect of the presumed failure of auditors in 
carrying out their duties efficiently and diligently, e.g. the closure of some of these 
corporations led to unemployment in the Nigerian economy and poverty of millions 
of Nigerians.230 
Auditors in Nigeria are considered the reason some corporate malpractices are 
evident in the system. For instance, it is asserted that they fail to alert regulators when 
they discover fraudulent or other questionable activities in company’s book. They are 
said to sometimes prepare three different accounts for the same organisation (one for 
the shareholders, one for management and one for tax authority).231 This kind of 
practice is held to be widespread in corporate Nigeria. In 2006 the firm of Akintola 
Williams & Deloitte was accused of collaborating with board of directors of Afribank 
Nigeria to falsify the business account for March 2006. Following this suspicion of 
malpractice in the system that was not investigated or sanctioned, the firm was 
accused of collaborating with the members of the board of Cadbury Nigeria PLC to 
deliberately overstate the company’s account by between 13 billion Naira and 15 
billion Naira six months later.232 There are other instances of unreported unethical 
conducts by auditing firms in Nigeria. In view of the foregoing there is the need for 
efficacious regulation of auditors in other to achieve best corporate practices. 
 
In Nigeria, auditors are regulated by the Nigerian Standards on Auditing 
(NSA), which prescribes that all audit carried out should be in compliance with the 
International Standard on Auditing (ISA).233 Furthermore, the Companies and Allied 
Matters (CAMA) mandates all financial statements of listed companies in Nigeria to 																																																								
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be audited by qualified auditors. 234  Additionally, the SEC also requires public 
companies with securities to file its audited financial statement and other returns that 
may be prescribed with the commission on periodic or annual bases.235 In a bid to 
attain heights that are comparable to its international counterparts, the Nigerian 
government in 2010 adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
with the aim of it being fully operational and applicable to audits carried out in 
Nigeria in 2014.236 
The UK is not immune from unethical practices by auditors as it has been 
documented that banks sometimes request accounting firms to visit their clients with 
the purpose of writing and reporting on the viability of their business operations. The 
accountants and auditors are tasked to provide pessimistic picture of the business with 
the aim of being appointed as receivers based on the recommendations from these 
accountants and auditors.237 Furthermore, evidence indicates that auditors that were 
implicated in audit failures and referred to professional bodies were sometimes not 
investigated.238 
In the UK, the requirements for statutory audits are set out by the Statutory 
Audit Directive (2006/43/EC), adopted by the European Union and transposed into 
UK law by the Companies Act 2006 (s.475). This directive grants powers to entities 
known as Recognized Supervisory Bodies (RSBs) to register and supervise auditors. 
They are subject to an independent oversight and are regulated by the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC). The FRC is the independent regulator responsible for 
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promoting high quality corporate governance and reporting. It does this by setting 
codes and standards as well as oversees regulatory activities of the professional 
accountancy bodies.239 The enforcement committee or tribunal effects enforcement by 
deliberating if an auditor has complied with the regulatory framework of auditing. It 
imposes a sanction on the auditor if the auditor has not complied with the regulatory 
framework. Sanctions include suspension, withdrawal of registration and regulatory 
penalty of a fine that is determined by the enforcement tribunal or committee. In 
Nigeria, auditors can be held liable for negligence.240 Furthermore, the ISA241 provides 
for the imposition of a fine of 100 thousand Naira and subsequent 50 thousand Naira 
on a daily basis against an auditor for not filing annual report and periodic report with 
the SEC or failing to issue a statement as to the existence, adequacy and effectiveness 
or otherwise of the internal control system.242 Additionally, in a bid to ensure that the 
financial statements produced by auditors is efficient, there is the provision that any 
officer of a company that knowingly or recklessly provide false statements to auditors 
will be held liable. In such an instance, s. 369 of CAMA provides that such person 
may be liable to a year imprisonment or a fine of N500 or both. 
If both the Nigerian and UK provisions are compared, one thing is evident, the 
deficiency in Nigerian regulatory provisions on auditors. The provisions in Nigeria do 
not explicitly define what behaviour constitutes negligence in comparison to the 
provision in the FRC in the UK. However, they can be held liable under the common 
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law for tortious professional negligence or negligent misstatements.243 This arguably 
is insufficient as auditors can feign ignorance of acts that they are prohibited from 
doing. Furthermore, in relation to penalties, the Nigerian provisions of penalty of 100 
thousand Naira and subsequent 50 thousand Naira for each day is not substantial 
enough to make auditors abstain from wrong acts whilst carrying out their duties. This 
thesis proposes a firmer approach with substantial sums as penalties. There has been 
the recommendation of a more rigorous approach towards quality control measures by 
individual auditing firms and quality monitoring teams of the professional accounting 
bodies in Nigeria.244 Furthermore, there has been the recommendation for stiffer 
penalties for erring auditors as practiced in other climes. Taking an example from the 
UK, although it is stated that the enforcement committee or tribunal determines the 
amount of the fine, the precedent set is commendable and a similar standard should be 
adopted in Nigeria. For instance, in 2014, Ernst & Young and Mazars LLP were fined 
52, 000 and 10,400 pounds respectively for not complying with the regulatory 
framework for auditing its audit of an entity’s 2013 financial statement.245 
The regulation of auditors is very important because of the sensitive nature of 
the job they perform. This thesis recommends a stricter approach towards auditing 
firms and auditors that do not perform their duties diligently and a stricter liability if 
by virtue of their verification, an individual invests in the market and subsequently 
suffers a loss. This has the likelihood to generate some diligence whilst performing 
their duties. 
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3.8.2. Credit Rating Agencies 
Credit rating agencies issue ratings about the creditworthiness of debt securities such 
as government and corporate bonds.246 They are used to assess the risk of a borrower’s 
default and its financial loss, in the sale of financial products.247 In essence, they 
provide standardised assessments of the future probability that a debtor will default on 
the liabilities owed to creditors.248 They play a very important role in the running of 
securities market by assigning ratings to securities, trading companies and 
governments.249 These ratings are a combination of purported science based on 
mathematical modelling of the entities financial performance or economy in the case 
of governments based on assessments of the prospects for that entity’s business or 
economy or its place in the global economy generally.250 They function in a ‘Two-
way’ or ‘Three-way’ manner. In the two-way manner they rate financial products and 
present them to investors. The need for accuracy and independence is important 
because, investor’s confidence escalates if the information provided by the agency is 
credible thus leading them to invest. In the three-way manner they present individual 
ratings to financial product issuers whom furnish them to investors using the 
associated credit ratings as a form of certification.251 Ratings are offered on variety of 
issues such as issuers, debt, instrument, credit risk of assets. They also rate general 
corporate debt or the credit risk of assets within a pooled security.252 Furthermore, 
they provide continuous assessments of securities they have already rated by 																																																								
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upgrading, downgrading, confirming a rating or placing the securities in an early 
warning watch list.253 
As reputational intermediaries, they reduce information costs as well as 
increase the pool of potential borrowers and promote liquid markets.254 They are 
expected to act independently whilst carrying out their duties so as to reach their 
ratings without favour or bias.255 In this regard, an argument about the independence 
of credit rating agencies is likely to be spawned because the companies they rate 
sometimes remunerate them. Their assessments are theoretically provided to investors 
through independent evaluation and assessment of the debt securities and provision of 
a succinct risk assessment in the form of credit worthy gradations for financial 
products. Gradations range from AAA to C. 256  These gradations assess risks 
associated with holding specific debt or debt-like securities.257 
They are sometimes used for contractual purpose, which is aimed primarily at 
regulatory compliance. In some countries, such as the United States of America, 
credit rating agencies have a regulatory licence that empowers them to endorse a debt 
instrument that is eligible by law for particular types of investments. Such licenses 
help insulate fiduciary liability when making investment.258 
Credit rating agencies have been criticized on different issues. Chief amongst 
these issues is the fact that there is a shadow of doubt cast over the ability of these 
‘gatekeepers; to provide reliable signals that investors can utilise to make informed 
decisions because they are held to provide little informational value especially for 
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more complex asset backed securities.259 Furthermore, there is the issue of conflict of 
interest that may arise when both the issuer and the rating agencies have an economic 
interest in ensuring the success of the issue.260 The issuer would want to ensure the 
sale of securities and the rating agency is desirous of being paid and securing 
lucrative future business from the issue.261 This becomes acute when the rating 
agency’s analyst proffer suggestions with regard to the structure of financial 
instrument in order to get good ratings, thus making the process of ratings more of a 
negotiation rather than one of commercial judgment.262 
The global market for credit rating agencies is believed to be oligopolistic. 
The effect of this is sparse concentration of credit rating agencies in the market, thus 
generating the possibility to make excessive profits. Furthermore, it creates the 
susceptibility to exude over confidence as well a lackadaisical attitude whilst giving 
ratings because there is little or no competition. Additionally, with the reputation such 
agencies already possess in the market, it would be a difficult task breaking grounds 
due to lack of experience and reputation. For example, in Nigeria, there are a handful 
of recognised credit rating agencies amongst which are, Augusto & co (a subsidiary 
of Africa’s global rating agency), Pharez ratings and Brickfield Road Associates. 
Standard & Poor is reported to have a local office.263 This is largely accountable to the 
fact that there are not a lot of rateable instruments as well the fact that the culture of 
credit rating in Nigeria is still underdeveloped.264 This thesis proposes the need for 
more players in the market, as it has the likelihood of generating some competition in 
the performance of their duties. Furthermore, by virtue of the sensitive nature of their 																																																								
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tasks, this thesis argues that there is the paramount need for regulation of credit rating 
agencies in a bid to get them to perform efficiently. 
In the UK, credit rating agencies are regulated by the provisions of the ESMA 
that is implemented in the UK provisions of The Credit Rating Agencies Regulation 
2010. In Nigeria, the SEC regulates them. The provisions contained in the Rules and 
Regulations of the SEC in Nigeria are not sufficient to tackle wrong behaviours by 
credit rating agencies or their employees towards investors. The rules do not regulate 
rating agencies conduct of their duties as it only lists procedure and accompanying 
document for registering with the SEC as well as the functions.265 Paradoxically, the 
provisions of the Credit Ratings Agencies Regulation 2010 indicates the possibility of 
imposing financial penalties on a credit rating agency that has contravened a 
requirement imposed by the EC regulation.266 Furthermore, upon imposing a penalty, 
the authority must publish a statement that it has imposed the penalty on that person 
or agency.267  
This thesis argues that regulation of credit rating agencies in Nigeria is grossly 
deficient, as it does not cater for situations where such agency may carry out its duty 
in a wrong manner or where they perform fraudulent acts. The UK provision on the 
other hand makes provision for this through the imposition of fines and publishing 
that such a fine was imposed. This thesis recommends that the SEC rules and 
regulations and the ISA grant strict liability for erring credit rating agencies. This 
thesis recommends both criminal and civil sanctions for the agencies that give 
falsified or incorrect ratings that leads investors to invest and then experience loss of 
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money. This is a viable means to ensure that credit rating agencies operating in 
Nigeria carry out their duties diligently and honestly.  
It is important to highlight that credit rating agencies were held partially liable 
for the financial crisis of 2008. However, the regulatory approach was updated in 
2010 by the virtue of the provisions of the ESMA and Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 
that was subsequently incorporated into the Credit Ratings Agencies Regulation 2010. 
These addressed a number of issues concerning credit rating agencies. Issues such as 
conflict of interest was catered for in the EC regulation that prescribed that rating 
agencies or analysts that participated in a credit rating or anyone that has approved a 
credit rating directly or indirectly or has any financial instruments of the rated entity 
or any related third party or has any direct or indirect ownership interest in that entity 
was prohibited from issuing a credit rating.268 It is also important to highlight that 
there have been adoption of non-legislative voluntary action in regulating credit rating 
agencies, e.g. IOSCO’s Code of conduct fundamental for credit rating agencies that 
was published in 2004 to promote investor protection by safeguarding the integrity of 
the rating process.269 This thesis asserts that the regulatory provisions contained 
therein are sufficient to tackle any form of perceived impropriety.  
Another issue that is of primary concern is the fact that the same corporations 
that they provide these ratings for remunerate credit rating agencies. This problem is 
highlighted as a major issue that generates conflict of interest. This becomes 
problematic especially in a country as corrupt as Nigeria.270 This thesis argues that 
this system is not ideal in a country as corrupt as Nigeria as it gives rise for 
corporations to bribe or attempt to bribe for favourable ratings for their instruments. 																																																								
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This practice has been criticised and there have been suggestions that they should 
revert to the old system of the credit rating agencies serving as agents for the 
investors. This thesis argues that this has the propensity to generate honest ratings 
from the agencies. Although this would place the cost burden on investors, this thesis 
argues that in a country where corruption is considered as a viable enterprise, it is a 
better alternative to avoid instances of corporations paying for ratings that can turn to 
be misleading to investors. 
In view of the above, there is the issue of sophistication of ratings provided. 
This applies more to retail investors. A question that may arise in view of this is 
should ratings provided to retail investors be different from the ratings provided to 
institutional investors? This thesis argues that the ratings credit rating agencies should 
adopt a system that entails easy comprehension of information to avoid incurring 
further costs of trying to decipher the content of the ratings. 
 
3.8.3. Lawyers 
Not all gatekeepers provide verification or approval with the required standards for 
transactions, some gatekeepers perform advisory role with respect to structural and 
regulatory issues, and they are tagged as gatekeepers because they advise clients to 
avoid illegal conduct as well as analyse the documents provided to investors to ensure 
its conformity with the requirements of the law.  Lawyers fall in this category. They 
play a more behind the scene role as gatekeepers.271 These roles have been compared 
either as a total commitment model or a gatekeeper.272  
The emergence of lawyers as intermediaries can arguably be viewed as an 
attempt to solve the inherent agency problems. Agents of companies seeking some 																																																								
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capital are usually short-term players that insinuate favourable statements in order to 
get the required capital, thus generating suspicion of their claims.273 Using a lawyer to 
verify the competence and completeness of the information provided can solve this 
problem. Furthermore, by carrying out verification repeatedly, a lawyer is likely to 
acquire relevant skills that will aid him in detecting fraudulent documents or 
misstatements.  
Lawyers also serve as coordinators by ensuring that companies disclose the 
required information they often conduct the legal due diligence on a company’s 
affairs before a public offering/capital restructuring. In performing this role, it is 
arguable that because their future and further engagement hinges on them performing 
diligently, they will act right. Furthermore, if the company they represent gets into 
trouble, there is the possibility that they will be held partially liable if there is 
sufficient evidence to prove that they aided in committing fraudulent acts or acted 
negligently. 
The role of lawyers as gatekeepers has been scrutinised in the past, as 
arguments have spawned up as to the acceptance of the role of the corporate attorney 
as a gatekeeper, some of which are highlighted below.  
First, critics argue that if lawyers are gatekeepers, their loyalty can be 
compromised due to a conflict in their responsibilities as they sometimes serve as 
advocate, transaction engineer and disclosure supervisor.274 The foregoing argument is 
stated to already have traces of gatekeeper duties. 275  Furthermore, lawyers are 
potentially not willing to risk their reputation because if they file a falsified document 																																																								
273 M. Bradley, I. De La Salvetierra and M. Gulati, ‘Lawyers: Gatekeepers of the Sovereign Debt 
Market?’ (2013) 38 International Review of Law and Economics 15 
274 J. Fisch and K. Rosen, ‘Is there a role for lawyers in preventing future Enrons?" (2003) 48 Villanova 
Law Review 1117  
275 J. C. Coffee, Jr, ‘The attorney as gatekeeper: An agenda for the SEC’, (2003) Columbia Law and 
Economic Working Paper No.22 117. 
	 145	
they are likely to be charged with “aiding and abetting” if they were reasonably 
expected to know the document was falsified.276 Additionally, they are aware of their 
primary duty to uphold the law in all their dealings. These coupled with the doctrine 
of noisy withdrawal ensures that lawyers act appropriately as intermediaries.277 
Moreover, the same argument could be made for gatekeepers like auditors. 
Second, all the other gatekeepers have a public body that regulates their 
activities as well as draw up a code of conduct that they are to adhere to. For example, 
in the United States of America, auditors are regulated by the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), security analysts are subject to regulation by 
the National Association of Securities Dealers ‘(NASD) and the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE). Because lawyers do not have a regulatory body critics have used 
this as a possible influence for lawyers to act unprofessionally.278 This argument 
barely stands as most countries have bar associations that sanction erring lawyers. 
Furthermore, in Nigeria, there is another body known as the Capital Market Solicitors 
Association, which is charged with promoting best practices amongst lawyers 
operating in the capital market in any capacity.279 It is however, important to note that 
it is not particularly clear if they are empowered to caution erring practitioners. In 
view of some of these criticisms identified above, there have been recommendations 
of certain requirements and obligations that should be adhered by lawyers in order to 
make them effective gatekeepers. These requirements and obligations are identified 
below. 
i)  Due diligence obligation 																																																								
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ii)  Independence requirement 
iii) Attorney certification requirement.280 
 
3.9.  Due Diligence Obligation 
It is argued that the first step in this regard will be mandating the practice of due 
diligence by lawyers in preparation of disclosure documents.281 There has also been 
the call for the SEC to necessitate the investigation as to the accuracy of statements 
made in documents prepared by lawyers.282 This requirement is evident in legal 
practice in Nigeria as lawyers sign documents that they have performed due diligence 
on. This is contained in rule 180 (2) of the Rules and Regulations of the SEC. This 
arguably instils some responsibility on the lawyer to perform his job with utmost care. 
This thesis argues that for such provision to work, there is the need to have adequate 
penalties for lawyers that do not carry out their fiduciary duties efficiently or lawyers 
that aid in fraudulent dealings. This suggestion also takes into account the possibility 
of hindrances a lawyer may encounter when carrying out such investigative function 
e.g. clients concealing information from the lawyer. In view of this, it is important 
that such laws expressly define the parameters within which a lawyer is to operate 
before liability is placed on the lawyer. Furthermore, whilst it is arguable that proving 
this may be problematic, the fear of being involved in such case has the likelihood to 
make a lawyer act diligently so as not to lose reputational capital. 
 
																																																								
280 A. A. Sommer, ‘The emerging responsibilities of the securities law, address to the banking’, (1974)  
Corporation and Business Law Section 617-619 
<https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1974/012474sommer.pdf > accessed 4 August 2015 
281 S. M. Bainbridge (n 271) 27 
282 ibid, 28 
	 147	
3.9.1. Independence 
Lawyers have been described as increasingly intertwined with their clients.283 A law 
firm that holds in its portfolio a certain percentage of the client’s equity is likely to be 
a poor, or biased monitor.284 Lawyers intertwined with clients may falsify information 
or provide inflated figures during disclosure when wooing investors. In view of this, 
there is the suggestion that a rule should establish the level of independence a firm 
should have in relation to its clients, and such rule should define when the attorney is 
not sufficiently independent of the client to perform sensitive tasks.285 It has also been 
suggested that the SEC of a country should define the limits to which a lawyer is to 
function as a gatekeeper. This thesis posits that this alone will not prevent lawyers 
from functioning poorly as intermediaries as it is going to be a strenuous/impossible 
task monitoring every lawyer that is functioning as a gatekeeper. In view of this, 
thesis proposes that, in addition to such laws, there should be adequate and prompt 
enforcement mechanisms that will instil some caution on lawyers when practicing as 
intermediaries. This thesis recommends that in other to avoid the issue of conflict 
within lawyers, a system should be adopted by law firms that entails that in relation to 
disclosure obligations i.e. prospectus, only counsel that is not under a retainership or 
has not carried out any work (other than one-off capital market/disclosure work) 
should be instructed by the prospective issuer. This inevitably will prevent the likely 
conflict that may arise when a counsel that is primarily involved in capital market 
cases within the firm is briefed. 
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3.9.2. Attorney Certification 
Lawyers serve as watchdogs that analyse documents with no certification. 
Implementing a law that requires a lawyer to certify documents he analysed as well as 
placing liability on him for certifying a faulty document will aid in boosting the 
efficiency of lawyers in their role as gatekeepers. A typical question that will arise in 
view of this proposition is what documents should the lawyer be reasonably be asked 
to certify? It has been suggested that in preparing the disclosure document or filing 
with the SEC, it should be certified by the lawyer that he believes the statements 
made in the document or report to be true and correct in all material respects and that 
he is not aware of any additional information whose disclosure is necessary in order 
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were 
made not misleading.286 This coupled with the suggestion of due diligence which 
requires lawyers to certify that after making such inquiry the attorney reasonably 
believes that adequate disclosure has been made would guarantee reliance and 
credibility of their role as gatekeepers. This thesis proposes that for this to work, strict 
liability should be placed on lawyers that affirm falsified disclosures. However, limits 
on such laws should be placed, i.e. the lawyer should not be asked to certify the 
accuracy and completeness of all information disclosed in SEC filings seen as he did 
not audit its client. Furthermore, the documents a lawyer should be required to certify 
should be limited to such he would reasonably understand and be able to detect if any 
information is falsified or omitted. 
The Nigerian Bar Association has implemented the compulsory affixing of 
stamp and seal by duly qualified lawyers in documents they file.287 Although this is a 
recent concept aimed at swooping out quacks from the profession, this thesis proposes 																																																								
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that it should be promoted to include documents related to the securities market. A 
law aimed at mandating stamping and sealing of documents by lawyers in the 
performance of their duties, as gatekeepers will be beneficial to the capital market. 
In concluding this section, this thesis postulates that a lawyer as a gatekeeper 
should be guided by two primary standards, which are, his impartiality in his dealings 
as well as his ability to advance the client’s lawful objectives and interests. The 
emergence of gatekeepers has condensed the problem of information asymmetry and 
insider dealing to a considerable extent. Investors are likely to invest when there are 
people/organisations that vouch for the credibility of information presented to them 
when deciding to invest. However, there has been some criticism about the role they 
play ranging from conflict of interest, provision of favourable recommendations to 
companies that have employed them, lack of regulation of gatekeepers’ etc. These 
criticisms suggest the possibility of information asymmetry regaining prominence, 
which is a problem for investors. In view of this, there have been recommendations 
for second-tier reputational intermediaries that are meant to vouch for the verification 
provided by reputational intermediaries. 
 
3.10. Second Tier Reputational Intermediaries 
Second tier reputational intermediaries vouch for first-tier intermediaries 
(gatekeepers). 288  Voluntary self-regulatory organisations (SROs) play this role 
efficiently. Self-Regulatory organisations exercise some degree of regulatory 
authority over an industry or profession. This could be applied in addition to some 
form of government regulation or it could fill the vacuum of an absence of 
government oversight and regulation. The regulatory authority of an SRO is not 																																																								
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necessarily derived from government as they set standard rules that participants are 
bound by, and a failure to meet the target standard can lead to suspension or expulsion 
by these SROs. This has the likely effect of preventing investors from seeking 
consultation from such gatekeeper.  
 There has been the call for the implementation of mandatory self-regulatory 
organisations.289 This has been considered a possible permanent solution to the issues 
associated with gatekeepers. For example, in the United States, investment bankers 
must belong to either the New York Stock Exchange or the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, and a member who is evicted by one is unlikely to be accepted by 
the other.290 There has also been the suggestion of provision of licenses by mandatory 
SROs. Minimum standards should be set to receive such license.291 This can promote 
credibility amongst gatekeepers if there are sanctions for participants that do not 
adhere to the set standards. Sanctions such as fine, suspension and revocation of 
license can help in guaranteeing the credibility of these gatekeepers. 
Regardless of these SROs aiming at instilling some sanity in the gatekeepers, 
desperate gatekeepers seeking favourable accreditation can compromise them. In 
view of this, it was suggested that low quality intermediaries could form a lax SRO to 
vouch for their quality and thus allowing investors figuring out if the SRO itself is a 
bogus intermediary.292 
 The above have the likelihood to reduce unruly practices by gatekeepers. This 
thesis proposes the need for SRO’s in Nigeria to ensure credibility of gatekeepers. 
The Nigerian stock exchange is an SRO that is aimed to protect and maintain the 
confidence of investors and to preserve the integrity of the market. This is 																																																								
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commendable; however, this thesis proposes the need for every gatekeeping 
profession to have their individual SRO that will provide accreditation for its 
members. Such a body should be empowered to sanction any member that acts in 
contravention of the general need to enhance investor confidence in the capital 
market. Such sanctions should be publicised in a bid to reduce their reputational 
capital. This thesis submits that this has the likelihood to make such gatekeepers sit up 
and carry out their functions diligently as well as ensures that investors do not utilise 
their services when they have been sanctioned. 
 
3.11. Conclusion 
Information asymmetry is a problem that should not be apparent in capital markets, 
particularly in markets situated in developing countries. The importance of 
disseminating accurate information to investors cannot be overemphasised. This is 
based on the peculiar nature of capital market transactions. A market known to 
possess corporations that provide accurate information is likely to have more 
investors willing to invest.  
The importance of credible rules governing disclosure is an important factor 
for the growth of a capital market as well as important in attaining the efficient status. 
Furthermore, it is equally important to have adequate and timeous enforcement 
mechanisms aimed at enforcing these laws if corporations do not adhere to the 
provisions. This coupled with adequate reparations that are properly enforced will 
boost investor confidence in the system. Although these recommendations are not free 
from criticism, this thesis submits that it would be more harmful if they were absent 
in a capital market and as such recommends that developing countries that are aiming 









4. Insider Trading in the Nigerian Capital Market 		
4.1. Introduction  
‘Insider trading’ or ‘insider dealing’, phrases used interchangeably in this chapter, is 
the use of inside information that is price sensitive and has not been made available to 
the public about a company or securities in order to make a profit or avoid loss 
through trading activity. 1  It usually involves an insider (director, employee or 
professional advisor) or someone connected to such persons trading on information 
obtained in the course of employment or in the course of their professional 
relationship with a company and which information is not available to the broader 
market.2 It also includes instances where one party provides the inside information 
(commonly referred to as tipping) to another party/parties who trades on the basis of 
the inside information.3 It is not confined to companies’ shares alone as it can also 
occur in the market for government securities.4 It is a manifestation of inefficient 
markets and a corporate governance problem.5 The illegality of this act is based on the 
fact that when transactions are to be executed in a financial market, there is the 
estimation of prices on the value of securities on the assumption that the special 
details known to the insider do not exist.6 In other words, investors trade on the 
assumption that they have been provided with complete information relating to the 
security they intend to invest in. 																																																								
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Insider trading is rampant in Nigeria and was identified as one of the reasons 
for the Nigerian market crash in 2008.7  Attempting to unravel the extent to which 
insider trading occurs in the Nigerian capital market is a daunting task and this is 
partly attributable to the deficiency of evidence in support of such allegations. This is 
further compounded by the fact that insiders conceal the act, trade through friends, 
relatives, and fictitious names to avoid detection. This chapter analyses the current 
legal regulation of insider trading in Nigeria in comparison regulation in the UK. It 
identifies the likely loopholes and highlights some recommendations on how to 
efficiently regulate the act. Before analysing the substantive rules, some of the effects 
of insider trading are highlighted in the next section. 
4.2. Effects of Insider trading 
The impact of insider trading on capital market is quite obvious and the clout of 
negativity surrounding it cannot be down played. This arguably would be so because 
of the consequential impression it places on the market and investors. Some of these 
effects are highlighted below 
 First, it reduces the trust investors have in the markets, thereby diminishing 
investors’ confidence to invest in such a market. This unarguably is detrimental as the 
importance of investor confidence has being highlighted in the preceding chapters of 
this thesis.8 Company officials betray the trust of investors when they engage in 
insider trading because in good and austere economic climates, investors’ funds are 
used to keep a company afloat while investors receive the increased value of their 
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shares and dividends if the company succeeds.9 In such an arrangement, trust is 
implicit as companies inform prospective investors of their intentions for the 
requested capital by disclosure. A consequence of a breakdown in trust is diminished 
investor confidence, which has also been identified by different academics as 
detrimental to running an efficient securities market.10 Furthermore, due to the nature 
of capital market trade, it is implicit that all investors have a level playing field in 
terms of the timing of relevant information. 
Secondly, because of diminished confidence, investors avoid the market, 
subsequently leading to less liquidity.11 The liquidity of a market is an important 
feature of a capital market used to measure institutional efficiency.12 If depleted it can 
lead to the crash of a market and financial institutions i.e. capital in the form of cash 
flow as opposed to lack of capital in the sense of legal rules.13 Insider trading affects 
market liquidity both in price and quantity.14   
Third, insiders have an incentive to choose riskier projects whilst utilising 
investors’ funds and they do this knowing that there is a possibility of lower returns 
that will not be beneficial to the investor.15 They embark on these projects without the 
informed consent of investors. If such investment is successful, they capture a portion 
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of the gains and if it does not go as planned the shareholders bear the loss.16 Although 
it has been suggested that trading on riskier projects can generate more liquidity for 
the market by stimulating competition,17 this thesis argues that trading on riskier 
projects can also have an adverse effect on investors’ interest. However, it is 
important to note that capital ought to be used for survival and growth of a company. 
During the growth phase, the company would often require investments in uncharted 
areas and investors, particularly equity investors cannot expect to enjoy the benefits of 
the subsequent growth without bearing the burden. Furthermore, in a bid to increase 
the confidence of investors or establishing business relationship, it is imperative that 
all information relating to the investment be made available to investors. This is not 
achievable if insiders conceal information from investors and utilise their investments 
for risky projects.  
Fourth, a major consequence of insider trading is delay in disclosure.18 
Although this has been described as having the potential to be beneficial in some 
situations, this thesis argues that delay in disclosure may discourage investors from 
the market. 19  An investor apprised with securities market operations will be 
discouraged from investing when there is delay in disclosing information he needs to 
make an investment decision.  
Fifth, insider trading obstructs the efficiency of a capital market. An efficient 
capital market has been described as a market that prices fully reflect the available 
																																																								
16 F. H. Easterbrook, ‘Insider trading, secret agents, evidentiary privileges, and the production of 
information’, (1981) The Supreme Court Review 309, 332  
17 Z. Goshen and G. Parchomovsky, ‘On insider trading, markets, and negative property rights in 
information’, (2000) 6 Fordham Law and Economics Research Paper 21 
18 R. A. Schotland, ‘Unsafe at any price: A reply to Manne, Insider trading and the stock market’, 
(1967) 53 Virginia Law Review 1448 
19 H. Manne, ‘Insider trading and the law professors’, (1970) 23 Vanderbilt Law Review 547, 552 
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information.20 If information is withheld or utilised in trade for the individual benefits 
of company officials, it makes the idea of an efficient market unattainable.21 
Academics have researched the Nigerian capital market and have arrived at 
different results in terms of the market’s efficiency.22 Whilst some find the market 
efficient on a weak level, others find that the market is efficient on a semi-strong 
level.23 A unanimous consensus in these studies is that there are traces of insider 
trading in the Nigerian capital market. Moreover, it has been documented that prices 
in the Nigerian capital market do not reflect the available information as it sometimes 
takes several weeks before the information reflects on the price of securities and in 
some instances, the likely impact of the company’s profitability on share prices take 
up to ten weeks before it becomes public information.24  
Based on the effects of insider trading, it is important to identify the reasons 
for insider trading practices in the Nigerian capital market and ways the act can be 
curtailed effectively. This thesis identifies three major reasons accountable for 
widespread insider trading in the Nigerian capital market; corruption, lack of 
knowledge of the act as well as its consequences and, poorly drafted rules with 
inadequate enforcement of rules. It should be noted that other reasons may also 
contribute to the operation of insider trading in the Nigerian Capital Market but these 
three reasons essentially stand at the root on which other problems are developed. 																																																								
20 E. Fama, ‘Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work’, (1969) 25 Journal of 
Finance 383. Discussed in detail in Chapter 2, 2.1-2.1.3 
21 N. Jain and L. J. Mirman, ‘Effects of Insider trading under different market structures’, (2002) 42 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 21 
22 O. J. Ojeyinka, Efficient market hypothesis and the Nigerian stock market: A review of theory and 
empirical work’, (1995, unpublished); R. A. Olowe, ‘Stock splits and the efficiency of the Nigerian 
stock market’, (1998) 1 African Review of Money, Finance and Banking 97; S. B. Oludoyi, ‘Capital 
market efficiency and the effects of earnings announcement on share prices in Nigeria’, (1999, 
unpublished); O. J Adelegan, ‘Capital market efficiency and the effects of dividend announcements on 
share prices in Nigeria’, (2003) African Development Bank Review 218 
23 Chapter 2 above for the Efficiency theory 
24 Oludoyi (n 22) This should not be the case as earnings announcement ought to be public information 
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These problems coupled with poor investigation, prosecution and conviction of 
insiders provide a substantial explanation for the existence of insider trading in the 
Nigerian capital market. Although some attempts such as enactment of laws 
prohibiting the act have been put in motion to control and eradicate insider trading in 
the Nigerian Capital market, these efforts have so far proven to be futile. These 
reasons highlighted are discussed in turn. 
4.2.1. Corruption 
Corruption in its entirety is ubiquitous in complex societies and can be traced back to 
biblical Israel, Rome, and ancient Greece.25 It is not peculiar to any continent because 
it is an endemic phenomenon that is experienced in both developed and emerging 
economies.26 It is said to flourish in countries with systems where decision making is 
unaccountable, access to decision makers is restricted and where pay is generally 
low.27 Both developing and emerging economies have incidence of corrupt practices 
in their business sector. 
In the Nigerian capital market, corruption is considered a viable enterprise and 
practiced in different ways.28 It is practiced both at the top and lower levels. For 
instance, a former Director-General of the Nigerian Stock Exchange gives a good 
illustration of corrupt activities in the capital market. She held this position between 
2000 and 2010, and was alleged to have perpetuated some corrupt dealings in her time 
as the boss of the Stock Exchange before her subsequent dismissal. Under her watch, 																																																								
25 V. E. Dike, ‘Managing the challenges of corruption Nigeria’, (2003) Centre for Social, Justice and 
Human Rights 2 
26 I. Carr, The UK Bribery Act: business integrity and whistleblowers’, (2012) 4 Financial Fraud Law 
Report 361 
27 Editorial Team, Corruption and bribery: trade and investments impacts’, 
<http://www.controlbae.org.uk/background/investment_impacts.php> accessed 11 February 2015 
28 I. K. Nageri, I.S. Nageri and A. Amin, ‘The joint impact of stock market and corruption on economic 
growth and development in Nigeria: Evidence from cointegration and VECM analysis’, (2015) 10 
Serbian Journal of Management 189 
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the stock exchange was said to have purchased 165 Rolex watches for employees of 
the stock exchange who have served for a long time. However, only 73 watches were 
presented to recipients and as of now there has been no account for the remaining 92, 
which amounts to about 99,500,000 Naira (£398,000). Furthermore, the stock 
exchange was said to have bought a yacht worth 37 million Naira ($235,300,000) 
with no recipient till date. Although the SEC attempted to investigate the alleged 
fraud behind the crisis, it was unable to publish its findings because the then Director 
General got a court injunction restraining the SEC from publishing the report and 
stopping further investigation.29 
Corruption in Nigeria has been evident for some time now, even before 1999 
when democratic governance was restored. In 1998, transparency international 
corruption perception index (CPI) survey of 85 countries ranked Nigeria as 81.30 In 
2001, the CPI survey of 91 countries portrayed the image of Nigeria going further 
south as it was ranked 90 out of 91 countries studied. With such figures, it is apparent 
that the problem of corruption has settled in Nigeria and its effects are felt in every 
parastatal or sector of the country including the capital market. In 2014, the 
Transparency International Corruption Perception index ranked Nigeria 136 out of 
175. The government’s response to this was that they were winning the war against 
corruption.31 More recently, in 2016, the country is still ranked at 136 out of 176 
countries.32  The country is still devoid of a system to trace, eradicate or control 
																																																								
29  Editorial Team, ‘The Nigerian Stock exchange spent millions on a yacht and Rolex watches for 
some reason’, Business Insider (Nigeria, 8th May 2012) <http://www.businessinsider.com/the-nigerian-
stock-exchange-spent-millions-on-a-yacht-and-rolex-watches-for-some-reason-2012-5?IR=T> 
accessed 28 January 2015 
30 S. M. Lipset and G. S. Lenz, Corruption, culture and markets in culture matters,  (New York Basic 
Books 2000) 112 
31 K. Olaniyan, ‘How corrupt is Nigeria?’ Vanguard (Nigeria, 17 December 2014) 
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/12/corrupt-nigeria/> accessed 16 February 2015 
32 www.transparency.org  
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corruption witnessed in most of the parastatals, including the capital market.33 
Corruption affects the performance of the capital market by increasing volatility in the 
political and economic environment, which further affects the GDP growth through 
lesser foreign direct investments.34 Views from international organisations on the 
correlation between corruption and investment suggest that this is incontrovertible. 
For example, the World Bank identified corruption as one of the biggest impediments 
to investment opportunities. 35 Similarly, the IMF also suggested that corruption 
reduces investment by around 5% and that an increase by one point in the corruption 
index can result in a reduction of foreign investment as much as 8%.36  
The reasons participants of the capital market in Nigeria engage in corrupt 
practices are borne out of several cultural beliefs and odd societal structure. Some of 
these issues are identified below. 
First, participants of the Nigerian capital market engage in corrupt practices 
because they see it as an avenue to make quick money and create a luxurious way of 
life. Many people living in Nigeria believe that indulging in corrupt practices is 
inevitable because morality is relaxed and people struggle for survival without any 
assistance from the government. Furthermore, there is the belief that material 
possessions of an individual substantiate his success. Merton affirmed the connection 
between cultural beliefs and corruption by indicating that there are several elements 
of social and cultural structures, but of crucial importance are culturally defined goals, 																																																								
33 ibid 
34 I. Saka, ‘Insider dealing: The problematic corporate crime 
<https://unilorin.edu.ng/publications/ismaelsi/INSIDER%20DEALING.pdf > accessed 8 February 
2015 
35 The World Bank, ‘Anticorruption in transition: A contribution to the policy debate’, (2000) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/contribution.pdf> accessed 11 
February 2015 
36 C. Schiller, ‘Improving governance and fighting corruption: An IMF Perspective’, (2000) IMF Fiscal 
Affairs department 31st March 2000. 
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purposes and interests.37 He stated that these things are the things worth striving for 
and that whilst some of these culturally defined goals, purposes and interests are 
directly related to the biological drives of man, some are not determined by them.38 
This thesis argues that whilst businesses see nothing wrong in corrupt practices that 
result in greater profits for their companies there is a wide consensus that corruption 
has a negative economic impact on society.39 
Second, corrupt practices are sometimes regarded as reward for work because 
of the poor remuneration system in Nigeria. Workers are not sufficiently remunerated 
for work done as well as not remunerated promptly.40 Consequently, individuals 
develop methods to cater for their livelihood and daily needs. This is further 
accentuated by the limitation of economic opportunities in Nigeria. The problem is 
convoluted because the society is achievement oriented and one where economic 
success is regarded an important goal with limited access to opportunities thus paving 
the way for corrupt practices.41 
Third, the Judiciary and law enforcement agencies such as the police have a 
lukewarm and inept attitude towards corrupt practices. When persons are charged 
with corrupt offences in Nigeria the law enforcement agencies are in most cases 
beneficiaries of bribes thus leading to neglect, eventual quashing, or lackadaisical trial 
of cases. The situation is worsened if the individual charged or being investigated of 
an offence is influential by virtue of a position he holds or has held. Law enforcement 
																																																								
37 R. K. Merton, ‘Social structure and anomie’, (1938) 3, American Sociological Review 672 
38 ibid 
39 I. Carr and O. Outhwaite, ‘Controlling corruption through corporate social responsibility and 
corporate governance: theory and practice’, (2015) 2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 299, 300 
40 Late remuneration is a constant practice in Nigeria generally, with emphasis on government 
parastatals. In some instances, workers don’t get paid for as long as three months. Furthermore, law 
enforcement agencies are not adequately remunerated. 
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agencies face the possibility of losing their job if they carry out investigations or 
charge such individuals to court. An inevitable consequence of this is the widespread 
entanglement of corruption eating deeply into the system. An individual faced with 
the temptation to commit an offence will indulge in the act knowing that he can bribe 
his way out of it.  
Recently, the Federal Government of Nigeria’s Department of State Security 
(‘DSS’) raided the homes of senior Judges (Justices of the Federal High Court and a 
Justice of the Supreme Court).42 In this operation, the DSS are alleged to have 
recovered sums of money that exceed the salary and allowances of these said Justices. 
Upon being questioned, the accused Judges had no viable explanation as to how they 
had these funds (both in foreign currencies and local currency). Rather, they classified 
it a witch-hunt by the government. Furthermore, upon being arraigned, additional 
evidence indicated that one of the Judges’ sons had been a beneficiary of a bribe from 
a senior lawyer in the form of a BMW car.43 There are many more instances of such 
practices in Nigeria and this thesis submits that such acts of corruption are partly 
responsible for the Judiciary not handling cases of market abuse (in this instance 
insider trading if there are such cases being tried) expeditiously and honestly. 
Corruption hinders effectiveness and stifles competitiveness in a capital 
market. This can be a major hurdle in the growth of the economy as well as impact 
fair business competitiveness adversely.44 A country with a capital market where 
corruption is practiced develops a reputation that affects companies emerging from 																																																								
42 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-37603857> accessed 20 January 2017 
43 B. C. Onochie and O. Richards, ‘We sold N8M vehicle to Justice Ademola’s son, witness testifies’, 
Guardian Newspaper (Nigeria, 17th January 2017)  
<https://guardian.ng/news/we-sold-n8m-vehicle-to-justice-ademolas-son-witness-testifies/> accessed 
20th January 2017 
44 S. Bhalla, ‘Survey on bribery and corruption: Impact on economy and business environment’, (2011) 
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such economy when they enter the international markets. Furthermore, it reduces the 
inflow of foreign direct investment because they are perceived as corrupt based on the 
market they are emerging from.45 Consequently, there is difficulty in establishing 
some sort of relationship with partner companies who see the companies emerging 
from that economy as untrustworthy business partners. 
This thesis proposes the need for an efficient structure that will tackle the 
incidence of corruption. If tackled effectively there is the likelihood of cleansing the 
market, thus reducing insider trading.  
It is worth noting that different bodies have been set up to tackle corruption in 
Nigeria.  Such bodies include the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), Public Complaints 
Commission, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent 
Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC). Furthermore, in 2013, the EFCC signed an 
MOU with the Nigerian stock exchange to tackle stock market fraud and other corrupt 
practices in the stock exchange with insider trading identified as one of the offences 
that the collaboration should address.46 Although these bodies have been established, 
it is arguable that their effectiveness is moving at slow pace particularly when it 
relates to the Nigerian capital market. However, there are a few cases that have been 
prosecuted by these bodies in the financial sector, e.g. EFCC v Cecilia Ibru47 where 
the accused was arraigned on a 25-count charge of corrupt practices in office amongst 
which was the fact that she granted a credit facility in the sum of 20 million US 
Dollars to a company which was above her credit approval limit. She was also 
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accused of granting a credit facility in the sum of 2 billion Naira to another company 
without adequate security as laid down by regulations.48 She was subsequently 
convicted and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. She also forfeited properties 
and assets values at 191 billion Naira.49 Another case worth noting is the case of FRN 
v Lucky Igbinedion50 where a former governor of Edo state in Nigeria was arraigned 
with a 147 count charge on fraudulent embezzlement, stealing and use of several 
corporate companies as conduit pipes to siphon several billions of naira. He pled 
guilty to all counts and was subsequently convicted and fined with 3.5 million Naira.51 
It is important to note that both cases were concluded by a plea bargain that facilitated 
shorter sentences and reduced fines when compared with the gravity of the offence 
committed. This has been described a mockery on the Nigerian criminal law system.52  
Another way in which corruption can be reduced is through the operation of 
the recent whistle-blowing scheme.53 The adoption of this scheme has led to recovery 
of a substantial amount of stolen monies. 54  This thesis recommends the 
implementation of this scheme in the Nigerian capital market as it can serve to deter 
corporate executives and capital market operators from engaging in corrupt practices. 
This recommendation is made because corporate executives that engage in corrupt 
practices usually utilise the help of individuals in the lower cadre of the ladder. In 
view of this, there is the propensity for such individuals to report such unethical 
practices when they are aware that they would receive a fraction of the money 																																																								
48 I. O. Babatunde and A. O. Filani, ‘The economic and financial crimes commission and its role in 
curbing corruption in Nigeria: Evaluating the success story so far’, (2016) 2 International Journal of 
Law 17 
49 ibid 
50 Unreported suit No. FHC/EN/CR/10/2008 
51 n 48 p.16 
52 ibid 
53 Chapter 1, 1.2.5 
54 S. Daniel, ‘Whistleblower: FG nets N 73 billion in 4 months’. Vanguard (Nigeria, 16 April 2016) 
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recovered as practiced in Nigeria.55 This thesis argues that the possibility of being 
found out can instil some caution and diligence on corporate executives to avoid 
participating in corrupt practices. A prime example of the operation of the 
whistleblowing policy is evident in the Enron when Sherron Wetkins blew the whistle 
when she saw some discrepancies in the accounts of the company.56 
Curbing corrupt practices in the Nigerian capital market will increase the 
interest of investors in the capital market. As Bod Dewar a former British High 
Commissioner to Nigeria stated, “…building the confidence of investors is paramount 
to deepening the capital market and this can only be achieved by the execution of 
good corporate governance and ridding the market of corruption”.57  
4.2.2. Lack of knowledge of the Act as well as its consequences 
Other than the problem of corruption, there is prevalent ignorance of market abuse in 
Nigeria, particularly insider trading. The level of ignorance is pervasive. It extends to 
market participants, investors, stockbrokers etc. The level of ignorance is also 
displayed by members of the Nigerian legislature charged with enacting rules that are 
aimed at regulating market malpractices. For instance, the legislators of the lower 
house of Nigeria’s bicameral National Assembly empowered to enact rules tackling 
corrupt practices such as insider trading are not particularly knowledgeable in this 																																																								
55 S. Tukur, ‘How Nigerians can make money, be protected in new whistle blowing policy: Finance  
Minister’, Premium Times (Nigeria, 21 December 2016) 
<http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/218643-nigerians-can-make-money-protected-new-
whistle-blowing-policy-finance-minister.html> accessed 5 July 2017 
56 J. D. Glater, Added value; A whistle blowers’ all too familiar story’, The New York Times (New 
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area based on their academic background and previous employments.58 The Nigerian 
House of Representatives committee on capital market is chaired by a member who 
has a degree in economics and worked as a realtor in real estate practice for seventeen 
years prior to becoming a legislator and possesses no previous experience in dealings 
that have to do with the securities market. This committee is co-chaired by a member 
who has a similar background, economics with no reference to what job he has 
engaged in the past. The situation is not different in the Senate as a member whose 
first degree is in political science chairs the committee and co-chaired by a member 
whose first degree is in management and his masters and PhD both in Christian 
leadership, chairs the capital market committee.59 If a person with no experience 
supervises such a sensitive position, it is arguable that the laws that will be enacted 
would lack credibility and substance. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, it would seem that 
placement in committees is based on political consideration rather than qualification, 
specialisation and relevant experience. 
Although this practice is not without its merits as it provides equal opportunity 
for everyone to attain significant positions, this thesis argues that because of the 
important role a capital market plays in the economy and due to the complex nature of 
its operation, persons with adequate knowledge and expertise should supervise such 
sensitive positions and the appointment of floor members can be preserved for 
individuals who do not necessarily have to be experts in the capital markets.60 																																																								
58 Although academic background does not necessarily guarantee knowledge, experience can guarantee 
some knowledge that can be employed when enacting laws aimed at tackling the problems associated 
with the market. Furthermore, Wunmi Bewaji in his book carried out interviews where he stated that of 
all the legislators he interviewed, not one of them could define insider trading. W. Bewaji. Insider 
Trading in developing Jurisdictions: Achieving an effective regulatory regime, (Routledge 2012) 
59 These committees are empowered to address problems associated with the capital market and how it 
can be developed. 
60 As observed by Wunmi Bewaji in his book the politicking that goes on between the Nigerian 
National Assembly means committee heads and members are not necessarily picked based on their 
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Alternatively, this thesis recommends the appointment of specialists in the field to the 
committee to evaluate problems associated with capital markets and suggest ways 
efficient laws can be enacted to curb such problems. Additionally, there should be 
continuous training for individuals in such committees in a bid to increase their 
knowledge as well as make them apprised of recent developments in capital markets 
around the world. However, this thesis recommends that the government should 
monitor such training and ensure that such individuals register for trainings attended. 
This recommendation emanates from the fact that there is evidence to indicate that a 
member of the Federal House of Representative in Nigeria was sent for conference in 
Dominica Republic and it is alleged that he did not attend the conference/training, but 
rather kept the money for himself.61   
Stockbrokers in the Nigerian capital market are described as having little or no 
knowledge of insider trading in Nigeria.62 Stockbrokers occupy a strategic position in 
the market and are empowered to monitor the market as well as report any irregularity 
in the market including suspicion of insider trading to the relevant authorities. This 
cannot be achieved if they possess little or no knowledge of how an offence such as 
insider trading occurs. Furthermore, the fact that insider trading is often a 
surreptitious affair necessitates the need for adequately skilled personnel to detect it.63 
Research carried out based on interview of stockbrokers in Nigeria indicated that over 
80% of the stockbrokers had no knowledge of insider trading, with 10% being able to 
																																																																																																																																																														
ruling party and also in some instances, such positions are reserved for a particular state. He also 
rightly observed the fact that in some instances people who have minimal experience or are minimally 
educated in a particular region are assigned to head committees whilst the persons with adequate 
knowledge or expertise serve as floor members.  
61 C. Ndujihe, ‘SEC: Public hearing turns bizarre for Hembe, Azubogu’, Vanguard Newspaper 
(Nigeria, 25 May 2012). A video of the hearing can be accessed at  <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WfIVO9A7_U8> accessed 20 January 2017 
62  W. Bewaji (n 58) 151 
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recognise it after being guided as to what it entails.64 Furthermore, the research 
indicated that journalists working in the financial sector regarded stockbrokers as 
mere traders who do not possess the necessary skills to be considered a stockbroker.65 
Lawyers are active participants in the conduct of legal proceedings on insider 
trading in addition their gatekeeping duties as identified in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
However, research has indicated that lawyers in Nigeria are not particularly 
knowledgeable in this area of practice because there is minimum specialisation in this 
area.66 Moreover, prosecuting criminal acts such as insider trading is not considered 
lucrative in comparison to the other areas of practice that are likely to generate more 
remuneration in Nigeria.67 It should be noted that this lack of specialisation starts from 
the root of the chain because, no law faculty in all the Nigerian universities has 
insider trading incorporated into its syllabus.68 Furthermore, the Nigerian Law School 
has no reference of insider trading in its syllabus since the removal of the provisions 
of insider trading from the Company and Allied Matters Act of 2004.69 This statute is 
used for company law tutorials in the Nigerian Law School and the absence of insider 
trading provisions in it means a lawyer may have no knowledge of insider trading 
regulation.70 Whilst this thesis acknowledges that the above assertion is not peculiar to 
Nigerian Universities, it proposes the insertion of the topic into the syllabus for law 
schools to enable students that are subsequently employed by corporate firms 
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Nigerian journalists have knowledge of insider trading and the danger it poses 
to the securities market.71 However, having the knowledge does not mean they are 
audacious to investigate an incident of insider trading or publish it. This is because of 
the fear of losing their jobs and lack of integrity of the media.  
The issue of awareness is further complicated by the fact that players in the 
Nigerian capital market are described to have adopted a less pejorative name to 
classify insider trading as ‘market liaison’.72 The effect of this is the continuity of 
insider trading with the belief that they are engaging in market liaison and in some 
instances, these insiders do not know the effect of their conduct on the market or 
economy whilst the unassuming investors are not aware of their rights to make a 
complaint to the appropriate authorities. Furthermore, the regulators are hardly certain 
about what is happening, given the lack of knowledge of the act, and a consequence 
of this is the prevalence of insider dealing, weak oversight, no enforcement and zero 
prosecution. 
4.2.3. Legal framework 
Whilst there are some differences in the jurisdictional approach in regulating insider 
trading, most jurisdictions have criminalised insider trading.73 Most countries have 
enacted rules that prohibit the operation of insider trading in their capital market. It is 
important to note that this alone is not enough to prevent insiders from performing the 
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The offence of insider trading was first recognised as a statutory offence in 
Nigeria in 1990 by virtue of its incorporation into the Companies and Allied Matters 
Act (‘CAMA’) 1990. However, the provisions contained in CAMA were not effective 
for the purpose of regulating insider trading. Evidence suggests that almost ten years 
after its inception there was no reported prosecution or investigation of insider 
trading.75 Consequently, the provisions regulating insider dealing under CAMA were 
repealed and replaced with the provision in the Investment and Securities Act (ISA) 
1999. The ISA 2007 was enacted to repeal the ISA 1999 because of its perceived 
ineffectiveness, inadequate capacity to monitor required market standards 
compliance, ambiguities in some of its provisions, weak enforcement, administrative 
sanctions and lack of civil penalties.76 The statutory provisions currently regulating 
insider trading in Nigeria are the ISA 2007 and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission Rules and Regulations 2013. The sections covering insider trading under 
both statues took precedence from the Company and Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 
1985 of the United Kingdom, Criminal Justice Act 1993 of the United Kingdom and 
Rule 10 and 10b of the United States of America Securities Exchange Act of 1933 
and 1934. Unfortunately, similar to its predecessors, these rules have not been 
successfully utilised, as there is only one reported successful conviction of insider 
dealing in Nigeria. 77   This has various implications on the market but most 
importantly is the fact that Nigerian capital market operators are known for notorious 
misrepresentations, manipulation of security prices, stealing of customers’ funds or 
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securities, violation of broker-dealer responsibility, violation of responsibility to treat 
customers fairly, insider trading and selling of unregistered securities.78 
Based on the foregoing it is arguable that the laws regulating the act are 
insufficient or have not been adequately enforced. To attain successful regulation of 
insider trading, the elements of the offence should be coherently defined for ease 
when attempting to establish liability against offenders. The next sections identify the 
relevant parts defining the act and its elements with a view to identifying any 
loopholes contained therein in comparison to similar provisions in the UK. 
4.2.4. Insider trading 
Section 111 of the ISA prohibits a person who is an insider of a company from 
buying, selling or dealing with securities of a company which are offered for public 
sale or subscription if he has information that is unpublished and is price sensitive to 
those securities. Section 111 (2) (a) prohibits a person from trading on information 
obtained directly or indirectly from another person connected with a particular 
company or was at the time within the six months preceding the obtaining of the 
information. Furthermore, he is aware or expected to know that the person he 
obtained the information from holds the information by virtue of being a member of 
the company and that the holder is not expected to disclose such information except 
for the proper performance of the functions attached to that position. Additionally, the 
interpretation given in section 315 of the ISA gives a clearer insight as to what 
individuals are precluded from doing with information that they obtained directly or 
indirectly from an insider. Similarly, rule 269 (2) of the Rules and Regulations of the 
SEC defines insider trading as occurring when a person or group of persons who are 																																																								
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in possession of some confidential price sensitive information not generally available 
to the public utilises such information to buy or sell commodities for their own 
account or makes such information available to a third party who either knowingly or 
unknowingly uses it to avoid loss for his benefit.  
It is arguable that these definitions are not thorough and can be considered 
broad. This thesis recommends the simplification of the definitions rather than having 
them littered through the act for ease of establishing liability and identifying exactly 
what the act prohibits. Taking an example from the UK, section 52 of the Criminal 
Justice Act (UK) 1993 (CJA) gives a thorough definition of what insider trading 
entails. It defines the act clearly as well as identifies ways that insider dealing can be 
practiced. The relevant sections of defining insider trading are highlighted below. 
“(1) An individual who has information as an insider is guilty of insider 
dealing if, in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (3), he deals in 
securities that are price-affected securities in relation to the information. 
(2) An individual who has information, as an insider is also guilty of insider 
dealing if— 
(a) He encourages another person to deal in securities that are (whether or 
not that other knows it) price-affected securities in relation to the information, 
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the dealing would take 
place in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (3); or 
(b) He discloses the information, otherwise than in the proper performance of 
the functions of his employment, office or profession, to another person. 
(3) The circumstances referred to above are that the acquisition or disposal in 
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question occurs on a regulated market, or that the person dealing relies on a 
professional intermediary or is himself acting as a professional 
intermediary”. 
The definition provided in the CJA is coherent and less likely to be problematic when 
attempting to establish liability for insider dealing. Other than identifying the offence 
being carried out, it also makes it illegal for an insider to provide information that he 
is privileged to by virtue of his position. Additionally, an insider will be held liable if 
he encourages someone else to trade on information he has provided. However, it is 
worth highlighting that the provision of Section 52(b) has the likelihood of facing 
some problems in an instance where the information is disclosed unknowingly. 
Proving disbursement of information knowingly beyond reasonable doubt is likely to 
be difficult as anyone charged has the likelihood of asserting lack of knowledge of the 
information been disbursed.79 Furthermore, the definition of insider dealing in the 
CJA postulates that criminal liability for each offence may only be attached to an 
individual. The word ‘individual’ is defined to exclude corporations.80 Directors 
sometimes partake in insider dealing for the benefit of the company, and this thesis 
argues that the appropriate liability established should be extended to such a company 
that is a beneficiary of the act. Furthermore, this thesis argues that the fact that the 
director maybe considered to have done so without the company’s knowledge should 
not be used as a defence. In Moore Stephens v Stone Rolls Ltd (in liq), it was held that 
where a fraudulent act was done for the benefit of the company, the company is 
presumed to be aware of the fraud and primarily liable for it.81 Furthermore, this thesis 
argues that in some instances, the director’s action may prejudice the company thus 																																																								
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making the company the victim to the fraud. In such instance this thesis suggests that 
the above assertion should not be applicable. This thesis argues that this has the 
propensity to make companies more cautious and employ adequate mechanisms to 
prevent their directors from engaging in insider trading. Also, a company is held to 
have a separate legal personality by the principle developed in Salomon v Salomon & 
Co Ltd and as such, it is arguable that a company is capable of dealing in securities.82 
This thesis submits that not explicitly identifying the possibility of establishing 
liability against a company is likely to be problematic as insiders can disguise their 
transactions in the name of the company with the aim of evading liability. This thesis 
proposes the need for the possibility to hold companies liable through fines as well as 
the possibility of holding directors jointly liable with the company because they are 
involved in the day-to-day running of the company. Such approach could generate a 
sense of caution by companies in a bid to discourage their directors from engaging in 
insider trading. 
The situation is not different in Nigeria as there are no provisions to establish 
liability against a company. However, it is important to note that, there are provisions 
for penalties accorded to companies in the ISA as will be identified in the later part of 
this chapter. This serves as a contradiction as it is pointless having penalties for an 
offence that is not statutorily defined. 
Whilst the definition given in the CJA is not free from loopholes, it is clearer 
and in conformity to the EC directive on market abuse in the UK and its effects are 
evident as there are reports of prosecution and investigation of insider dealing in the 
UK. The amount of prosecution and investigations carried out by the Financial 																																																								
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Conduct Authority (FCA) and its predecessor Financial Service Authority (FSA) is 
impressive when compared to Nigeria. There were no fewer than 27 convictions for 
insider trading between 2009-2015 with a number of ongoing investigations.83  
4.2.5. The Definition of ‘Insider’ 
An insider is anyone engaged in insider trading and consequently prosecuted for the 
behaviour.84 Insiders can be classified into two categories, primary and secondary 
insiders. A primary insider is usually an individual that possesses key information 
relating to production and stock performance by being a member of the 
administrative, management or supervisory body of the company.85  It also includes 
persons or entities that beneficially own more than 10% of a company’s voting 
shares. 86   Examples of primary insiders include directors, and managers of a 
corporation. They partake in insider trading when they utilise their informational 
advantage for trade purpose to transfer wealth from outsiders for their personal gain 
or for that of the company in a capricious manner.87  
Primary insiders by their position in the corporation owe a fiduciary duty to 
have regard for the interests of the company and its members, e.g. directors. Non-
directors owe other duties such as duty of care and duty to exercise reasonable skill. 
The fiduciary duty theory is a common-law theory that originated in England and 
Wales and is implied when employees accept appointment in their capacity.88 This 
theory postulates that the director by virtue of the position he occupies is to act loyal 																																																								
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to the company and not utilise the fiduciary position in way that is adverse to the 
interests of the persons for whom the fiduciary is acting89 Furthermore, when a person 
is in a fiduciary position, they are not to make a private profit through the position. 
Any profit made should rightfully go to the person on whose behalf they are 
working.90 The House of Lords (as it then was) held that by virtue of the fiduciary 
duty, if a director possesses or is apprised to confidential information because of his 
position, it is unlawful for him to trade on it for his private profit. Further, if he did so, 
the company could recover the profits even though it itself had suffered no loss.91 
A more recent assessment of insider trading emanated from the United States 
of America, known as the ‘misappropriation theory’. This theory provides that 
information is a type of property belonging to the corporation and if disclosed to a 
third party by someone apprised of this information because of his position in the 
corporation, this can be categorised as a form of theft.92 Furthermore, anyone that 
trades on such information in a stock market is guilty of insider trading.93 This notion 
was developed in United States v Chiarella and subsequently applied in SEC v 
Materia.94 Applying this principle in the UK, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in 2004 
secured convictions of Richard Spearman, Catherine Spearman, Michael Smith and 
Norman Payne for insider dealing based on the information passed to them by 
Norman Payne whilst carrying out his duty as a proof reader at a firm of commercial 
printers where he saw drafts of prospectuses and offer documents prior to the 																																																								
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announcement of bids in the London Stock Exchange. Michael Smith and Catherine 
Spearman pled guilty and were both sentenced to 18 months in prison, Norman Payne 
got 21 months. Richard Spearman pled not guilty and was sentenced to 30 months in 
prison and ordered to pay £169, 000 by way of confiscation.95 
The second category of insider is the secondary insider, who trades on 
information received from a primary insider.96 For example, where a corporate insider 
tips a friend about non-public information that is likely to influence the company’s 
share price and the friend in turn trades with this information. The person who 
provides the information is known as the ‘tipper’ and the trader who trades on this 
information is known as the ‘tippee’. 97  Secondary insiders include lawyers, 
investment bankers and others who receive confidential information from a 
corporation while providing services to the corporation.98 They are held liable for 
insider violation if the information they come across is disbursed to non-insiders 
either knowingly or otherwise since they acquire the fiduciary duties of a true insider. 
Furthermore, people that receive information from secondary insiders are liable if 
they had reason to believe that the source of the information had acted in breach of his 
fiduciary duty. 99  The source shall also be liable for his part in disclosing of 
confidential information and the liability will be more onerous where he benefitted 
from such disclosure.100 
Section 111 (2) (a) of the ISA identifies an insider as a person that has 
information that he knowingly obtains from another person who is connected to a 
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company or was at any time within six months before the information is connected to 
the company. Rule 400 (3) of the Rules and Regulations of the SEC defines an insider 
as anyone who is connected with the company in the preceding six months in their 
capacity as director, officer of the company or a related company, employee of the 
company or related company, anyone involved in professional or business relation 
with the company, members of the audit committee and are in possession of 
unpublished price sensitive information of the securities of the company because of 
the position they occupy or once occupied.101 
Based on the foregoing discussions on the capacity in which an individual 
may be categorised as an insider, it is evident that the provisions identified above do 
not cater for this coherently. The ISA by its definition of the act identifies an insider 
but does not give a clear indication of the capacity an individual should occupy to be 
tagged as an insider. The attempt in section 111 (2) (a) does not cater for this either, 
and it is arguable that section 111 (2) (a) (i) identifies secondary insiders, this thesis 
argues that it does so vaguely. Rule 400 of the Rules and Regulations of the SEC 
gives a clearer definition of both primary insider and secondary insider.  This thesis 
recommends the coherent definition of the various capacities an insider may occupy 
in the ISA because it serves as the principal regulator of the capital market and will 
make it easier to establish liability against alleged offenders.  
In the United Kingdom, section 57 of the CJA 1993 gives a detailed 
description of an insider by identifying a primary insider through his position in the 
corporation as well as a secondary insider by virtue his getting information from a 
primary insider. The provision postulates that such a person would be guilty of insider 
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trading if and only he is aware of the fact that it is inside information.102 This 
definition is arguably apt but leads to the possible argument in relation to proving the 
state of mind, i.e. proving the alleged offender knew that the information was inside 
information. This thesis proposes that in satisfying the element of awareness, it should 
be screened through a reasonable/objective test in a bid to achieve best results.  
4.2.6. Inside Information 
Inside information is information that is not been made public or has not been made 
public, is of a precise nature and is likely to have a significant effect on the price of 
the securities it concerns.103 Examples of inside information include details on an 
upcoming merger, changes in performance of a company or the expectation of the 
performance of the business or changes in the share capital. Different elements have 
to be proven to show that the information is inside information. These are discussed in 
turn. 
‘Non-public or unpublished information’ in its simplest form means 
information that has not been made available to members of the public or the market. 
It is important to highlight that not all non-published information is regarded as inside 
information. For information to be classified as inside information, it must indicate 
the direction or movement in the price that would or might occur if the information 
was made public.104  
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‘Precise’ means exact, clear and correct. 105  Information is precise if its 
contents can lead a conclusion to be drawn on the possible effect/s of certain 
circumstances or event/s on the price of qualifying investments or related 
investments. It is the role of a competent authority or a court to define the extent of 
precision required because proving that information was not precise enough to 
constitute inside information can be used as a defence by an alleged offender. 
Information would be deemed precise even if it were a fragment of a process. In the 
case of Geltl v Daimler, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that an intermediate 
step in a protracted process intended to generate a future event might be regarded as 
precise information. 106  An example of such instance is when a company is 
negotiating. Every intermediate step towards achieving the targeted aim will be 
regarded as precise information. However, a future event can only be considered 
inside information if there is a realistic prospect it will occur and that an anticipated 
high impact of the future event on the issuer cannot compensate for a low likelihood 
that the future event will occur.107 
‘Significant effect on price’ This is an important feature of inside information, 
as information would only be classified as inside information if it has the prospect of 
affecting the price of securities.108 It is not a question of law to determine if 
information is likely to have an effect on price of securities as each case is decided on 
its own peculiarity.109 It has been suggested that when determining if information 
would have a significant effect on price, the value of the information should be 
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evaluated in a hypothetical way and all possible scenarios taken into account and the 
actual results should be considered only to the extent that they were predicted.110 
Section 112 of the ISA defines inside information as information held by a 
public officer or former public officer by his position or former position as a public 
officer, or is knowingly obtained by a person (directly or indirectly) from a public 
officer or former public officer who he knows or has reasonable cause to believe held 
the information by virtue of any such position. It identifies the elements of inside 
information by providing that the person holding it knows it is unpublished, price 
sensitive, and is in relation to securities of a particular company.111 Furthermore, 
section 315 of the ISA caters for the need for information to be precise. 
The UK CJA 1993 defines inside information as information relating to 
particular securities or to a particular issuer of securities or to particular issuers of 
securities and not to securities generally or to issuers of securities generally.112 It 
identifies the elements required to classify information as inside information.113 
Furthermore, section 56 (1) (d) highlights the need for information to have significant 
effect on the market price of the particular security or securities if the information is 
made public.114 These provisions make it easier to know what inside information 
entails and as such will be easier to establish liability. Prior to the enactment of the 
CJA, it was held that information must be capable of being pointed at, identified and 
expressed unequivocally.115 Desperate defendants exploited this to avoid liability as it 
implied that rumors or speculative gossip could not be regarded as inside information. 																																																								
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This was corrected by the CJA that recognised the relevance of inference. Section 58 
(2) (d) prescribes that any information not made public is inside information if used 
for trade on securities. Section 58 provides a detailed but not exhaustive guidance on 
how and when information is to be treated as having been made public. Section 58(3) 
identifies different circumstances that information may be considered public. 
Examples given includes, information that can only be acquired through due diligence 
or expertise, information communicated to a section of the public and not the public at 
large, communicated on payment of a fee etc.116 
Regulation of insider trading as evident in the CJA are arguably sufficient and 
less likely to be problematic when establishing liability when compared to the ISA 
and Rules and Regulations of the SEC. Based on the aforementioned, it is arguable 
that whilst the regulations are partially sufficient, they can be simplified and well put 
together as against being littered through the act. Furthermore, there are some issues 
missing in the Nigerian regulatory regime such as establishing liability for insider 
trading against a company, indicating the capacity that an individual should occupy to 
be deemed a primary insider as well as granting a coherent definition of secondary 
insiders. This thesis argues that these issues appear minimal but will be beneficial if 
corrected in the fight against the act in the Nigerian capital market as well as for 
completeness. 
4.2.7. Penalties 
There are custodial and non-custodial sentences available to offenders that engage in 
insider trading. In recent times, there has been an upsurge in both custodial and non-
custodial sentences accorded to individuals that participate in insider trading in the 
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UK. The same cannot be stated for Nigeria as identified above. The need for adequate 
penalties for alleged offenders of insiders is very important as it cultivates a conscious 
effort in individuals to abstain from engaging in insider trading. This thesis argues 
that with adequate penalties there is the likelihood that the act will be reduced to a 
considerable extent in Nigeria.  
The ISA prescribes a fine of not less than 500 thousand Naira or double any 
amount of profit derived by him or loss averted by such insider whilst carrying out the 
act.117 For corporate bodies, they are to be fined 1 million Naira or twice the amount 
of profit realised or loss averted.118 Furthermore, in relation to custodial sentence, an 
insider is liable for a term of imprisonment not exceeding 7 years.119 These provisions 
are arguably tailored around the provisions contained in the CJA and should be 
sufficient in tackling the problem, however, the thesis submits that these penalties will 
only be effective if adequately enforced. Evidence indicates that since the enactment 
of the Act-prohibiting insider trading there has been only one reported case of insider 
trading.120 Enforcement of the regulatory provisions of insider trading is of paramount 
importance because it is insignificant if laws are enacted and not enforced properly 
and adequately, especially when evidence indicates that the problem the act is aiming 
at regulating is been practiced in the capital market.121  
This chapter identified the fact that Nigeria is considered one of the most 
corrupt countries in the world. Issues such as lack of enforcement of legal regulations 
are largely responsible for the widespread corruption. With a corrupt judiciary, there 																																																								
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is the likelihood that corporate executives will bribe their way out of charges of inside 
trading. This problem is further complicated by the fact that, the regulatory provisions 
are sometimes not appropriate for controlling the act. Consequently, there are little or 
no cases of insider trading in the courts as litigants consider this a futile endeavor. 
4.3. Arguments for Insider trading 
Some academics have proposed the decriminalisation of insider trading on the basis 
that it is a victimless act and that no form of crime is committed whilst engaging in 
the act.122 It has been argued that if injustice results when one individual takes the 
property of someone else without the persons consent and the government prevents 
such acts, then the government should refrain from interfering with non-fraudulent 
transactions.123 Furthermore, since no one’s right is being violated and no unjust act is 
done, insider trading should be legalised.124 Additionally, there is also the challenge of 
meeting the burden of proof of the offence when attempting to establish liability. This 
thesis submits that legalising insider trading will diminish the confidence of investors 
because of the belief that they are being exploited. Furthermore, when insider trading 
occurs directors act in contravention of their duty to act in the best interest of the 
company with regards to the interest of the shareholders. Moreover, other than 
harming investors, it has the likelihood to harm the corporation as executives 
sometimes use this information for their personal benefit. This is confirmed by the 
misappropriation theory that connotes that the information executives use to trade for 
their personal benefit is property of the company.125 Furthermore, it has the propensity 
to harm the company if there is erosion in the value of the company, high cost of 																																																								
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equity as well as lack of access to capital because of the effects of the act. 
To further strengthen the case against criminalisation of insider trading, it has 
been likened to the operation of business. It was stated that it would be unfair if 
traders were mandated to make the entire intricacies of their business known.126 
Additionally, it has been argued that most outsiders who bought from or sold to 
insiders would have traded regardless and possibly at a worse price.127 This thesis 
submits that because of the complexities involved in capital market operations and the 
fact that investors are dealing with intangible goods, it is imperative that investors are 
collectively notified of information that will instigate investors to participate in the 
market. Trust is implicit in these sorts of transactions and if an investor becomes 
aware that the company is hiding information or that individuals operating the 
company are using information for their monetary advantage and/or that of a 
company, s/he would be less interested in investing. Furthermore, it is important that 
investors make informed independent decisions based on the information that is 
disclosed to them. This also has the effect of protecting the company if an investor 
seeks legal redress in the event of something going wrong. In such instance, the 
company will aver that they complied with disclosure obligations and, as such, made 
no efforts to convince the investor into investing. 
Another reason that has emanated for the de-criminalisation of the act is the 
fact that the evidential burden of proof is high in criminal trials. In view of this, there 
has been the call for civil remedies to tackle the act. Some countries have adopted this 
as an alternative to criminal trials for the act and this is discussed in the next section. 
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4.4. Civil Actions 
Establishing criminal liability for insider trading entails proving the actus reus and the 
mens rea beyond reasonable doubt.128 The onus of proof is on the prosecution. 
Proving the actus reus is less likely to be problematic as it entails proving that there 
was trade in securities with privileged information. However, proving the mens rea 
that the alleged offender knew the information was not available to the public and is 
price sensitive is likely to be difficult as an individual charged would assert lack of 
knowledge except he is willing to admit.129 This problem generates a setback in the 
pursuit of insiders. Furthermore, in Nigeria, criminal prosecution is sanctioned on the 
attorney general of the Federation (Minister of Justice) and attorney general of the 
individual states. These offices are more interested in defending the Country or State 
rather than prosecuting cases of financial crimes. The problem is further convoluted 
by the fact that there is no specialised unit charged with investigating or prosecuting 
crimes emanating from the financial markets. Although there is the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) empowered to investigate and prosecute 
economic and financial crimes. The EFCC seems not to have been involved in 
prosecuting offences generated from the capital market. They are more inclined to 
prosecute cases of money laundering and corruption. In 2013, the EFCC signed an 
MOU with the Nigerian stock exchange to guard against infractions on extant rules by 
players in the capital market. 130  This was considered a welcome development. 
However, this thesis submits that the pace at which they are working is very slow. 
Since the MOU was signed in 2013, there have been only two reported cases that 																																																								
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have explored the collaborative effort of the EFCC and NSE’s MOU.131 More 
recently, the EFCC also signed a MOU with the SEC.132 
The UK at some point experienced the problem of proving the mens rea in 
insider dealing cases. Prosecution of insider dealing was considered infrequent and 
often unsuccessful as they were typically no more than one or two successful 
prosecutions a year, and in some years there may be none at all.133 Because of the 
technicality involved in proving the mens rea, authorities sought after other offences 
such as conspiracy to defraud and offences contained in the Theft Act in order to 
avoid the complications of proving the specialised crime of insider dealing and this 
led to minimal results being achieved under the provisions of the CJA part V.  In 
addressing these concerns there was consultation with the financial industry that led 
to the provision of a guide to market operations. This guide was known as the Code of 
Market Conduct (COMC). Reference was made to the standard of the mens rea 
required to prove insider dealing in the original guide provided. Although no 
reference was made to ‘mens rea’ in the statutory definition, the essence of it been 
contained in the guide was to establish a behaviour that is likely to be regarded as 
falling below the expected standard of a person in that position (the regular user 
test).134 
             Consequent to the above, there was the enactment of the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) by the UK Parliament. The provisions of the FSMA 																																																								
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created the opportunity to establish a single regulator charged with complete overhaul 
and consolidation of the UK Financial Services Law as well as provide the regulator 
with enhanced regulatory powers. This regulator was known as the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA). 135  The FSA was empowered to punish and regulate market 
participants whose conduct fell below acceptable standards but does not necessarily 
rise to the level of a criminal offence. It was empowered with a variety of rulemaking 
and investigatory powers as well as with the responsibilities to prosecute offenders for 
insider trading, enforce the provisions of the FSMA through several sanctions such as 
injunctions, fines, restitution order, publicly reprimand or fine a company or any of its 
directors. This was considered a stepping-stone in the fight to regulate insider dealing 
as it created an avenue to enforce regulatory and administrative proceedings in which 
unlimited civil penalties could be imposed on the basis of a lower evidentiary 
standard.136 It is worth noting that prior to the enactment of the FSMA, there were 
traces of civil liability for breach by directors and officers who benefitted from inside 
information or who illicitly disclosed privileged information although limited by 
virtue of the decision in Percival v Wright where it was stated that the duties of a 
director are owed to the company and not to individual shareholders.137  
            The emergence of the FSMA made it possible to institute civil suits and 
proving such actions on a civil standard of proof, which is on a balance of 
probabilities. However, it should be noted that the fact a procedure is referred to, as 
civil procedure does not necessarily make it one for the purposes of Articles 6 and 7 
																																																								
135 A quasi-judicial body responsible for the regulation of the financial services industry in the United 
Kingdom. 
136 K. Alexander, ‘Market structures and market abuse’ in G. Caprio, Handbook on Safeguarding 
Global Financial Stability, (1st Edition Academic Press 2013) 379 
137 [1902] 2 Ch 401 
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of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).138 This was the issue in R 
(Fleurose) v Securities and Futures Authority Ltd,139 where it was held that on the 
basis of the decision in Wickramsinghe v UK,140 market abuse proceedings should be 
categorised as civil, however, for the purpose of the ECHR such cases should be 
treated as criminal. Moreover, English law postulates that where civil cases imply 
criminal or quasi-criminal behaviour, the standard of proof ought to be affected. In 
Hornal v Neuberger Products Ltd, Lord Denning stated that in situations where the 
standard of proof is in dispute, the more serious the allegation, the higher the degree 
of probability required because it is less likely that the offence happened. This is also 
referred to as the sliding scale principle.141 The Financial Services and Markets 
Tribunal (FSMT) adopted this model in Mohammed Ariff v FSA. The applicant was 
on trial for dealing based on inside information and on the basis that the allegation 
made against the applicant was a serious one attracting potentially serious penalties.142 
Furthermore, the House of Lords in Re a Solicitor143 provided that when applying the 
Denning sliding scale, the more serious the allegation, the less likely the event 
occurred and hence the evidence ought to be stronger. This was subsequently adopted 
by the FSMT in cases such as Davidson & Tatham v FSA144 and Parker v FSA.145 The 
FSMT in these cases stated that in serious cases as these, the civil standard of proof 
would most likely provide similar result with the criminal standard of proof. 
																																																								
138 Article 6 and 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights covering the right to a fair trial and 
the right of no one been held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission that did 
not constitute a criminal offence respectively 
139 [2001] IRLR 1033; Affirmed on slightly different grounds in [2002] IRLR 297 
140 [1987] 1 EHRR 6 
141 Hornal v Neuberger Products Limited [1956] 1 QB 247 
142 <http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/financeandtax/Documents/decisions/FSMTribunal/012.pdf> accessed 
14 January 2015 
143 [1993] QB 69 
144 (2006) FSMT Case 031 
145 (2007) FSMT Case 037 
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The substantive provisions that create the possibility of instituting civil suits 
for insider trading are contained in Part VIII of the FSMA 2000 and the Market Abuse 
Regulation 2016.146 This does not repeal or alter in a major way (except for the lower 
evidentiary requirement) the criminal provisions for regulating insider trading as 
contained in the CJA 1993, rather it supplements it. It contains some commendable 
innovations such as identifying another class of insiders who are individuals in 
possession of information as a result of their criminal activities or persons who 
obtained information in other means which he knows or ought to know is inside 
information.147 Section 118(c) (5)(a) provides that in relation to precision requirement, 
the information might not be wholly accurate but must indicate circumstances or 
events that actually existed or had occurred or which might be reasonably expected to 
occur when viewed objectively. In relation to future events, the test required was if 
there was a realistic prospect that the event would occur. This was demonstrated in 
Hannam v Financial Conduct Authority where it was held that the accuracy of 
information is not a necessity as inaccurate information might be sufficiently precise 
to amount to inside information. It stipulated further that in assessing precision as 
demonstrated in Section 118 (c) (6) of the FSMA 2000 caters for the need for 
information to have significant effect on the price of securities.148 
The reputation of the UK’s capital market as a leading financial center hinges 
on the openness, competitiveness as well as it being free of market abuse and 
malpractices.149 The enactment of the FSMA can be described as enhancing the 
prospects of achieving this purpose this. As identified above, the FSMA created the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA). Its creation consolidated the nine regulatory 																																																								
146 FSMA 2000 
147  ibid s (118) (b) (d & e)  
148 [2014] UKUT (TCC) 
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bodies that were charged with regulating the market.150 The emergence of the FSA 
was admired by a host of other countries, and some went as far as adopting their own 
model.151 The consolidation was deemed necessary and was regarded as the formation 
of an integrated system with overall consistency and quality supervision.152 With its 
creation, the UK financial markets flourished and attracted a significant share of 
global financial transaction and in the mid-2000s it was widely thought that the UK’s 
approach to financial regulation was giving the London financial markets an 
international competitive edge.153  
The FSA was dissolved in April 2013 due to its perceived failure in the market 
crisis of 2007-2008. The system was considered costly, inefficient and confusing, as 
well as not delivering the standard of supervision and investor protection that was 
expected.154 Upon its dissolution, its power was split between the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) and Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA). The FCA regulates 
financial firms providing services to consumers and is charged with maintaining the 
integrity of the UK financial markets whilst the PRA is responsible for the prudential 
regulation and supervision of banks, building societies, credit unions, insurers and 
																																																								
150 C. Briault, ‘The Rationale for a single National Financial Services Regulator’, (1999) Financial 
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major investments firms. It sets standards and supervises financial institutions at the 
level of the individual firm. In promoting safety and soundness, the PRA focuses 
primarily on the harm that firms can cause the stability of the UK financial system, 
they do this by ensuring the provision of a stable financial system, which is 
considered a precondition for a healthy and successful economy.155 The FCA is 
charged with the responsibility of consumer protection in financial services, and the 
regulation of conduct of business, including the conduct of firms supervised by the 
PRA and market regulation, including the listing of securities.156 Their duties include, 
establishing rules to prevent the outbreak of insider trading as well as handle cases 
involving insider trading and general market abuse.  
             Other than the FSMA, there was the enactment of the EU Market Abuse 
Regulation 2016 (MAR 2016) that strengthens the FSMA. The MAR 2016 aims to 
increase market integrity and investor protection as well as propel the securities 
market as a viable place to raise capital. It came into effect in July 2016. It bears 
similarities with the FSMA but has some substantial difference that expands the scope 
of market abuse regime. Article 8 (1) of MAR defines insider dealing as well as 
identifies who an insider is. Article 8 (2) identifies secondary insiders. Article 14 
prohibits insider dealing by primarily engaging in the act, recommending someone to 
engage in the act, or inducing someone to engage in the act. Furthermore, article 10 
introduces a new offence known as unlawful disclosure of inside information. It is 
described as a situation where a person possesses inside information and discloses 





employment, profession or duty.157 Article 11 (4) posits that disclosure of inside 
information made in the course of ‘market sounding’158 shall be deemed to be the 
normal exercise of a person’s employment, profession or duty. However for this not 
to be considered a normal exercise, the participant must make a written record of the 
inclusion of the information with reasons as well as obtain consent to disseminate the 
information.159 Article 17 mandates issuers to inform the public as soon as possible of 
inside information that concerns the issuer. They are mandated to ensure that the 
information is disseminated in a manner that enables fast access, complete, correct 
and timely assessment of the information by the public.160 In a commendable manner, 
article 18 of the MAR 2016 prescribes that a list of all the persons that have access to 
inside information and those working for them under a contract of employment or 
otherwise performing tasks through which they have access to inside information be 
drawn up. The list includes but is not limited to advisers, accountants, credit rating 
agencies etc. This thesis asserts that this is a good innovation when attempting to 
establish liability as there is typically a list containing individuals that had access to 
the inside information that was used for investment, thus narrowing down the number 
of individuals that need to be investigated.  
The mens rea problem for insider trading offences is not absent in Nigeria and 
can arguably be considered accountable for lack of prosecution of insider trading in 
Nigeria.  There are no express provisions in the Nigerian regulatory framework that 
provides civil remedies for insider trading. Section 116 of the ISA has some traces of 
providing a civil remedy for insider trading. The relevant parts are highlighted below. 																																																								
157 Market Abuse Regulation 2016, article 10 (1) 
158 Market sounding is the communication of prior to the announcement of a transaction in order to 
gauge the interests of potential investors in a possible transaction and the conditions relating to it such 
as potential size or pricing to one or more potential investors; MAR 2016 Article 11 
159 MAR 2016, article 11 (4) 
160 MAR 2016 article 17 (1) 
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116 (1)‘A person who is liable under this part of the act shall pay 
compensation at the order of the commission or the tribunal, as the case may 
be, any aggrieved person, in a transaction for the purchase or sale of 
securities entered into with the first mentioned person or with a person acting 
for or on his behalf, suffers a loss by reason of the difference between the 
price at which the securities would have likely been dealt in such transaction 
at the time the first mentioned transaction took place if the transaction had not 
occurred.’ 
(2) ‘The amount of compensation for which a person is liable under 
subsection (1) of this section is the amount of the loss sustained by the person 
claiming the compensation or any other amount as may be determined by the 
commission or the Tribunal.’161 
This thesis submits that this provision is deficient and not capable of completely 
regulating insider trading with civil standards for reasons highlighted below. 
First, it only provides the remedy of compensation, which limits its scope, as 
this is not the only civil remedy that can be used to regulate the act. Executives, 
corporations are likely to engage in insider dealing if they know that compensation is 
all they will liable to pay. Furthermore, because the Nigerian judicial system is known 
for granting relatively meagre sums as compensation and fines, it is important that 
other forms of civil remedies be made available or else the provision will be futile. 
This thesis recommends the greater use of suspension and expulsion from the market 
as further penalties that can be imposed on individuals that engage in insider trading 
																																																								
161 ISA 2007, s (116)  
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Second, it does not create an avenue for victims of insider trading to institute 
private civil actions before a regular court of competent jurisdiction as the Investment 
and Securities Tribunal (IST) is charged with trying cases for insider trading.162 This 
is further complicated by the fact that section 284 of the ISA lists out the possible 
cases the IST is empowered to adjudicate over and it does not cater for disputes or 
question of law between corporations or between investors and corporations, thus 
implying that it is impossible to seek civil remedies against corporations or directors 
that have participated in insider dealing.  
Third, the provision of section 116 ISA operates contrary to the provision of 
section 251(e) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (CFRN). 
The substantive provision of section 251(e) bestows jurisdiction on the Federal High 
Court of Nigeria to try civil cases arising from the operations of CAMA or any 
enactment replacing the act or regulating companies incorporated under CAMA.163 
Regulation of insider trading was initially contained in the CAMA.164 When it was 
repealed, the regulatory provisions were incorporated into the ISA. In view of this, it 
is arguable that the provision of section 116 is in contravention of section 251(e) of 
the CFRN. The CFRN is the supreme statute and its provisions override any other 
statute enacted.165 This unarguably generates some difficulties, as litigants may be 
confused as to where to institute civil actions.  
            The foregoing makes it arguable that the regulatory provisions in Nigeria are 
not efficient to tackle the problem of insider trading. This is supported by the fact that 
since the enactment, there has been only one recorded case of insider trading in the 																																																								
162  A. Garba, (n 75) 17 
163 CFRN 1999, s (251)(1)(e) 
164 CAMA 1990, s. 614-624 contained the relevant provisions criminalizing insider dealing was 
repealed and subsequently incorporated in the Investment and Securities Act 
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Nigerian capital market. The UK provisions are more likely to prevent the act from 
eating deep into the system by adequately identifying the elements of the offence, 
providing and enforcing penance as well as creating a viable alternative of civil 
remedies if the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt is problematic. The next 
section comprises of recommendations on how the act of insider dealing can be 
effectively and efficiently regulated in the Nigerian capital market. 
4.5. Recommendations for regulating insider trading in Nigerian Capital 
Market 
This section highlights some recommendations on how to effectively regulate insider 
trading in the Nigerian capital market.  
First, mandatory disclosure should be adequately regulated and the substantive 
rules governing disclosure should be expeditiously enforced. This thesis in chapter 3 
highlighted the importance of laws regulating disclosure with the aim of attaining 
Fama’s theory of an efficient capital market. In the United Kingdom, mandatory 
disclosure has been used to control insider trading to a reasonable extent and 
enforcement of this regulation is extended to family members of insiders.166 It is 
tagged the oldest anti-insider dealing technique and was introduced on the 
recommendation of the Cohen committee of 1945 which mandated disclosure by 
companies to investors.167  
Mandatory disclosure instils caution on insiders, as they know that this is 
required by law and as such must be complied with. Furthermore, and importantly, 
this thesis proposes that disclosure should not be limited to the company alone but 
inclusive of company directors and officers as contained in the Rules and Regulations 																																																								
166 L. Bromberg et al (n 2) 5 
167 Report of the Committee on Company Amendment, CM 6659, 1945 
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of the SEC rule 401. However, this thesis proposes the need for such provision to be 
contained in the ISA. Such a provision creates the possibility of tracking director’s 
earnings and shareholdings, thus making it easier to detect when they have any 
unusual dealings. This recommendation considers the possibility of directors trading 
through associates and recommends the adaptation of the rule that extends liability for 
insider trading to the known associates and family members of the director as 
practiced in the UK under the CJA, FSMA and MAR.  Additionally, insiders and 
corporations that do not conform to the laws of mandatory disclosure should have 
adequate penalties levelled against them. It goes without saying that having the 
provisions is not enough as there is the need for adequate and expeditious 
enforcement of these penalties. For example, the US Securities Exchange Act 1934 
compels companies to disclose the required information or abstain from trading.168 
This thesis recommends the adoption of this model because it has the likelihood of 
generating efficient pricing of securities as all traders have equal access and same 
quality signals of information.169  
Second, there is the urgent need to reform some of the substantive rules 
regulating insider trading to convey coherent rules as well as provide adequate 
enforcement. This chapter identified several loopholes and terminologies that can be 
exploited by insiders when actions are brought against them in order to evade 
liability.170 The importance of reforming/updating these rules cannot be taken for 
granted if the Nigerian capital market is desirous of being at par with its international 
counterparts, attaining a strategic position in Africa as well as enhancing the 																																																								
168 Securities Exchange Act, 1934, s10b-5. 
169 A.S. Kyle, ‘Market structure, information, future markets and price formation’ in G.G. Storey, A. 
Scmitz and A.H Sarris International agricultural trade: Advanced readings in price formation, market 
structure and price instability, (Boulder & Cauldron: Westview press, 1984) 45 
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economy. In attaining this, this thesis recommends that certain provisions be made 
coherent and free from loopholes that can be exploited by desperate individuals. This 
has the likelihood to spark improvement in tackling and investigating the act as well 
as develops the knowledge on individuals who are unaware of the fact that the act is 
wrong. 
Third, it is crucial that an adequate enforcement mechanism be implemented 
because it will be futile having rules that are not enforced.171 The current penalties 
contained in the ISA are arguably sufficient, nevertheless, enforcement is a major 
problem identified in this chapter. Aggravating the problem further is the fact that 
influential persons will be able to evade these penalties because of the corrupt nature 
of the country. Furthermore, the role of law enforcement agencies and the courts in 
the fight against insider trading cannot be taken for granted. Efficient investigation 
and expeditious application of penalties against offenders have the propensity to 
reduce the occurrence of the act.  This thesis proposes a more adept approach in 
upholding the regulations whilst ignoring corrupt practices, such as granting 
favourable judgments and rulings to influential persons. The lackadaisical approach 
by the judiciary is a major factor that has hindered the growth of the market. It has 
also diminished the reputation of market and has discouraged institutional, retail and 
international investors from the market. Taking an example from the United States of 
America, Sam Waksal was found guilty of insider trading and sentenced to prison for 
7 years and 3 months as well as ordered to pay $ 4.3 million in fines and back taxes.172 
Another case worth noting is the Martha Stewart case where she was implicated in the 
Imclone scandal and was indicted on conspiracy charges. She was found guilty and 																																																								
171 L.C.B. Gower, Principles of modern company law’, (7th Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell 2003) 
172 Sam Waksal is the founder and CEO of the biopharmaceutical company ImClone Systems and 
Kadmon Pharmaceuticals. 
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sentenced to serve a five-month term in a US Federal correctional facility and two-
year period of supervised release to include five months of electronic monitoring.173 
Furthermore, in other to effectively enforce the rules regulating the capital 
market, there is the need for copious investigations.174 A setback in the provisions of 
the ISA is the absence of providing an efficient system of investigation. It has been 
suggested that this defect might be due to the fact that the same defect existed in the 
UK Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, which is the statute from which 
the ISA was culled up.175 It is worth nothing that this defect in the UK legislation was 
sorted by provisions of the repealed Financial Services Act 2010 and incorporated in 
provision 3 and 4 of the Enforcement Guide, Financial Conduct Authority, which 
empowers them to investigate and prosecute insider dealing as defined in the CJA 
1993.  
The SEC in Nigeria is empowered by Section 45(1) of the ISA to conduct 
routine and special inspection as well as carry out investigation of capital market 
operators. This provision is limited to capital market operations by virtue of this 
provision highlighted below. 
‘This part of the Act applies to any capital market operator who is involved in 
the administration, management or custody of funds for or on behalf of client 
including the management and operation of a collective investment scheme or 
the soliciting of investment in a collective investment scheme.’176 
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This thesis argues that this limited provision does not empower the SEC to conduct 
investigations required for the prosecution of insider trading. There is the suggestion 
to empower the SEC to appoint specialist investigators that will inquire into any 
alleged infringement of the ISA generally and any suspected case of insider trading.177 
This thesis proposes the need for investigation to be conducted into the affairs of 
corporations and directors that can link them to insider trading if they had engaged in 
the act. In attaining this, the proposed MOU signed between the SEC/Nigerian Stock 
Exchange and the EFCC will serve as a viable mechanism to pursue this.  
Furthermore, it is important to implement procedures that can be used by 
market participants to ensure that insider trading is not practiced in their 
establishment. Taking an example from the MAR, article 16 (1) stipulates that market 
operators, investment firms that are operating in a trading venue shall establish and 
maintain effective arrangements and systems as well as procedure aimed at preventing 
and detecting insider dealing. In applying such a principle to Nigeria, this thesis 
proposes the need to promote the operation of corporate governance in the market 
through the development and efficient regulation of audit committees.178 
Fourth, it is suggested that there is a need to implement a variant of the short-
swing rule as provided in section 16(b) of the US Securities Exchange Act 1934. This 
rule precludes insiders from making short sales within a six-month period.179 It 
prevents insiders whom are privileged to material company information from taking 
advantage of information for making short-term profits. It provides that insiders are 
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required to surrender to the company all profits if a transaction as such happens 
within six months.180 This rule follows section 16(a), which provides that every 
director or officer of the company with registered equity security as well as every 
beneficial holder of 10% of every class of registered equity security to file monthly 
reports with the SEC indicating whatever changes in the beneficial ownership of those 
securities. 181  In 1966, the SEC extended this obligation to spouses and family 
members.182 This thesis proposes that such a law will be beneficial in tackling insider 
trading in a developing country like Nigeria because it identifies a specific period 
when insiders cannot deal which is from the time the information is generated and 
possibly extended to the point where the likely effect would have expired. This will 
prevent unfair exploitation of inside information as well as reduce the temptation to 
trade on inside information.183 Furthermore, the fact that it is extended to spouses and 
family members is commendable. This thesis recommends, the addition of close 
associates to the category of persons this obligation is extended to.  
Fifth, there should be provisions for private right of action by companies and 
individuals against insider trading. The ISA criminalises insider trading with 
prescribed punishment of imprisonment or fines. When an insider is fined, such 
money goes back to the government and when he is incarcerated it is the tax of the 
victims of insider trading that are used to maintain insiders whilst in prison.184 
Furthermore, the right of prosecution lies with the Attorney General of various states 
and the Federation.185 Minimal attention is paid to cases such as insider trading and 
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there is no arm of the ministry dedicated to neither financial crimes nor insider trading 
cases.  
The MOU signed by the EFCC and the Nigerian stock exchange and more 
recently the SEC led to the assumption that there would be rapid investigations and 
trials, however, till date there have been little amount of reported cases of either arms 
investigating or prosecuting insider trading. In view of the above, this thesis proposes 
that the SEC align with the Ministry of Justice to generate a medium through which 
insider trading cases can be prosecuted by the provision of a specialist unit charged 
with prosecuting market abuse like insider dealing. This, it is argued, will go a long 
way in the fight against insiders. As a substitute to the foregoing, this thesis proposes 
the need to statutorily empower the EFCC to carry out investigations and prosecute 
cases of market abuse such as insider trading.  
Furthermore, this thesis proposes the need for provisions that permit 
institution of civil suits for insider trading with civil remedies made available as 
possible admonishment. Instituting civil actions should not be limited to individuals 
alone but a company should have a right to institute actions because it is regarded as a 
separate legal entity and as such should possess the capacity to institute an action in 
the event of suffering any harm. 186  Section 299 of the CAMA underlines the 
possibility of instituting such an action by a company. 187 
In the United States of America, the responsibility is on the company to 
institute actions to recover any profit made by any director, officer or shareholder or 
substantial shareholder in breach of s16 (b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934. 
Where such a company fails, or refuses to bring such an action within 60 days after a 																																																								
186 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 
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request in that regard is made or fails to diligently prosecute it, a shareholder may 
bring an action in the name or on behalf of the company in a manner known as 
‘derivative action’.188 The prospects for a derivative action were enhanced under Part 
11 of the Companies Act 2006. They are instituted to remedy a situation or correct a 
wrong done to the corporation and in some instances against insiders of the company. 
It is usually commenced in a representative capacity for the corporation and provides 
a means for shareholders to enforce claims of the corporation against managing 
officers and directors of the corporation. The effect of this is the fact that companies 
can protect their images through such actions. If the company does not pursue such an 
action it can be implied that the company is protecting its own. The UK has adopted 
the concept of derivative actions in section 260(1) Companies Act 2006. There have 
been more derivative claims brought since this change. 
In Nigeria, the CAMA provides that an applicant may apply for leave of court 
to bring an action in the name or on behalf of a company.189 The prerequisites for 
commencing such action are listed as, the fact that the wrongdoers must be the 
directors in control, such directors must have been notified of the intention to apply to 
the court for such an action, applicant must be acting in good faith and in the best 
interest of the company.190 Although there is the provision for such actions in the 
CAMA, this thesis submits that the concept of derivative actions is not properly 
addressed by virtue of the fact that the money realised from such an action is paid to 
former and existing shareholders with the exclusion of the company that the action 
was instituted on its behalf. In view of these arguments, this thesis submits that 																																																								
188 Heron International Ltd v Lord Grade [1983] BCLC 261-3 
 Shareholders are regarded as the owners of the company and they employ individuals such as directors 
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189 CAMA 2004, s303 (1) 
190 ibid s303 (2) (a-d) 
	 204	
provisions of section 304 (2) (c) of CAMA is impractical because such payments if 
made will usually be at the expense of the company and the corporate assets, which 
will be to the detriment of creditors and fellow shareholders.191 Further, derivative 
actions are usually not pursued because of the cost implications. However, in a 
commendable manner the provision of CAMA by virtue of s304 (2) (d) indemnifies 
shareholders from such legal expenses.192   
In addition to the above, this thesis proposes that there is the need for civil 
remedies to be available to serve as a viable alternative to criminal prosecutions 
against insiders. The provisions of the ISA place strict reliance on criminal 
prosecution for insider trading with a brief provision for civil remedies.193 However, 
history has shown that these criminal provisions have not been effective in the 
regulation of insider trading as there has just been one reported case of insider trading 
since the inception of these laws. In view of this and reiterating what has been 
discussed in this chapter, it is important that there is the enactment of adequate civil 
remedies to serve as a viable alternative to criminal prosecution. The recommended 
remedies have the likelihood to save time and not obstruct the provisions of the ISA 
criminalising insider trading, rather it will complement the provisions of the ISA and 
serve as an alternative for victims of insider trading with lower evidentiary 
requirement as witnessed in the UK through the provision of the FSMA. This thesis 
submits that if properly implemented, these recommendations have the likelihood of 
decreasing the operation of insider trading to a reasonable extent in the Nigerian 
Capital Market. 
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4.6. Conclusion 
Suspicion amongst shareholders as to transparency of directors and officers of 
companies vis-à-vis handling price sensitive information of companies has generated 
the upsurge of insider trading regulations. Several countries have utilised the 
enactment of laws prohibiting insider trading as a mechanism to preserve the integrity 
of their capital markets as well as revive investor confidence. Some countries have 
recorded success in attempting to regulate the act of insider trading and at the top of 
the list are the UK and the US. They started with self-regulatory market codes and the 
common law doctrine of disclosure, which have been adopted by developing 
countries such as Nigeria. It is arguable that insider trading is practiced in the 
Nigerian capital market. Its effects are evident on the confidence of the public in the 
Nigerian capital market. This thesis submits that insider trading is one of the reasons 
attributable to presumed lack of depth of the market. Ultimately, if the 
recommendations (provision of clear regulations, enforcement, adoption of civil 
remedies and investigation) highlighted in this chapter are conspicuously 
implemented, there is the likelihood that the incidence of insider trading would be 
reduced to a considerable extent, thus enhancing investor confidence. 
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5. Rule of Law and Corporate Governance in the Nigerian Capital Market  	
5.1. Introduction 
This thesis in the preceding chapters has highlighted the importance and impact of an 
efficient capital market. The benefits of such machinery are manifold. Its importance 
cannot be taken for granted as there is general consensus that a country equipped with 
an efficient capital market, free from market abuse and improprieties have the 
tendency to spur economic growth. This will have a substantial impact on improving 
the standard of living because of the increment in the amount of goods and services 
produced per head of a population.1 This argument is tied to the idea that when the 
capital market is fully functional and effective, there is sufficient access to capital 
thus making businesses effective and possibly more productive because they have the 
access to capital. 
The Nigerian economy is currently in recession and is experiencing an all-time 
low due to deflation/devaluation of the Nigerian Naira, dwindling price of crude oil, 
scarcity of foreign exchange, and low productivity amongst other factors. The 
situation has been described as frightening.2 This thesis argues that, an efficient 
capital market in Nigeria would generate positive contribution to the sustainability of 
the Nigerian economy. This has the likelihood to reduce the negative impact 
associated with economic depressions/recessions. This argument is borne out of the 
fact that, there will be more investors willing to invest in the capital market, hence 
providing the requisite capital for exploration of the other sectors as well as granting 
corporations access to funds for their businesses, thus reducing over reliance on crude 																																																								
1 J. E. Stiglitz, ‘Capital market liberalisation, economic growth and instability’ (2000) 28 World 
Development 1077 
2 J. O. Nwachukwu, ‘Nigerian economy in a frightening situation-NLC NUC’, Daily Post (Nigeria, 
March 21, 2016)  
<http://dailypost.ng/2016/03/21/nigerian-economy-in-a-frightening-situation-nlc-tuc/> accessed 5 April 
2016 
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oil as the primary source of revenue. In view of this, it is important to develop the 
right machinery that will be used to spur economic growth and avoid negative impacts 
associated with economic depression/recession. There have been suggestions for the 
diversification of the Nigerian revenue generated through crude oil.3 This thesis 
argues the urgent need to diversify the economy, as the possibility of attaining a 
strengthened economy is not possible if the country depends on one source of 
revenue. Moreover, the primary source will also benefit from a robust/efficient capital 
market. The drop in oil prices has heightened these suggestions in recent times, which 
has significantly reduced the income of the country.4  The case of Nigeria and other 
African countries that depend heavily on exploration of crude oil ought to serve as a 
blue print. These countries neglect other sectors that can generate some revenue and 
with the recent crash of oil prices globally, such countries are struggling for survival 
and in the case of Nigeria, there is an on-going recession.5 
 This thesis identifies some issues hindering the efficiency of the Nigerian 
capital market and recommends the implementation of the suggestions highlighted 
with a view to attaining efficiency in the Nigerian capital market. It is the contention 
of this thesis that implementing the core suggestions as articulated in the thesis has 
the propensity to make the capital market efficient and make it an investors choice 
because countries described to have strong capital market at some point experienced 																																																								
3 A. A. Awe and S. O. Ajayi, ‘Diversification of Nigerian revenue base for development: The 
contribution of the non-oil sector’, (2009) 6 Pakistan Journal of Social Science 138 





20 March 2017 
4 G. Steinhauser, ‘Oil-price drop pushes Nigeria into first recession since 2004’, (2016) The Wall Street 
Journal <https://www.wsj.com/articles/naira-oil-price-fall-push-nigeria-into-recession-1472647749> 
accessed 2 February, 2017 
5 A. Bedwei, ‘Doing business in a low oil price environment: The impact on Africa’, (pwc Blog, 17th 
October, 2016) <http://pwc.blogs.com/energy_spotlight/2016/10/doing-business-in-a-low-oil-price-
environment-the-impact-on-africa.html> accessed 2 February, 2017 
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these problems, and their approach towards reducing/terminating these issues have 
yielded admirable results.  
Developing a sturdy capital market rests on a complex network of legal and 
market institutions, which ensures that investors receive adequate and efficient 
information about the value of a company’s business as well as ensuring that investors 
are confident that managers and controlling shareholders will not appropriate their 
investments or what is due to them.6 Furthermore, in developing a strong capital 
market, the operational efficiency of such market is an essential factor that can 
influence investors in the market. Operational efficiency in this instance includes the 
provision and regulation of a transparent system for disclosure coupled with practices 
that will deter market malpractices. Additionally, the enactment of impermeable laws 
and adequate enforcement mechanisms aimed at protecting the interests of investors 
as well as ensuring they get their money back is off paramount importance. Such laws 
can double as a guide for market operators in carrying out their operations.  
It is arguable that the primary reasons individuals and institutional investors 
avoid the Nigerian capital market is because of the possibility of being provided with 
unreliable, falsified or incomplete information as well the operation of market 
malpractices such as insider trading. This arguably is accountable for the reason the 
market lacks depth and is considered volatile.7 It is important to note that there are 
other problems associated with the capital market in Nigeria. However, these 
problems highlighted serve as the root for the other problems that may emerge.8  
																																																								
6 B. S. Black, ‘The legal and institutional preconditions for strong securities markets’, (2001) 781 
UCLA Law Review, 783 
7 A. Babatunde and O. Olaniran, ‘The effects of internal and external mechanism on governance and 
performance of corporate firms in Nigeria’, (2009) 7 Corporate Ownership and Control 332 
8 This argument spawns from the fact that information is the most important thing when investing in a 
capital market and the major problems associated with capital market transactions are provision of 
inaccurate information or falsified information. Chapter 3 
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The importance of utilising legal provisions to tackle these problems cannot be 
undervalued as academics have argued that law is the best way to tackle the problems 
underlined in this thesis.9 Countries have adopted the model of using legal provisions 
to eliminate these problems and the practice is no different in Nigeria. There are 
regulatory provisions concentrating on eradicating these problems such as the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004 (CAMA), Investment and Securities Act 
2007 (ISA), and the Rules and Regulations of the SEC. This thesis compared some of 
the provisions contained in the Nigerian statutes with similar provisions in the UK 
and argued that the laws in Nigeria are incapable of handling such issues as there are 
instances of the laws not adequately and completely handling the issues identified or 
in some instances, there are no provisions for the regulation of such issues. 
Furthermore, a predominant problem associated with these rules is the issue of 
enforcement.   
This chapter seeks to explore some other elements that hinder the possibility 
of these laws bestowing credibility to the Nigerian capital market. However, it is 
important to state that these recommendations do not provide all the possible 
solutions to the problems accorded with the capital market in Nigeria, it only 
highlights select actions, procedures and mechanisms that hold the most potential to 
deliver impact based on similar approach by countries that are considered to possess 
strong capital markets. The issues discussed in this chapter is the operation of the rule 
of law in the capital market through the enactment of efficient rules and appropriate 
enforcement mechanisms through the IST, SEC and rule of law personnel (judges, 
lawyers) as well as the effective operation of corporate governance. 																																																								
9 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, R. Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’, (1998) 106 The Journal 
of Political Economy 1114 
S. Djankov, C. McLeish and A. Shleifer, ‘Private credit in 129 countries’, (2007) 84 Journal of 
Financial Economics 301 
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5.2. Rule of Law  
In its simplest form, rule of law connotes that the law should govern every facet of a 
nation (including its capital market) as opposed to being governed by arbitrary 
decisions of individual government officials.10 It is described as less formal and more 
substantive in the sense that rights should be recognised and enforced by courts or 
other judicial institutions as far as practicable as it is important in promoting the rights 
of individuals.11 The idea of rule of law not only requires the government to rule 
through laws but also is ruled by laws.12 In view of this the courts are described a 
viable means to enforce the rights of citizens against the government and bodies that 
aim to breach these rights.13   
Rule of law is important not only for the legal development, but also for 
economic and political development, which are also constitutive parts of national 
development as a whole. Based on the importance of capital markets, there is the vital 
requirement for regulation to avoid sharp practices, market abuse and improprieties. 
In achieving this, the importance of rule of law cannot be challenged as it guarantees 
the continued existence and operational efficiency of the capital market.14  
 
Economic development has been described to advance the rule of law.15 That 
said, it is arguable that absence of rule of law can hinder economic and business 
growth. According to the World Bank, Africa must unleash the power of its 
																																																								
10 T. Bingham, The rule of law, (Penguin Books, 2011) 3 
11 G. F. Gaus, ‘Public reason and the rule of law’, in I. Shapiro, The rule of law, (New York University 
Press, 1994) 329 
12 ibid 
13 J. R. Lucas, The principles of politics, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966) 113 
14 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, ‘Legal determinants of external 
finance’, (1997) 52 Journal of Finance 1149 
15 American Bar Association, ‘The rule of law and economic development’, International Rule of Law 
Symposium, April 2007, p. 2 
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enterprises to create jobs, expand exports and greater wealth to grow economically.16 
The ‘Africa action plan’ is held to be hindered by the combination of high regulatory 
costs, unsecured land property rights, ineffective judiciary, policy uncertainty and 
corruption, thus making the cost of conducting business in Africa 20-40% higher than 
that of other developing regions.17 Ultimately, the consequences are difficulty in job 
creation, wealth generation and economic development.18 
The thesis argues that the unavailability of a standard set of rules is partly 
attributable to the hindrance of the operation of rule of law in the Nigerian capital 
market as research suggests that total stock market returns positively correlate with 
overall measures of the quality of institutions, such as judicial efficiency and rule of 
law as well as controlling for risk.19 Additionally, dividend yields and earnings also 
correlate positively with judicial efficiency and rule of law.20  
This thesis has previously highlighted some of the legal provisions regulating 
the Nigerian capital market, which is aimed at protecting investors as well as 
promoting its operational efficiency.21 However, some of the provisions are not easily 
comprehendible, or they fail to realise their objectives. Some of the laws are of 
average quality and do not amplify the need to protect investors. These laws were 
adopted from similar provisions in the UK and USA that have now being updated 
whilst the laws in Nigeria remain unchanged. These provisions, still contain some of 																																																								
16 Unleashing Africa’s private sector: a key to shared growth 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:20639
324~menuPK:258649~pagePK:146736~piPK:226340~theSitePK:258644,00.html> accessed, 5 April 
2016 
17 The African action plan on development is based on development priorities as expressed by the 
African Union and New Partnership for Africa’s Development and is aimed at achieving an integrated 
and prosperous Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena. 
<http://www.nepad.org/resource/africa-action-plan-development-effectiveness> accessed 20 March 
2017 
18 (n 16) 
19 D. Lombardo and M. Pagano, ‘Legal determinants of the return on equity’, (1999) Centre for studies 
in Economics and Finance, Working paper, No. 24, 26 
20 ibid 
21 See 3.6.1(a) (b), 3.7.1, 4.3.3, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4 above 
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the mistakes of the previous provisions and not meeting societal/economical 
innovations such as technological and credit advancements. 22  Some of these 
regulations are due to be amended and or repealed if the capital market is desirous of 
growth. The rule of law should guide the application of these laws. However, it is 
arguable that it has not being applied properly or can be considered not useful for the 
purpose of investor protection. Furthermore, its application in the capital market has 
not succeeded in transforming the market to a desirable investment hub for investors. 
In view of the foregoing, this thesis recommends the immediate and persistent 
promotion of the rule of law in Nigeria as the likelihood of the capital market 
benefitting from a nation that pays attention to the rule of law are manifold. The rule 
of law can be promoted through an effective regulatory regime charged with fostering 
capital market development by encouraging the participation of investors and issuers 
in capital market transactions. 23  It should reprimand anyone that impairs the 
regulations governing the market as well as practices criminal activities. However, it 
is important to achieve a balance by excluding characteristics that are robust enough 
to protect investors without acting as a disincentive to the participation of issuers. The 
regulations enacted should not be too strict to make people avoid the market as well 
as not feeble to make it easy to avoid compliance. Furthermore, to achieve and 
promote the rule of law as an ultimate guide for market participants, the rules 
contained in the ISA and Rules and Regulations of the SEC must be updated to 
achieve regulatory efficiency because their primary purpose is to ensure operational 
efficiency of the capital market and guarantee investors adequate protection. 
																																																								
22 V. O. Okoye, K. J. Nwisienyi and O.Eze, ‘Capital market and industrial section development in 
Nigeria: A theoretical analysis’, (2013) 4 Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management 
Sciences, 20 
23  S. Kiyingi and E. Uwaifo, ‘Nigerian capital markets: Legal and regulatory review and 
recommendations’, (2015) The Nigeria-UK Capital Markets Projects 23 
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Examples of such laws that require updating are highlighted in the next section.24 
Furthermore, it is arguable that the effects of these rules have not been felt in the 
market due to exploitable ambiguities and lack of enforcement.  
This thesis argues that for the rule of law to be engaged appropriately to derive 
an appreciable result within the Nigerian capital market, there is the need for auspices 
of the rule of law to function appropriately. These factors include the provision of 
efficient and impermeable rules as well as the cogent operation of the factors needed 
to enforce these legal provisions. These factors are examined in turn below. 
 
5.2.1. Efficient rules  
The provision of rules aimed at promoting market efficiency serves as the primary 
means to engage the rule of law in the Nigerian capital market. To achieve an 
efficient regulatory regime, it is important that there are impermeable rules that 
prescribe how capital market operations should be conducted as well as provide 
adequate punishment for individuals and corporations that do not adhere to these 
rules. Formal legal and regulatory obligations are part of the external incentive 
structure designed to ensure that companies abide by common standards of fairness, 
transparency, accountability as well as develops the responsibility to protect 
shareholders, consumers, workers, the environment and even competitors from 
abusive practices. It would efficiently address the entry operations, develop best 
practices on quality of disclosure, as well as accounting and auditing standards. 25 
This thesis argues that with efficient rules and adequate enforcement investors will be 
more willing to invest which becomes savings for their use either in short term or in 
																																																								
24 Details of these provisions are addressed in the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
25 A. Babatunde and O. Olaniran, (n 7) 334 
	 214	
the future, thus enhancing liquidity in the market. Furthermore, this has the propensity 
to attract prospective investors to invest in the market.26 
Historically, the Nigerian capital market was without any form of regulation 
for almost twenty years from 1960.27 This meant that if any dispute had occurred 
during that period, chances of success in courts were very minimal as there were no 
legally enforceable principles governing the system. However, in recent years, rules 
were enacted to regulate the capital market. Paradoxically, these rules, arguably, have 
not regulated the market efficiently as it has been suggested in this thesis that the 
inefficiency of some of the rules governing disclosure is accountable for the lack of 
depth of the Nigerian capital market. 28  This, coupled with inadequate/lack of 
enforcement, is largely accountable for the Nigerian capital market being occupied by 
corporations that do not adhere to disclosure obligations. 
This thesis argues that the growth of the statutory provisions regulating the 
Nigerian capital market has been slow and has not evolved with the global 
innovations of recent years.29 It has been argued that regulatory accountability in 
relation to the capital market has not received much attention.30 The regulatory 
provisions are described to have adopted similar provisions in the Criminal Justice 
Act 1993 of the UK and the SEC Rules and Regulations in the USA.31 These statutes 
have constantly been updated or have adopted other statutory provisions in a bid to 
complement the existing ones, e.g. the enactment of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 that provides civil regulations for market abuse such as insider 																																																								
26 A.C. Fernando, Business Environment, (Pearson, 2011) 326 
27  A. Sanda, S. Mikailu and T. Garba, ‘Corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial 
performance in Nigeria’ (2005) 149 African Economic Research Consortium 5 
28 Chapter 3 above 
29 A. B. Ahmed and M. Bello, ‘Regulatory failures and the collapse of the capital market in Nigeria: 
Aligning responsibilities with accountability’, (2015) 40 Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization 167 
30 ibid 
31 A. A. Oluwabiyi, ‘A comparative legal appraisal of the problem of insider trading in mergers and 
acquisitions’, (2014) 2 Frontiers of Legal Research 1 
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trading and disclosure in the United Kingdom. The Nigerian statutes cannot be 
viewed to have developed at the same pace with its foreign counterparts. There are 
few advances in the regulatory provisions that are still considerably inadequate to 
sufficiently regulate the market, as they still contain exploitable loopholes as 
highlighted in this thesis. This becomes a major issue for the market, as investors are 
likely to avoid the market due to lack of confidence in the system as well as the legal 
regulations overseeing the market. The importance of these laws cannot be 
underestimated as their proficiency has the possibility of enhancing the confidence of 
investors because of improved operational efficiency.32  
Whilst this thesis commends the attempt at promoting regulation of the capital 
market, it argues that the contents of both regulatory instruments in the capital market 
are likely to generate confusion when attempting to establish liability. Particularly, 
this is because that there are provisions contained in one of the instruments and absent 
in the other. With the prevalence of financial markets illiteracy in Nigeria, it is 
important that the rules governing the market are not confusing not only to members 
of the public, but also to members of the investing sphere and legal practitioners. 
Therefore, this thesis recommends restructuring the focal point of both regulations 
and proposes the following: 
a) The Investment and Securities Act should be redrafted to contain specific 
offence, which include, insider trading, market manipulation, falsified 
disclosure etc. for which an action can be maintained as well as likely 
punishment if the regulations are not obeyed 
b) The Rules and Regulations of the SEC should be redrafted in the form of a 
rulebook, which highlights and defines the rules governing capital market 																																																								
32 B. R. Cheffins, ‘Does law matter? The separation of ownership and control in the United Kingdom’, 
(2001) 30 Journal of Legal Studies 459 
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operations. This thesis proposes that this rulebook should include specific 
practices that should be observed by capital market operators and companies 
registered in the capital market in observing best practices. Further, issues 
such as disclosure of information required by corporations in the capital 
market should be contained, inclusive of practices that companies and capital 
market operators should desist from. It should also contain the offences 
contained in the ISA or in the alternative, it should be referenced so as to draw 
the attention of market operators and corporations of the likely offences that 
can be committed and potential punishment. 
 
As identified by this thesis, some key issues, such as that for mandatory disclosure are 
not concisely set out in the ISA when compared to the rules and regulations of the 
SEC. This becomes tricky because disclosure of accurate information is a likely factor 
that persuades both retail and institutional investors to invest. In view of the 
foregoing, it is imperative that such provision should be conspicuously evident in both 
provisions as it is important both for the running of the securities markets and for 
establishing liability if necessary. Although section 313 (1) (p) of the ISA gives effect 
to a more robust SEC rules and regulations by prescribing that the SEC may make 
rules and regulations for the effect of carrying out the principles, this thesis proposes 
the need for important issues like disclosure and avoidance of market abuse to be 
clear in both regulations. In alternative to the foregoing, this thesis recommends that 
the ISA include a provision to the end that infractions of the Rules and Regulations of 
the SEC would be handled in the same manner as infractions of the ISA. 
There are other regulatory provisions that require updating in a bid to attain 
capital market efficiency. These provisions are examined in turn. 
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First, the need to grant jurisdiction to the Investment and Securities Tribunal 
(IST) to adjudicate for wrong committed against an individual in the capital market by 
corporations. Section 284 (1) of the ISA grants exclusive jurisdiction to the IST to 
exercise jurisdiction, hear and determine any question of law dispute arising from the 
capital market. It lists the type of disputes to include, disputes between capital market 
operators, operators and their clients, between an investor and a securities exchange 
or capital trade point but does not include adjudication between investors and listed 
companies. 33  This is an issue that should be addressed because if the IST is 
established for the purpose of adjudicating disputes that arise out of the capital 
market, it is important that it caters for disputes between an investor and a corporation 
and vice versa. Although such disputes are brought to the Federal High Court in the 
form of contractual disputes, this thesis recommends that issues emanating from the 
capital market be adjudicated in the IST because of the presumed expertise the judges 
of the IST possess in capital market operations. Furthermore, if such issues are 
adjudicated in the Federal High Court, the purpose of the IST is arguably defeated if it 
cannot hear disputes between investors and corporations. The foregoing has the 
potential to further enhance the confidence of potential investors in the system 
because they are aware of where to institute actions if anything goes wrong between 
the investor and a corporation in the market and potentially the ability to institute an 
action against the commission.  
Second, the need to confirm where actions from the securities market are to 
commence is important for clarity purpose.  Section, 251(e) of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal 
High Court for civil cases arising from the operation of the Companies and Allied 
																																																								
33 ISA, s. 284(1) 
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Matters Act (CAMA) or any enactment replacing the Act or regulating the operation 
of companies incorporated under the CAMA.34 Section 251 (e), CFRN and section 
284 (1) ISA are likely to cause difficulties because they contradict each other in 
relation to commencing civil cases emanating from the capital market. The ISA was 
enacted after substantive provisions governing issues such as insider trading were 
repealed in the CAMA, which makes it fall under this category in section 251 (e). 
Such contradiction paves the way for unnecessary time wastage technicalities that can 
be exploited by defence attorneys. Although there is the possibility of appealing such 
judgments/rulings if they occur, the cost implication may not be encouraging to a 
party whose case has been struck out, or judgment/ruling not given in his favour.  
Drawing on an example from the UK, the method of commencing a civil 
action by an aggrieved investor is explained on the website of the Financial Conduct 
Authority.35 The commercial courts of the England and Wales are the designated 
courts accorded with jurisdiction to hear disputes arising from the financial markets.36 
In October 2015, there was the introduction of the financial list that is to cater for 
financial services claims of £50 million and above or for complex disputes that raise 
issues concerning the domestic and international financial markets.37 The system in 
the UK is unarguably easier to comprehend and likely attributable to the success of 
the London Stock Exchange because it gives adequate information of where to make 
formal complaints as well as the courts to institute such actions if need be. This thesis 
argues that this is an additional factor that will influence an investor to invest in such 
a market because of the belief that if anything goes wrong, they are aware of the 
procedure to resolve such disputes. In view of foregoing, this thesis proposes the 																																																								
34 CFRN, 1999, s.251 (e) 
35 <http://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/complaints-and-compensation/how-to-complain>  
36 <https://www.gov.uk/courts-tribunals/commercial-court>  
37 Civil Procedure Rules, part 63A 
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adoption of a system similar to that in the UK by the Nigerian capital market that 
provides adequate information to investors on where to make complaints as well as 
the right court/tribunal to institute actions. This has the likelihood to enhance the 
confidence of potential investors in the capital market. 
Third, the rules governing disclosure should be available in both the ISA and 
the Rules and Regulations of the SEC. Disclosure of information relating to a 
company and its business is of paramount importance when investing in the capital 
market as investors rely on the documents provided by companies in the securities 
market when they are making the decision to invest and as such it should be contained 
in the Rules and Regulations of the SEC for participants in the market to know their 
obligations and also used to establish liability against anyone that does not adhere to 
the regulatory provisions. Adequate rules governing disclosure have the likelihood to 
generate coherent disclosure by corporations and ignore sharp practices.  
Other than the fact that both regulatory instruments should contain concise 
rules pertaining to disclosure, this thesis submits that it is important that sanctions 
available for contravention of these rules are also made available. Currently, the ISA 
lists the sanctions for non-adherence to disclosure. However, they are absent in the 
Rules and Regulations of the SEC. This thesis recommends that such sanctions should 
be made available in the rules and regulations to enable participants in the markets 
and corporations be aware of the likely sanctions they would face if they do not 
adhere to mandatory disclosure, which has the propensity to make them desist from 
such practice. 
Another issue that is of paramount importance and needs some clarification is 
that both regulatory instruments should specify the extent to which disclosure should 
be carried out under both statutes. This is important because firms that are in default 
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of appropriate disclosure can claim that the disclosure carried out was reasonably 
sufficient within its capability. This will go a long way in enhancing the provisions 
relating to negligent misstatements. Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller & Partners 
established the possibility to claim damages for negligent misstatements.38 It was held 
that a duty of care could exist where there was an assumption of responsibility, thus 
creating a special relationship between the parties.39 Furthermore, section 2 (1) of the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 established a statutory right to damages where a person 
has entered into a contract after misrepresentation has being made to him and as a 
result suffered loss.40 Although it can be argued that the provision of section 313 (1) 
(L) (i) of the ISA caters for this by providing; 
‘The commission may from time to time, make rules and regulations for the 
purpose of giving to the provision of this Act and may in particular without 
prejudice to the generally foregoing provisions, make rules and regulations 
without prejudice to the Companies and Allied Matters Act specifying for the 
protection of investors; 
(i) the matters to be disclosed relating to the public issue of securities transfer 
of securities of public companies and other matters incidental thereto;’ 
This thesis argues that the provision highlighted above does not adequately cater for 
the extent to which disclosure should be carried out. It prescribes that information to 
be disclosed should involve matters that are ‘incidental thereto’. Giving the ordinary 
meaning, (information you accidentally come across) this has the propensity to cause 
problems and can be used to evade liability because it does not give an obligation to 
seek this information.  This thesis recommends that rules should have provisions that 																																																								
38 [1964] AC 465 
39 ibid 
40 J. Beatson, A. Burrows, and J. Cartwright, Ansons Law of Contract, (30th Edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2016) 327 
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explicitly identify what it is attempting to cover as well as be made easily 
comprehendible. This thesis recommends that such rule be drafted to have similarities 
with this: 
‘…without prejudice to the provisions of the Companies and Allied Matters 
Act specifying for the protection of investors: 
(i) the matters to be disclosed relate to issue of securities, transfer of 
securities of public companies and extended to information that can influence 
the decision to invest. Such information should include those that will be 
reasonably obtainable by adequate due diligence’. 
The above has the propensity to imbibe some caution on parties disclosing to do it 
carefully and diligently. The above draft shares similar attributes to that provided in 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.41 
 In 2011, it was announced that 48 firms were suspended from the market for 
failing to publish annual reports and in 2012 some 72 firms were penalised for not 
meeting reporting requirements.42 The emergence of rules regulating the market has 
led to its subsequent compliance by participants of the market. This is commendable, 
however, there is room for improvement, which should stir the direction of the SEC 
and courts towards this direction when the need arises. 
Fourth, this thesis recommends the need to provide clearer and concise rules 
regulating market malpractices such as insider trading. This thesis identified some 
inconsistencies and insufficiencies in the rules intended at prohibiting this act as 
provided by the Rules and Regulations of the SEC and ISA.43 This thesis argued that 
these inconsistencies are possibly accountable for the inability to protect the market 																																																								
41 FSMA 2000, s. 80 (3) 
42  <http://www.nigerianstockexchange.com/mediacenter/Press%20Releases/Aug%2002,%202011%20-
%20Exchange%20Places%2024%20Companies%20on%20Full%20Suspension.pdf> accessed 14 
August 2016 
43 Chapter 4 
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from the act.44 Insider trading is rife. It is considered more obvious in countries where 
the laws prohibiting it are lax.  This coupled with the lack of knowledge of the act can 
constitute a disastrous outcome in the future. It is important that the regulations 
highlighted be updated to contain certain provisions.  
The role legal rules and regulations play in the capital market is off paramount 
importance. It is therefore imperative that the provisions of these rules and regulations 
be adequate and succinct to aid in the running of capital markets and make it easier to 
establish liability against defaulters 
 
5.2.2. Enforcement 
To achieve an efficient capital market that is operational based on the rule of law, it is 
important that the legal rules that are enacted to regulate the market are adequately, 
appropriately and timeously enforced. This has the likelihood to generate a good 
impact on the market because it is argued that legal and regulatory mechanisms alone 
cannot protect the interests of shareholders and investors. 45  To propel investor 
confidence, this thesis proposes adequate enforcement of legal provisions regulating 
the capital market. For this to be achievable, officers of the law must be willing to 
enforce the rules in a fair and consistent manner for it to be effective.46  The 
difference in the nature and effectiveness of financial systems around the world is 
held to be traceable in part to the differences in investor protection against 
expropriation by insiders, as reflected by legal rules and the quality of their 
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enforcement.47 Furthermore, it is argued that the content of regulation is not as 
important as the resources directed towards enforcement.48  
The importance of enforcement cannot be taken for granted as it mitigates 
agency problems because executives are dissuaded from engaging in behaviours such 
as insider trading, misleading/falsified disclosure, or fraud because they are aware of 
the possibility of a real risk of punishments. Furthermore, research indicates that 
countries with developed securities regulations and legal enforcement mechanisms 
have a lower cost of capital than countries where these characteristics are absent.49  
Enforcement input is considered to generate output in the form of sanctions imposed 
on wrong doers as well as serves as a method for dealing with the minority of 
organisations that do not comply, and as a deterring factor to prevent others from non-
compliance.50  
Enforcement is vital in emerging economies not as integrated as those of 
advanced economies. When a country’s economy is integrated in the international 
capital markets, the efficiency of those markets can partially make up for deficiencies 
in the country specific securities regulation and legal system.51 The intensity of 
enforcement is crucial to the development of the capital market and may matter more 
than differences in substantive law.52  
Enforcement indicates a clear operation of the rule of law in the market as it 
contributes to investor confidence because management is monitored and property 
rights are protected. Emerging markets in developing countries are advised to take the 
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issue of enforcement seriously because it indicates some credibility in the system 
protecting the capital market thereby instilling confidence in investors. This would 
create a significant difference in the market because their regulatory provisions are 
currently considered less credible than those of their developed counterparts.53   
Companies are considered to apply a more conservative accounting approach 
in countries where enforcement of securities regulation is strong and because 
regulators are likely to be penalised if, under their watch, there are cases of 
overstating accounting results and market malpractices, they are likely to be more 
rigorous in their enforcement.54 Research indicates that participation in equity markets 
increases when countries adopt market malpractice laws, such as controlling insider 
trading, because those laws put outside investors on more even footing with insiders 
who have access to non-public information.55 This spawns some caution in companies 
and likely leads to the effectiveness in its operation. A probable consequence of this is 
that when companies recognise bad news in their financial reports, they will 
investigate and report to the appropriate authorities in a bid to avoid regulatory 
infractions.56 When enforcement is weak or inconsistent, shareholders avoid the 
market because of the belief that the official channels may not protect their interests, 
thus making them seek a more direct role in governance oversight, either through 
greater rights afforded through the byelaws and charters or through direct 
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representation on the board. Without these tools, they will demand higher returns on 
capital to compensate for the greater risk of investing their money.57 
The role of enforcement has gained increased recognition in recent years and 
its importance has been highlighted by academics and in some instances institutions 
charged with regulating capital markets around the world. For example, the European 
Securities Markets Experts (ESME) highlighted the importance of enforcement in the 
following statement: 
‘There is a concern that without market abuse directives being seen to be 
implemented (i.e. enforced), abusive practices are continuing. There is little 
incentive for compliance among general market users where there appears to 
be a low risk of being caught, which is partly a result of settlements that are 
not published and where sanctions are light’.58 
Furthermore, the FSA has also recognised the effect of enforcement and stated as 
follows: 
‘Where enforcement is key is where we need to be visible In the market place 
sending tough messages about wrongful behaviour and imposing sanctions 
(which does not just mean fines) which are severe enough to have a deterrent 
effect. We recognize that we need to do enough enforcement cases of the right 
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In promoting enforcement, there are different activities accessible to regulators that 
can be implemented as part of their compliance gaining strategies. Strategies based on 
persuasion, education, and co-operation holds a coercive measure in reserve to handle 
a minority of non-compliers. 60  A holistic mix of tools employed flexibly in 
constructive engagement is suggested as an appropriate way forward so long as there 
is always the real possibility of escalation to tougher measures. 
It has been argued that higher enforcement intensity has the likelihood to 
discourage issuers from entering the market.61 An example given of such is the United 
States of America where it is said that enforcement intensity is largely attributable for 
the decline in competitiveness of the capital market.62 It is important to differentiate 
intensive enforcement from overregulation. The former connotes a system where the 
laws are impermeable and as such a breach of them leads to adequate reparation. The 
later connotes a system where the provisions are somewhat unattainable. 
Overregulation is said to be a force that constrains and retards financial 
development.63 Whilst this argument is viable and has its merits, this thesis posits that 
developed countries such as the UK and USA have relatively older markets as well as 
efficient rules that have built their reputation for years. Furthermore, they have 
developed their reputational capital and as such entities listed in such markets have no 
option but to observe the rules. However, this argument is not applicable to 
developing countries as intensified rules and enforcement have the tendency to attract 
entities that will adhere to the rules and regulations, which subsequently enhances 
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investor confidence. Furthermore, this can lower the cost of a country’s equity capital 
as well as has the likelihood to attract foreign issuers and investors.64 
In buttressing the importance of enforcement, the law and finance theory 
highlighted in this thesis is considered the primary reason some countries have 
stronger capital market than others.65 This theory has gained sufficient cognisance in 
the last decade and arguably has not being discredited. This theory argues that the 
enforcement variable is the likely reason for the prowess of such countries that have 
proven to be stronger because of the law and finance theory.66 This is held out to be 
the apparent difference in the impact of legal origins on financial development. 
Furthermore, prioritising private recovery of investors’ losses is essential to harness 
the incentives of market participants to enforce securities law.67 It is stipulated that an 
efficient system would provide agents with incentives to collect and present 
information to investors and would hold them liable if they do not.68 
In the context of securities markets, a public enforcer can be a securities 
commission, a central bank or some other supervisory body.69 However, it has been 
argued that enforcement may only be effective in countries with efficient government 
bureaucracies.70 A related concern is that enforcement may be ineffective if the 
supervisor of the market lacks adequate resources as enforcement is described to be 
statistically significant in countries with well-staffed regulators.71  
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In enforcing the legal provisions regulating the Nigerian capital market, this 
thesis proposes a tripartite approach for effective enforcement of the rules and 
regulations of the market. The proposed system is highlighted below. 
a) The first step would be to report to the SEC or relevant law enforcement 
agency. Such agency should be empowered to carry out preliminary enquiry 
into such complaints. This enquiry should serve as a method to determine the 
viability of the case and if it should undergo investigations. This approach will 
filter out any frivolous and unnecessary claims aimed at wasting the time of 
the commission. If the commission finds the case worthy of proper 
investigation, the commission should write to the party/parties involved, 
informing them of their decision to go further with the case request for further 
evidence if applicable and give a realistic estimate of how long such 
investigations will take. Upon carrying out their investigation, it is suggested 
that the commission utilises the best possible way to resolve the dispute. 
Furthermore, this thesis recommends the awareness of conducting 
investigations timeously. In achieving this, the Economic and Financial Crime 
Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corruption Practices Commission 
(ICPC) should be utilised. Both bodies are in charge of investigating and 
prosecuting corruption in Nigeria and as such, it is important that their scope 
be expanded to the capital market and serve as a means of enforcing the 
regulations governing the capital market. The foregoing factors are important 
and have the likelihood to bolster the confidence of investors in the system. 
b) The second step would be to report and forward case to the IST. Cases that 
involve the rights of investors should be heard with candour and promptly 
without any unreasonable delays. 
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c) Third, law enforcement agencies should enforce the decision of the 
court/tribunal against erring market participants. 
 
Whilst this may partially be the traditional system to enforce securities laws, this 
thesis proposes a stricter approach and significant increase in the amount of resources 
directed towards enforcing the laws in order to enhance investor confidence in 
Nigeria. This thesis suggests that with more resources be directed towards 
enforcement of regulations as it can bolster the confidence of investor in such a 
market. Paradoxically, this has not been the situation as the handful of reported cases 
indicates that the SEC does not treat complaints in a timeous manner thus 
depreciating the confidence of investors further. For example, in an on-going case 
involving BGL Nigeria, several petitions were brought against the company for 
failure, refusal and/or neglect to liquidate investments of investors in two companies 
run by BGL.72 Although, the eventual suspension of the company from the market by 
the SEC was applauded, a lingering question in the mind of the individuals is the 
reason the process was so protracted, as the complaints had accumulated years before. 
Indeed, it was alleged that more than forty petitions were filed with the SEC against 
the company before the SEC eventually acted.73 Several reasons can be attributable to 
this, such as the fact that the managing director of the company at that time was the 
president of the chartered institute of shareholders in Nigeria and as such possessed 
the required connections to block any investigation from going forward.  
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This thesis recommends adequate enforcement of rules that concern the capital 
markets because of the sensitive nature of its trade. Taking an example from cases 
that have to do with the Investor Protection Fund in Nigeria,74 it is arguable that the 
application of the Fund has been inadequate. In Ezemgbe v Nigerian Stock Exchange75 
the investor claimed 3.7 million Naira but was awarded 200, 000 Naira because of the 
cap placed by Nigerian Stock Exchange Investor Protection Rules 2007. Although, 
there is no cap in the current Investor Protection Rules 2013, it provides that the board 
in a written policy will determine such amount.76 This thesis asserts that this is not 
encouraging as compensation ought to restore the aggrieved person to his former 
position or so near it and as such it should be prescribe a figure that will potentially be 
sufficient to cater for investors’ losses.  
For effective enforcement of the regulations governing the capital market, this 
thesis submits that the SEC, Courts, law enforcement agencies must work efficiently 
and credibly to achieve the best results, which can enhance the confidence of 
investors in the capital market. The next section highlights the role of the SEC, and 
other law enforcement agencies with the aim of identifying reasons for their presumed 
lacklustre performance. Furthermore, it highlights possible reforms that can make 
them achieve operational efficiency. 
 
5.2.3.  Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
The Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission is the apex regulatory institution 
of the Nigerian Capital Market. The provisions of the Investment and Securities Act 
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2007, establishes the commission and the Federal Ministry of Finance supervises it.77 
In regulating the market, the SEC utilises different activities that are aimed at 
protecting investors and market operators as well as guarantees that the market 
operates with utmost integrity. It is empowered by the ISA to register securities and 
market intermediaries to ensure that only fit and proper individuals can operate in the 
market.78 In performing its duties, it carries out inspection on capital market operators 
to ensure that they adhere to common practices as well as ensure that they are not 
involved in fraudulent activities. At regular intervals, the commission requests for 
information from capital market operators to ensure they are operating efficiently and 
within the ambit of the law.79 The SEC carries out surveillance over exchanges and 
trading systems to forestall breaches of market rules as well as deter and detect 
manipulations and trading practices that can cause market disruption.80   
 Typically, the SEC, by its provisions identified above, ought to be the first 
point of call when there is an issue arising from or during the course of a transaction. 
However, historical trends and recent occurrences in the market indicate that while 
the SEC is the regulatory compliance tool of the capital market, it has not performed 
this function adequately. The SEC has been described as lax in carrying out its 
investigatory functions and taking an example from the BGL case highlighted earlier 
in this chapter, it is evident that this assertion is confirmed as it is reported that 
different formal complaints and petitions were made to the commission, however, it 
was years later before any major step was taken.  
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In carrying out their functions, the Commission is empowered to summarily 
sanction an erring operator or other regulated entity.81 In according such sanctions, 
they are empowered to appoint one or more committees on its behalf to execute such 
function as determined by the Commission.82 One of such committees enacted for 
enforcing the regulations of the capital market is the Administrative Proceedings 
Committee (APC). It is a quasi-judicial arm through which matters provided for in the 
ISA are heard. It hears matters between capital market operators and institutions as 
well as considers if they have violated or attempted to violate the provisions of the act 
or rules and regulations.83 It also creates the possibility to negotiate settlement and is 
empowered to impose some administrative sanctions listed in rule 601 of the Rules 
and Regulations of the SEC. The SEC confirms the decision of the APC. 84 
Furthermore, the APC levies penalties and administrative costs of proceedings as 
contained in the ISA.85 This thesis proposes a more adept approach by the SEC in 
performing its functions because it occupies a strategic position in the Nigerian 
capital market and can serve as a medium to enhance investor confidence.  
 
5.2.4. Investment and Securities Tribunal (IST) 
The ISA was enacted in 1999 to promote a more efficient and virile capital market 
that is pivotal to meeting Nigeria’s economic and development aspirations based on 
the recommendations made by the Dennis Odife Committee. 86  One of the 																																																								
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recommendations of the committee was the establishment of the Investment and 
Securities Tribunal (IST) to be responsible for the adjudication of disputes emanating 
from the capital market in a speedy, informal and business-like manner. 87  Its 
enactment was as a result of the perceived philosophical standpoint that the 
administration of justice in the capital market required to be responsive to the needs 
of litigants above all else.88 It is considered a fast-track medium for the resolution of 
capital market disputes, and is deemed for all intents and purposes to be a civil 
court.89   
The IST is conferred with exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising under 
the ISA. The ISA also confers the IST with appellate jurisdiction in relation to 
disputes between capital market operators. Appeals from the decisions of the tribunal 
are to lie in the first instance with the Federal High Court and thereafter with the 
Court of Appeal and subsequently the Supreme Court.90 
The tribunal combines the rule of law applicable in traditional courts with the 
responsiveness, flexibility, speed and cost effectiveness associated with specialised 
courts and ADR systems.91 The IST is empowered to enact rules regulating its 
procedure, however, for the purpose of discharging its power under the ISA, it is 
empowered to carry out a variety of functions such as summoning, receiving 
evidence, call for examination of witnesses, reviewing its decisions, and do anything 
that is within its power or ancillary to its functions under the Act.92 
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The tribunal has specialised knowledge of the capital market due to the 
presumed technical and operational skills of its members and staff that is applied 
when deciding cases before it as against what is obtainable in regular courts that are 
manned by judges who may not possess the cognate experience skills in capital 
market issues.93 It has a three-month period to deliver judgment in a matter before it.  
This time frame is constrained because of the sensitivity of the capital market and the 
grave damage that a lapse of time can cause to investors. The tribunal also has 
appellate jurisdiction over actions or decisions from the APC.94 Judgment from the 
tribunal is registered and enforced as if it is a judgment of the Federal High Court.95  
 
The establishment of the IST has generated some concerns. These concerns 
are identified in turn. 
It has been argued that the regulation of the IST as contained in the ISA 
implies that the decision of the tribunal is that of the Federal High Court thus 
obviating the need for an appeal to the Federal High Court since it cannot sit on 
appeal over its decision.96 The establishment of the tribunal does not make it a 
department of the Federal High Court neither does the Federal High Court Act 1973 
provide for anything in this regard, therefore, it is argued that the tribunal ought to be 
considered independent of the Federal High Court.97 Furthermore, the argument over 
the jurisdiction of the IST and the Federal High Court as highlighted above is still an 
issue litigants’ face. The issue concerning the jurisdiction to hear capital market 
disputes generate some confusion given that the provisions of section 284 (1) of the 
ISA and 251 (e) of the CFRN 1999 are contradictory. In the case of SEC v Kasunmu, 																																																								
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it was held that any Act of parliament that is inconsistent with the provisions of the 
constitution is void to the extent of such inconsistency.98 The constitution was held to 
be the grundnorm of the country and supreme law to all other legislation as indicated 
in section 1 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria 1999.99 In Okeke 
v SEC it was held that the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court under 
section 251 (1) (e) and (r) cannot be whittled down or taken away by an ordinary Act 
of the National Assembly, in the absence of any amendment to the provision in 
question.100 Moreover, the CFRN also provides that any other law that is inconsistent 
with its provision is void and the constitution shall prevail to the extent of the 
inconsistency.101 This uncertainty in jurisdiction could be capitalised on by litigants 
and might make the tribunal ineffective. This thesis postulates that a major 
consequence of this is the detrimental effect it has on the capital market, as investors 
do not believe in the system thus hindering the growth of the development of the 
securities market. 
Another issue that is of concern is the fact that the IST has not sat in the last 
18 months due to prolonged delay in the reconstitution of the boards of ministries, 
departments and agencies that were dissolved on the 16th of July 2015 by the Federal 
government.102 It is reported that the efforts to make the Federal Government realise 
the strategic importance of the tribunal to the national economy and the need for the 
reconstitution of its membership and reiterate its status as a civil court and not a board 
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has yielded no positive results.103 Inevitably, this affects the role of the tribunal as the 
capital market adjudicator through which disputes are resolved and can reduce the 
confidence of investors as there is no way to resolve disputes if any arises. 
Although tribunals are considered to consist mainly of experts in particular 
fields, which in this case ought to be capital market related, it however, has to 
conform to the grundnorm i.e. the constitution for it to be viably accepted.  It was 
stated by Hon. Justice Ogunwumiju J.C.A:  
“There is no doubt that to ensure speedy disposition of certain genres of cases, 
the National Assembly had thought it fit to create specialist tribunals, 
however, such creation must conform with the constitution. Under the 
inconsistency rule, the validity of any law or act is determined by its 
consistency”.104 
The impact of an uncertain medium for the resolution of disputes is a great hindrance 
to investment. It was stated:  
“it might interest you to note that one of the earliest opinions of foreign 
investors typically seek from commercial lawyers is the dispute resolution 
architecture available in the country and any uncertainty in this might dampen 
the investment appetite for any given country, hence the need to resolve any 
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5.2.5.  The rule of law: personnel 
A major hindrance to the smooth operation of rule of law is the enforcement of legal 
provisions through the judicial system which is described as severely run down with 
their current form not offering a reliable basis for dispute resolution, protection of 
participants in the capital markets as well as property rights and enforcement of 
contracts.106  
The importance of the judicial system cannot be ignored, particularly in the 
role that they play in the survival of a capital market because there is the propensity 
for a capital market to fail if the judicial system does not function effectively in 
enforcing the rules aimed at supervising activities of the capital market, and discharge 
its role in punishing offenders. It has been argued that if there is no efficient judicial 
system, organised crime, extortion, bribery etc. will be the reigning corporate 
model.107 In view of this, this thesis recommends that the legal/judicial framework be 
strengthened in its aim to credibly protect investors.108  
There are allegations of practices of market abuse such as insider trading, 
manipulations of annual accounts, deliberately withholding share certificates in the 
Nigeria capital market.109 These crimes are committed in the market irrespective of 
the availability of several regulatory institutions and measures enacted by the 
Nigerian government for proper management of the market with a view of protecting 
investors from losing their funds.110  
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For a capital market to attain its full potential, it is important that it is 
governed by the rule of law. For this to be attainable, it is imperative that the 
personnel/officers be adept and upright in handling their role of upholding the rule 
law.111 This thesis highlighted prevalent ignorance of capital market operations as 
well as corrupt practices evident in the Nigerian judiciary, members of the capital 
market and the public. When dealing with cases involving investing in the capital 
market, the function played by judges both at the IST and the Federal High Court are 
of paramount importance in upholding the rule of law. Judges in carrying out their 
duties of interpreting statutory provisions, hearing cases, giving rulings and judgment 
of cases before them must be proficient to enable the rule of law prevail without any 
obstruction by corrupt practices.  
In performing these duties, it is imperative that judges are knowledgeable to 
enable them uphold decisions that are justiciable. In view of this, this thesis proposes 
the practice of appointing members of the IST be based on merit. Section 275 of the 
ISA prescribes that the individual that chairs the tribunal should be a legal practitioner 
with no less than 15 years cognate experience in capital market matters. However, 
presently this is not the practice as the Chairman/ Chief Judge of the tribunal worked 
as a director of public prosecution before becoming the Solicitor General of Abia 
State in Nigeria and subsequently working as the acting registrar for the corporate 
affairs commission. There is no evidence to indicate or suggest that she has any 
experience with the securities matters.112 Given the temperament and complexities of 
the capital market, it is important that individuals with experience in capital market 
matters be employed to occupy such strategic positions because s/he has 
understanding of how the system works and the importance of conducting cases 																																																								
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timeously.113 The practice of appointments made based on favouritism and nepotism 
should be abandoned with the aim of appointing individuals with the requisite 
experience.  
Additionally, it is imperative that judges seek continuous education and 
training. This is particularly so in light of the evolvement of the market, the 
digitalised and technological innovations that are developing rapidly. To address this, 
it is necessary for there to be constant training of judges aimed at keeping them 
abreast of the different ways offences can be committed and keep them well informed 
of any innovations in the securities world. Training should also extend to markets 
participants and to the members of the Nigerian bicameral houses charged with 
making rules and regulations for the capital market. With adequate training, such 
individuals will acquire the required understanding in the innovations with capital 
markets around the world, thus equipping them with adequate knowledge and 
appreciation to enact suitable rules that will govern capital market operations.  
Another issue that is of primary concern to individuals that rely on the judicial 
system generally is the time frame within which cases are instituted to its completion 
date. The typical timeframe from institution to conclusion of an action in Nigerian 
courts is two to three years and in some instances extend as long as fifteen years.114 
This thesis argues that delay in hearing cases that emanate from the capital market has 
a negative effect on investors and has the likely effect to make them avoid the market 
because of the belief that if anything goes wrong, they cannot rely on the 
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courts/tribunal to hear the case timeously.115 The reasons for delay are usually 
attributed to judges not appearing in court daily or in some instances they appear but 
do not address the underlying issues timeously.116 Furthermore, some lawyers bring 
irrelevant applications before the court with the aim to cause some delay and frustrate 
the other party.117 This practice should be discouraged in cases involving securities 
market and investors. Delay in deciding cases has the likelihood of frustrating 
investors and make them avoid the capital market.  The fact that the Nigerian judicial 
system is known for delay in cases has developed lack of confidence in the system. In 
this instance, it would apply to cases in the IST and Federal High Court. This thesis 
recommends granting of adequate costs in a bid to eradicate delay tactics. Judges in 
Nigerian courts usually give meagre sums as costs/fines. This inevitably makes it 
easier for desperate litigants to employ delay tactics because even with the delay, the 
amount they are likely to pay as costs is little. It has been recommended that courts 
should strive to exercise its power to award costs properly, which can discourage 
irresponsible litigation.118  Furthermore, litigants utilise frivolous applications as delay 
tactics in Nigeria. This problem is further compounded by the fact that judges adjourn 
for a long period (two-six weeks, sometimes longer) before they hear such 
applications and a further two to six weeks to give their ruling on such applications. 
This thesis proposes the need for such applications to be heard expeditiously and 
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rulings given on the same day, thus creating the possibility of attaining the three 
months limit as prescribed by the ISA. 
This thesis submits that an efficient judicial system known for hearing cases 
promptly and giving judicious judgments will enhance the confidence of investors. 
Additionally, in carrying out their duties, judges should employ different orders 
available to them. They should appreciate the use of freezing orders and subpoenas to 
enable cases go on easily and unobstructed. However, in utilising these orders, the 
courts should employ some caution so as not to create difficulties for a company’s 
business.  
Lawyers also have a substantial role to play in ensuring the rule of law is 
upheld in relation to capital market transactions. They have a duty to ensure that they 
carry out the instructions of their clients diligently and honesty. This necessitates the 
need to be sufficiently informed of any innovations and relevant provisions when 
seeking for any order of court. In performing their duties, lawyers should also seek to 
ensure that they are operating within the ambits of the law and not acting illegally. 
They should dissuade their clients against engaging in acts that will lead to breaking 
the law.  
These issues highlighted in the preceding sections have the propensity to 
improve the operation of rule of law in the Nigerian capital market as well as lead to 
achieving an efficient capital market. The next section highlights the importance of 
awareness amongst the Nigerian inhabitants of capital market operations to make the 




One of the reasons the Nigerian capital market is described as illiquid and lacking 
depth is because of lack of awareness of capital market operations and protection 
accorded to investors who participate in the market. The individuals aware of the 
market and its operations are sometimes not aware of the protection accorded to 
investors because of lack of enforcement of the regulations. A major consequence is 
that a substantial amount of the Nigerian population eschews the capital market.119 
The need for awareness/enlightenment is not limited to outsiders because operatives 
of the markets are sometimes not aware of sharp practices corporations exploit in an 
attempt beat the system. This issue is worsened by the fact that the individuals 
charged with detecting such practices are sometimes not aware of their occurrence or 
do not know how to detect it.120   
This thesis recommends continuous training for capital market operatives to 
keep them abreast of the innovations associated with capital markets as well as how 
markets are to be operated efficiently. This has the propensity to curb the practices of 
individuals or corporations attempting to perform illegal acts in the market. 
Furthermore, such training should be mandated for brokers and advisors because they 
are driving force behind new products and innovations and to carry out such 
functions, they must continually engage and update their knowledge of the ever-
evolving global capital markets. In relation to market operatives, there appears to be 
an information asymmetry within the industry in relation to what training or 
certification is available and or required amongst investment professionals. This is 
considered to influence investor confidence in the market because the advice of 
investment managers and stockbrokers in some instances contribute to adverse 																																																								
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fluctuations in the pricing of securities due to lack of broker knowledge. 121 
Additionally, this thesis proposes the need for market operatives to be well apprised 
with the regulatory provisions governing the market aimed at promoting efficiency in 
the market and protecting investors. Thus giving them the expertise to advise to 
investors if need be.  
There are traces of market growth initiatives in the Nigerian capital market 
such as the certification of investment advisors provided by the Chartered Institute of 
Stockbrokers, FMDQ in conjunction with Financial Market Dealers Association 
(FMDA) developed a financial market competency framework, which is aligned with 
the Central Bank of Nigeria’s competency framework. However, it is arguable that 
they have not being effective because there are still traces of market malpractices that 
are hindering the Nigerian capital market from attaining its full potential and research 
indicates that market operatives are unaware of market abuse such as insider trading 
operating in the capital market.122 There is the need for adoption of a more cohesive 
industry wide approach.  
This thesis proposes the need to mandate such training and failure to complete 
such training should lead to suspension of such a broker or advisor pending when they 
get the required training. Furthermore, for individual brokers and advisors that do not 
obtain the required training and subsequently handles clients that eventually loses 
some money or there is the occurrence of an unforeseen circumstance, there should be 
severe punishments accorded to such persons especially when it is evident that this 
loss or unforeseen circumstance could have being avoided if he had the appropriate 
training. Additionally, this thesis proposes the use of punishments such as suspension, 
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expulsion and fines for lack of the required training. Taking an example from the 
United Kingdom, the Financial Conduct Authority through their training and 
competence regime ensures that market operatives are well equipped by ensuring that 
the financial services workforce is qualified and well regulated. 123  The regime 
provides a list of appropriate qualifications for firm activities, services, as well as 
level of qualification, which is prescribed through examination standards. 124  It 
operates a two-tier system where both individuals and firms maintain their 
competence through training as well as meeting the required standard of behaviour. 
An accredited body sometimes grants these qualifications. For example, investment 
advisers obtain specific level of annual continuous professional development and they 
are granted annual statement of professional standing. Firms on the other hand are 
required to meet the competence requirement in three principal areas; assessing 
competence, maintaining competence, keeping records.125 The duty is placed on the 
individual to get the appropriate certification within thirty months but on the firm to 
assess the employee’s competence that is defined as having the skills knowledge and 
expertise needed to discharge the responsibilities of an employee’s role.126 
In addition to the above, the Nigerian capital market should provide a 
mechanism that potential investors can be adequately informed of their operations as 
well as how they are protected if they invest. Currently, there are nine trading centres 
for the Nigerian capital market as listed on the website of the NSE, which has led to 
the presumption that the capital market is only available to occupants of that part of 
the country.127 This is not encouraging as there are other individuals that are interested 
in investing the market, but not within the trading zone. Inevitably this will 																																																								
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discourage people as well as make the market to be viewed as elitist.128 In view of 
this, this thesis recommends that the SEC in collaboration with market operatives 
should aim to communicate to potential investors the possibility of trading in the 
capital market from where they are situated, in some instances via online provisions. 
Furthermore, the SEC and market participants should be open to the idea of trading 
through modern technology to bring members and dealers together so as to enable 
them trade with one another electronically rather than on a trading floor. The use of 
modern technology could facilitate a more transparent, rapid and disciplined 
trading.129 This has the potential to diversify the people who will be trading in the 
market thus providing more investors and liquidity.  
Another issue that can be linked to the issue of awareness is the fact that 
participation of domestic retail investors in the Nigerian capital market is not as large 
as it should be because retail investors believe the best securities are those that pay 
dividends. Consequently, they buy and hold securities in order to receive dividends. 
As at 2015, retail participation in the Nigerian capital market stood at 66% compared 
to 34% participation by institutional investors.130 This is bad for the market as well as 
investors because in limiting investments to dividend paying companies, they miss 
out on investing in a wider pool of potentially valuable stocks. This thesis 
recommends training of market operatives be made mandatory to make them well 
informed of relevant developments both in the regulation of the market and products. 
This will further enhance investor confidence as they can give investors succinct 
advice and recommendations based on the knowledge they have amassed.  
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This thesis proposes the collaboration between the SEC and market operators 
to spearhead a retail investor education campaign that focuses on communicating 
issues to consider when investing in capital markets as well as inform them of the 
protection accorded to them by virtue of legal provisions in an attempt to make them 
invest. Additionally, online trading platforms and the use of other innovative 
technologies should be encouraged. This goes without highlighting the fact that the 
SEC should to develop rules governing online trading platforms and other innovative 
technologies that may provide retail investors with access to the capital markets. At 
minimum online trading platforms should ensure the provision of live price feeds, up 
to date market research and access to collective investment schemes and mutual 
funds. 
Whilst determining the issue for awareness, it is important to note that the 
awareness campaign has to be developed from the root. Rules in Nigeria are 
developed at the bicameral chambers. For one to enact rules that are credible enough 
to protect capital market operations, it is important that individuals promoting such a 
bill that subsequently becomes a law appreciate the importance of enacting laws that 
are impermeable. History indicates that both at the lower and higher bicameral 
houses, the individuals accorded with the duty to head capital market committees are 
individuals with no relevant or previous experience in the capital market.131 The 
current government of Nigeria was inaugurated in May 2015. Presently, the 
individuals heading the capital market committee both at the senate and Federal 
House of Assembly are individuals with no record to indicate that they have any 
experience in capital market operations.132  
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Given the profiles of such individuals leading the committee for capital 
market, it is arguable that they may not appreciate the importance of enacting 
substantial legal provisions that will tackle problems as they arise in the capital 
market. In the bid to ensure efficient rules governing the capital market, it is 
important that individuals with the adequate qualifications and expertise are placed to 
head such committees. Although, an argument has been put forward that the idea is to 
give everyone equal opportunity to participate in the Federal House of Assembly and 
Senate. This thesis refutes this argument because individuals that are nominated to 
head such committees are usually appointed based on favouritism and they usually 
lobby for the juicier committees that can accord them some benefits. Furthermore, 
and in alternative to the foregoing, this thesis recommends adequate consultation with 
professionals that possess the requisite training, qualification and experience to advise 
them appropriately to guide them in enacting rules that will be beneficial as well as 
enlighten them on the likely innovations going on around the world.  
Other than the emergence of appropriate regulations and adequate 
enforcement and provision of awareness of capital market operations, another factor 
that should function efficiently is the operation of corporate governance to guide 
companies in their day-to-day affairs. 
 
5.4. Corporate governance 
Corporate governance has been described as the system through which companies are 
directed and controlled.133 It is comprised of formal and informal institutions, laws, 
values and rules that generate the menu of legal and organisational forms available in 
a country, which in turn determines the distribution of power, how ownership is 																																																								
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assigned, managerial decisions are made and monitored, information is audited and 
released as well as how profits are allocated.134 It is more or less the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment. 135  The assurance provided by corporate governance is a major 
determinant when investors are making the decision to invest.136 It is also described as 
a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders 
and other stakeholders. This relationship is developed through the provision of a 
structure that identifies the objectives of the company and the way the objectives can 
be attained through monitoring performance.137 
The rules apply to specific financial markets and organisational forms that 
establish the discretion of parties that possess control, rights and information as well 
as mechanism at their disposal to choose management, propose or confirm major 
strategic decisions and to determine the distribution of remuneration and profit.138 
Corporations adopt this mechanism in a bid to prevent or dissuade potentially self-
interested managers from engaging in activities that are detrimental to the welfare of 
shareholders and stakeholders.139  
The system consists of a board of directors that oversee management and an 
external auditor that gives its opinion on the reliability of financial statements. 
Corporate governance is applicable to the capital market, as the corporate players 
need to be put in check so as not to engage in activities that are injurious to the 
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market.140 It is considered to be at the nub of financial markets development, and 
research has indicated that emerging markets that improve corporate governance are 
likely to experience greater equity valuation.141 Furthermore, research on corporate 
governance around the world has established a number of empirical findings, amongst 
which is the fact that diverse elements of countries financial systems such as the 
breadth and depth of their capital markets, the pace of new security issues, corporate 
ownership structures, dividends policies and efficiency of investment allocation 
appear to be explained both conceptually and empirically by how well the laws in 
these countries protect outside investors through the operation of corporate 
governance.142 
The importance of a fully functional corporate governance regime that is 
operational in a capital market cannot be taken for granted. Some benefits that 
corporate governance bestows on capital markets are highlighted in turn below. 
First, better corporate governance standards play a significant role in helping 
the world’s newest market economies realise their full economic potential through 
economic enterprise and not state directed enterprise.143  
Second, corporate governance is considered a major factor that conduits 
success to stock performance as evidence indicates that companies that engage in 
shareholder friendly features outperform companies that do not.144 
Third, it provides shareholders and the public with reliable reports and 
financial information as well as ensures that decisions incorporate the best interests of 
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all shareholders whether majority or minority shareholders.145 Furthermore, it ensures 
that rights, assets or resources will not be siphoned from shareholders unfairly or 
unequally.146  
Fourth, it has been argued that legal compliance and voluntary activism in 
corporate governance can reduce the expropriation costs in governance process and 
partly compensate for the inefficiency in the institutional arrangement in a developing 
economy.147  
Fifth, with better firm level corporate governance there is reduction in agency 
costs and enhanced investor optimism in the firm’s future cash flow and growth 
prospect. Furthermore, better investor protection and lower expropriation by 
controlling shareholders gives outside investors the incentive to invest more and 
generates willingness to pay a premium for a well-governed company’s shares in the 
hopes that more of the firm’s profits would come back to them as interest or 
dividends.148  
Sixth, it has been advanced that apart from the systematic risks, corporate 
governance is an additional risk factor that investors require than higher expected 
returns.149 Furthermore, it has been argued that the effectiveness of the capital market 
in influencing the rate of return is more likely to be constrained by the critical issues 
of transparency and disclosure.150 
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The legal system of a country outlines the corporate governance structure in 
relation to the rules of ownership, board structure, liquidation and shareholders 
rights.151 Legal protection of a firm’s external financiers in developing economies is 
regarded to be low because of the differences in interpreting legal systems and poor 
enforcement. 152  Furthermore, the effectiveness of pricing mechanisms in capital 
markets have being linked to corporate governance as it has being described that the 
pricing of securities in developing economies remain rudimentary because of poor 
corporate governance associated with transparency and disclosure.153 
Corporate governance reform in emerging markets has recently become one of 
the most discussed topics in financial circles. Academics, business personnel, 
investors, economists and policy makers are eager to help emerging markets improve 
their standards of corporate governance because countries around the world have at 
some point had issues of ineffective corporate governance practices.154 Formal legal 
and regulatory obligations are part of the external incentive structure designed to 
ensure that competing companies abide by common standards of fairness, 
transparency, accountability and responsibility to protect shareholders, consumers, 
workers and environment and even competitors from abusive practices. In 
highlighting the importance of corporate governance, it was asserted that a good legal 
and regulatory framework would efficiently address the entry operations and exit of 
firms into a capital market.155 
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The Nigerian capital market has historically been underdeveloped and 
corporate governance has played little role in its processes. The small size of the 
capital market combined with the ownership structure entails that a threat of takeover 
has no effect in disciplining management and protecting minority shareholders’ rights. 
This highlights the failure and or ineffectiveness of governance structure in the 
market. This thesis highlighted some issues that are problematic in the Nigerian 
capital market ranging from disclosure, to market abuse such as insider trading etc. 
This thesis argues that poor corporate governance structure is largely accountable for 
the emergence of these problems, which subsequently hinders the smooth operation of 
the capital market as well as hinders it from being efficient.  
Historically, corporate governance was foreign to the indigenous customary 
business practices of the pre-colonial Nigeria.156 This thesis argues that corporate 
governance has not achieved its full potential because of certain practices that are 
engaged by corporations in Nigeria. For example, family members occupy strategic 
and important positions in Nigerian corporations. Family dominance in a corporation 
is held out to be a major constraint in developing economies.157 The consequence of 
this includes weak incentives to improve disclosure and governance, poor protection 
of minority shareholders as well as weak accounting standards and practices, which 
obstructs the operational efficiency of a corporation.158 
Furthermore, managers and directors are known to utilise corporate 
opportunities and resources for their own personal benefit at the expense of the 																																																								
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corporation and its shareholders. This is a clear indication of corporate governance 
not operating efficiently in the market. Taking an example from the BGL case and the 
Lever Brothers Nigeria case highlighted in the earlier chapter of this thesis, both cases 
illustrate examples of the effects of poor governance and commentators have argued 
that these cases were further compromised by the inability of regulatory bodies to 
monitor the activities of listed companies.159 Issues such as board appointments, 
senior management positions, and in some instances, lower cadres of appointment are 
often based on political connections, ethnic loyalty and or religious faith as opposed 
to consideration of professional qualification and experience.  
The evolution of corporate governance in Nigeria was as a result of various 
corporate failures and the country gaining independence from prolonged military 
regime in a new democratic administration, which necessitated the need for a policy 
capable of attracting new and sustainable foreign investments.160 The regulation, 
control and governance of business within provisions of company legislation in 
Nigeria have their roots from British colonies, which is their source of political 
independence.161 However, its effects have not been adequately evident in Nigerian 
corporate sphere. The regulations indicating the presence of corporate governance in 
Nigeria are contained in CAMA, ISA, SEC Rules and regulations etc. However, the 
regulatory institutions such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, Central 
Bank of Nigeria, Corporate Affairs Commission, and Nigerian Deposit Insurance 
Corporation are staffed with executives that are interested in enriching themselves by 
colluding with company’s senior executives to compromise shareholders’ interests.162 																																																								
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This is partly attributable to the fact that board members are described to lack the 
requisite skills and competencies to effectively contribute to the leadership of modern 
corporations.163 
Regulators and companies are beginning to realise the importance of corporate 
governance and the fact that it is necessary to avert financial crisis as well as aiding 
growth and development of entities. In view of this, there was the call for appropriate 
a corporate governance guideline that is relevant to socio-political, economic and 
cultural environment of Nigeria and additionally, effective laws, will, and 
commitment on the part of the government to enforce compliance of corporate 
governance policy.164 In response to this, there was a review of the existence, 
adequacy and relevance of corporate governance in Nigeria in relation to the 
international best practices in response to the new internal economic order. 
Subsequently, the Federal Government of Nigeria through some agencies came up 
with different institutional arrangements aimed at protecting investors. These 
arrangements were enacted in the code of corporate governance of 2003.165 The code 
identifies the roles and responsibilities of the board, management, shareholders, audit 
committee and external auditors etc. It is developed to channel the principles of 
transparency accountability and fairness in running the affairs of public companies.  
In 2011, the SEC enacted the code of best practices on corporate governance 
and part of its content was aimed at increasing the operations of corporate 
governance. Some of its content includes, the fact that the board should be a sufficient 
size relative to the scale complexity of the company’s operation and be composed in 																																																								
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such a way that ensures diversity of experience without compromising independence, 
compatibility and integrity. Other issues include the attendance of meetings, 
constitution of the board etc. The code also addresses the issues of the responsibility 
of the chairman, which is to ensure the effective operation of the board in such a way 
that it works towards achieving the company’s strategic objectives. He ought not to be 
involved in the day-to-day operations of the company as that is the primary 
responsibility of the CEO. It also explains the ideal constitution of the remuneration 
committee (i.e. should consist of only non-executive directors). Additionally, it 
provided that the board should undertake periodic peer review of director 
compensation and remuneration levels. Furthermore, in 2016, the Financial Reporting 
Council of Nigeria issued the National Code of Corporate Governance 2016 with its 
commencement date 17 October 2016. However, the Federal Government of Nigeria 
suspended the new code because it was inconsistent and sought to amend the 
provisions of the CAMA and other statutory legislations.166 
 
A noteworthy component of good corporate governance is the presence of an 
audit committee within a company.167 It is an operating committee on the board of 
directors charged with oversight of financial reporting.168 They monitor the integrity 
of financial statements and any formal announcements relating to financial 
performance.169 The importance of an audit committee within a company is well 
documented as they are charged with ensuring that shareholders’ interests are 
protected in relation to financial reporting and internal control, reviewing 																																																								
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arrangements by which staff of the company may in confidence raise concern about 
possible improprieties in matter for financial reporting or other matters, as well as 
overseeing the company’s relation with the external auditor, negotiate fees and define 
the parameters of the audit. With such duties, this thesis postulates that if they 
function properly, it would lead to efficient capital market transactions as they ensure 
the correctness of financial statements that are disclosed to investors. 
Audit committees developed in Nigeria because the investing public were 
getting sceptical about the credibility of financial reports and the performance of 
directors. 170  Also, there was the recommendation in the Nigeria Law Reform 
Commission 1988 that audit committees be set up in companies and should comprise 
of representatives of directors and shareholders.171 This recommendation was founded 
on the fact that the preceding practice of auditors dealing with the executive members 
of the board who are part of the management was considered unsatisfactory with 
many pitfalls.172 In view of this, the CAMA of 1990 required corporations to have 
audit committees as an additional layer of control and certification in the bid to make 
annual accounts of public corporations more acceptable and reliable. This was 
incorporated into the CAMA 2004. Section 359 (3) prescribes the provision of an 
audit committee within a company. This thesis argues that whilst the introduction of 
audit committee is a welcome development, there is the need for the review of the 
existing laws governing the appointment, remuneration, duration of tenure and 
qualifications of audit committee members. 
In relation to qualification of the auditors, CAMA 2004, s. 358 does not 
prescribe the qualification requirement of members of the committee. This implies 																																																								
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that persons with little or no understanding of financial reports could be elected into 
such an important committee.173 Although the Code of Corporate Governance 2011 
prescribes that the members should have basic financial literacy with at least one of 
them having knowledge of accounting or financial management.174 This thesis argues 
that such a provision should also be in the CAMA.175 Taking an example from the 
UK, the FRC prescribes that members of the audit committee should have 
competence that is relevant to the sector in which the company operates and at least 
one of its member has recent financial experience with a professional qualification 
from one of the professional accountancy bodies.176 If both provisions are analysed it 
is evident that the FRC’s requirement is likely to attract persons with sufficient 
knowledge of accounting than that of the Nigerian Corporate Governance Code. 
Given the technical nature of their assignment, it is pertinent that all members of the 
committee should be knowledgeable enough in accounting in order to be effective and 
make their opinion credible and in order to command adherence to such provision, it 
is important that it is contained in a legally enforceable regime such as the CAMA.  
Section 359 (4) of the CAMA 2004 prescribes that the committee compose of 
an equal amount of directors and representatives of shareholders of the company 
subject to a maximum number of six members. Members of the committee are to be 
elected yearly at the annual general meeting.177  It is argued that the most experienced 
members of the committee are usually board nominees that are rarely changed.178 The 
same cannot be said for shareholding members of the committee because board 
members are usually in a strong position to influence those elected to the committee, 																																																								
173 ibid 121 
174 Code of Corporate Governance 2011, s.30.1 and 30.2 
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thus creating the avenue for persons with no integrity who are willing to sacrifice 
shareholder goals for personal gains. Furthermore, the fact that the CAMA does not 
prescribe the minimum qualification or experience to be members of the committee 
ensures the availability of a steady army of volunteers shareholders that are willing to 
deal with the board and compromise the interest of shareholders.179 This thesis 
recommends that the tenure of members be extended to three years and further 
extendable with no more than two additional three-year periods as practiced in the 
UK.180 This recommendation is on the basis that it provides some certainty and allows 
for the development of constructive change strategy that will enable the injection of 
new ideas into the financial reporting of the company.181 It is arguable that if members 
exit yearly, the continuity of the work started by one committee may not be finished 
and subsequently not taken over by the new committee. Furthermore, there has been 
the recommendation that no member of the committee be allowed to serve for more 
than two consecutive terms. 182  This will help prevent possible collusion that 
familiarity between executive directors and audit committee may bring. 
Another issue that is of concern is the requirement that audit committee 
members should not be remunerated.183 Members of the audit committee employ their 
expertise and time towards a venture mainly to enhance the credibility and 
performance of the business. In view of this, it is only right that they are remunerated. 
A likely consequence of this is the fact that there will be shortage of competent audit 
committee members. This thesis argues that this practice has the likelihood to 
compromise the independence of the committee as research indicates that in Nigeria 
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there are no shortages of members for audit committees.184 This leads to the likely 
assumption that management of a company use covert ways to remunerate audit 
committee members as well as the possibility of there being other intrinsic benefits 
derived from being a member of the committee. This unarguably questions the 
independence of auditors because if the foregoing assertions are true, there is the 
likelihood that the auditors will ignore any accounting improprieties they become 
aware of. The FRC in the UK prescribes that audit committee members be 
remunerated and they list the things to be considered when considering remuneration 
to include, skills they bring, onerous duties they take on and the value of their work to 
the company. 185  This thesis recommends the remuneration of audit committee 
members. This will stimulate the interest of persons with the required qualifications 
and experience as well as integrity in such committee. 
 
Despite these reforms documented above on corporate governance, there 
remain corporate failures of firms in Nigeria.186 This can partly be accountable for the 
lack of confidence in the market by investors. This is further fuelled by the indications 
that the banking industries and other firms are collapsing in numbers leaving trail of 
woes to investors, shareholders, suppliers, depositor, employees and other 
stakeholders. This thesis proposes the urgent need to embrace and enforce the 
provisions of corporate governance in the Nigerian corporate sphere. This would go a 
long way to enhance the confidence of potential investors in the market because 
investors are willing to pay a premium for a well-governed firm. Furthermore, this 
thesis posits that a company that operates within the ambit of the provisions of 
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corporate governance will bring such effective practices when listing in the capital 
market and desist from wrong practices. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter was structured to identify further reasons that hinder the Nigerian capital 
market from operating efficiently. It identified the operation of rule of law, 
importance of awareness as well as the corporate governance as important factors that 
are not functioning to the best of their capability by various reasons identified in this 
chapter. This chapter argues that if these factors are functioning effectively in the 
capital market, there is the likelihood that investors will be interested in the investing 
in the capital market. It is important to note that these factors are not the sole issues 
that will enhance investor confidence. However, if the capital market is to be 
efficient, there is the need for evidence of the operation of the rule of law governing 
market operations. This thesis submits that these factors each constitute of a segment 
of law that can assist the market in attaining efficiency and compete with its 














Capital realisation is one of the factors accountable for economic growth; the 
availability and cost of capital is therefore a central theme in discussions of growth 
possibilities in developing countries.1 An efficient capital market of a country is of 
paramount importance as it is considered the bedrock of growth in modern 
economies. 2  Based on the sensitive nature of capital market transactions, it is 
imperative that the operations are adequately regulated as this not only ensures that 
business is carried on smoothly in the market, but also has the propensity to attract 
more investors as highlighted in this thesis. The focal point of this thesis was on the 
regulation of the Nigerian capital market. It analysed the legal regulations and 
enforcement mechanisms governing the Nigerian capital market in comparison to that 
of the UK. The findings of this thesis identified and highlighted several exploitable 
loopholes in the substantive rules regulating the market and made some 
recommendations on how to make the Nigerian capital market efficient. 
 The central theme/ research question for this thesis was ‘to what extent are 
the legal frameworks and enforcement procedures in the Nigerian capital 
market laws and practices effective as compared to those in the United 
Kingdom’? This was used to propel the fact that the Nigerian capital market is 
categorised as a weak market in terms of market efficiency and is not considered an 
investors’ choice due to scandals/events that seem to have diminished the confidence 
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2 R. Levine and S. Zervous, ‘Stock markets, banks and economic growth’, (1988) 88 American 
Economic Review, 554. 
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of investors in its capital market.3 In view of the foregoing, this thesis examined the 
laws and regulations governing the Nigerian capital market in a bid to ascertain the 
cause of the events that have diminished and can diminish the confidence of investors 
in the market. Based on the research carried out, this thesis argues that the laws and 
practices regulating the Nigerian capital market are not totally capable of regulating 
the market to attain its full potential, as there are reports of unethical practices in the 
capital market. Furthermore, the legal regulations contain loopholes that can be used 
to evade liability. This arguably is accountable for the weak operational efficiency of 
the market as well as the presumed low confidence exuded by potential investors. 
This thesis analysed the major issues that are responsible for the state of the capital 
market, amongst which are; the regulation of information asymmetry, regulation of 
insider trading and other issues such as the importance of corporate governance, 
enforcement of the regulations governing these acts. The summaries of the findings of 
this thesis are highlighted in turn. 
 
6.2. Nigerian capital market falls under the weak form efficiency theory 
Research indicates that the Nigerian capital market falls under the weak form 
efficiency.4 The reasons given for this categorisation includes the fact that technical 
and other forms of analysis based on historical prices appear to be valueless in the 
Nigerian capital market and the fact that stockbrokers are sometimes not familiar with 
the operations of the company to enable them place a fair price on the company’s 
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shares.5 Furthermore, it is asserted that prior to public offers and announcement in the 
Nigerian capital market, there is usually an erratic price movement that usually has a 
minimal effect because the information had already arrived in the market before it is 
made public.6 The findings of this thesis indicate that this is a principal reason for the 
presumed lack of depth of the market as investors may not be interested in investing if 
the information emanating from such a market is characterised as inadequate and 
inaccurate.   
 
6.3. Different factors determine the strength of a capital market 
This thesis recognises the importance of the three theories (law and finance, politics 
and finance, endowment and finance) towards the growth of a capital market and 
posits that the chances of building a strong capital market in Nigeria that can compete 
with its international counterparts rests on all theories functioning efficiently and 
concurrently.7 The reasoning behind this argument is that Nigeria is well endowed 
with adequate resources that can be properly explored to enhance growth of the 
economy. However, this is not the case as research has indicated that there is large 
reliance on crude oil that has led to the subsequent neglect of other areas that will be 
essential to boosting the economy.8 However, regardless of the large reliance, crude 
oil is not the largest contributor to the GDP as statistics show other sectors such as 
agriculture that have contributed immensely to the GDP. This thesis argues that an 
efficient capital market would facilitate the accumulation of requisite capital for 
exploration of other areas that can lead to economic growth.9 Additionally, areas that 																																																								
5 Chapter 2, 2.1.2 
6 W. Bewaji, Insider Trading in developing Jurisdictions: Achieving an effective regulatory regime, 
(Routledge 2012) 147 
7 Chapter 2, 2.5 
8 Chapter 1, 1.2.1 
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contribute a great deal to the GDP will also benefit from a properly functioning 
capital market. This would only be achievable if the market is adequately regulated by 
provisions of the laws that are enacted by the government as well as enforcement of 
the said laws by the regulatory bodies enacted by government. This propels the 
argument that for the capital market to attain international standards, the three theories 
must work concurrently. 
 
6.4. Information asymmetry is a primary reason for the lack of confidence in 
the Nigerian capital market 
This thesis finds that a market tainted with information asymmetry has the propensity 
to discourage investors from investing because entrepreneurs are considered to have 
superior information of the business and sometimes overstate their value in a bid to 
attract investors.10 This thesis finds that although mandatory disclosure is present in 
the Nigerian capital market it is not appropriately regulated because of the absence of 
some key provisions as well as lack of enforcement of the substantive rules.11 This 
thesis argues that utilising two regulatory provisions in the Nigerian capital market 
may not be ideal in every instance because of the possibility that investors may not be 
aware of both provisions as well as the presumed financial regulation illiteracy.12 
Furthermore, issues such as disclosure of directors’ earnings should be available in 
both regulatory provisions as well as the extent to which disclosure is to be effected in 
a bid to prohibit companies from disclosing only favourable information 
The issue of enforcement has been analysed. This thesis highlighted the fact 
that the regulatory provisions are not enforced because they are either unattainable or 
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too lenient when compared to similar provisions in the UK.13 Additionally, this thesis 
highlights the fact that courts in Nigeria are known to award meagre sums as fines and 
hardly utilise custodial sentences for such offence, as there is no record of any.14  
This thesis also explored the concept of voluntary disclosure and argues that it 
is a concept that should be encouraged and regulated as research indicates that bigger 
firms operating in the Nigerian capital market tend to voluntarily disclose information 
and that better performing firms are those that carry out disclosure voluntarily.15 
This thesis finds that the regulation of reputational intermediaries is inefficient 
in Nigeria and may not guarantee the needed competence that instils caution in them 
to perform their duties proficiently.  It finds that regulation of auditors is deficient, as 
it does not prescribe behaviour that auditors should desist from.16 This is further 
accentuated by the fact that the provision for fines for erring auditors is meagre when 
compared to its counterpart in the UK. Similarly credit rating agencies lack 
competition that may lead them to exude lackadaisical attitude towards their jobs.17 
Furthermore, they are not adequately regulated as the regulations only provide 
procedure and lists accompanying documents for registration with the SEC without 
providing any regulation if they act inappropriately or unprofessionally. 18 
Additionally, this thesis finds that the remuneration of credit rating agencies by the 
companies they rate is not ideal in a country like Nigeria because of the widespread 
corruption and recommends that there should be a reversion back to the principal 
agency relationship (i.e. the credit rating agency serves as agents of the investors). 
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The thesis also finds that lawyers as reputational intermediaries are arguably well 
regulated because of the due diligence requirement and the fact that erring lawyers 
can be reported and cautioned by the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee of 
the Nigerian Bar Association and the Capital Markets Solicitors Association in 
Nigeria.19 This thesis recommends that the requirement for compulsory affixing of 
stamp and seal by legal practitioners in Nigeria be extended to documents related to 
capital market transactions.20  
 
6.5. Regulation of insider trading is not adequately enforced in the Nigerian 
capital market 
This thesis argues that insider trading is practiced in the Nigerian capital market as it 
is alleged to be one of the reasons for the crash of the Nigerian capital market in 
2008.21 This thesis identifies three main reasons for the alleged widespread practice 
of insider trading in the Nigerian capital market; corruption, lack of knowledge of the 
act and its consequences and insufficient regulations/ enforcement.22This thesis finds 
that regulation of insider trading is not effective in Nigeria because since its 
introduction into the Nigerian regulatory regimes there has been only one 
conviction.23 This thesis argues that one of the reasons for inadequate enforcement of 
the act is partly because the rules prohibiting the act do not completely cater for the 
offence it is attempting to prohibit. This thesis identified several elements that need to 
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be impermeably defined or its definition expanded to cover every angle within which 
the offence can be committed.24  
This thesis argues that although there is a trivial provision for instituting civil 
claims against insider trading in Nigeria, the regulations are not sufficient in tackling 
the act as it makes provision for just compensation with no mention of possible 
suspension or expulsion from the market.25 Thus creating the likelihood for erring 
companies to perform this act without any remorse knowing that they would be 
ordered to pay compensation. This is further compounded by the fact that the 
Nigerian judicial system awards insufficient sums as fines/costs.  
This thesis proposes the use of other civil remedies such as freezing orders, 
injunctions etc. in a bid to dissuade companies from engaging in the act. It is 
important to note that there are provisions for remedies as expulsion and suspension 
in the Nigerian regulatory regime; however, they are not in respect to insider trading. 
Furthermore, the provision does not create the avenue for private individuals to 
institute private civil actions in competent courts of civil jurisdiction. Such cases are 
instituted in the Investment and Securities Tribunal (IST) by virtue of section 116 of 
the ISA, which operates contrary to the provision of section 251 (e) of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) thus eliminating the 
possibility of establishing such claims.26 This thesis argues that the Nigerian capital 
market will benefit from a better worded insider trading provision that links the 
offence to particular punishments. 
This thesis makes some recommendations that ought to sufficiently prevent 
the act from being practiced in the Nigerian capital market. Amongst these 																																																								
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recommendations, there is the need to establish adequate and efficient disclosure 
regime, reform and enactment of rules regulating insider trading, the need for 
enforcement of the rules and regulations, creating the possibility to institute derivative 
actions and private rights of action by individuals and the use of civil remedies. 
 
6.6. The operation of Rule of Law in the Nigerian capital market is not 
efficient 
This thesis argues that for regulations to work efficiently there is the need for the 
operation of rule of law within the capital market, which is currently not evident in 
the Nigerian capital market.27 It highlights several factors that will be essential for the 
efficient operation of rule of law such as the need for efficient rules, which arguably 
is the primary means to engage rule of law.28 This thesis argues that in order to 
achieve adequate operation of the rule of law in the capital market it is important that 
the rules adequately prescribe capital market operations and provide adequate 
penalties for individuals and corporations that do not adhere to these rules.29  This 
thesis highlights the importance of certain issues to be contained in both regulatory 
regimes such as mandatory disclosure.30 Other issues identified includes the need to 
grant jurisdiction to the IST in adjudicating wrongs committed against an individual 
in the capital market,31 confirmation of where disputes from the capital market be 
instituted,32 issues pertaining to establishing liability against insiders through the 
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provision of adequate and broad definitions of the offence and the elements required 
to prove them.33 
Furthermore, this thesis finds that enforcement of the rules is unarguably 
deficient, as it has been described as slow, inefficient and inadequate.34 This thesis 
recommends a stricter approach to the tripartite system of enforcement in the Nigerian 
capital market. 35  It also finds that for effective enforcement of the regulations 
governing the capital market, the SEC, courts and law enforcement agencies must 
work efficiently and credibly to achieve the best results which further enhances 
investor confidence.36  
Another issue appurtenant to the smooth operation of rule of law in the capital 
market is the role played by judges and law enforcement agencies in upholding legal 
rules. This thesis proposes that judges appointed to the IST should be persons with 
integrity that will avoid the temptation of bribes, carry out their duties competently as 
well as determine cases promptly.37 Furthermore, they should always strive to uphold 
the rule of law by applying the laws effectively as well as penalties. Additionally, 
judges should seek to get continuous education that will keep them updated with the 
evolving global financial markets.38 
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6.7. Lack of awareness of capital market operations and lack of knowledge of 
protection accorded to investors is partly accountable for the presumed 
illiquid nature of the Nigerian capital market 
This thesis finds that one of the reasons the Nigerian capital market is described as 
illiquid and lacking depth is by virtue of lack of awareness of capital market 
operations and sometimes lack of knowledge of the availability of protection accorded 
to investors.39 This thesis highlighted a few ways in which the issue of awareness can 
be resolved such as continuous training for capital market operators so as to make 
them knowledgeable of new ways desperate persons attempt to use to beat the system. 
It also recommended that individuals appointed to chair the committee on capital 
markets in the Senate and Federal House of Representatives be individuals with some 
financial knowledge/experience, as they would appreciate the need to enact rules that 
will aid in smooth operation of the capital market. Furthermore, it proposed the need 
for adequate enforcement that will give members of the public some confidence in the 
system as well as collaboration between the SEC and market operators for retail 
investor education campaign that focuses on communicating issues to consider when 
investing in the capital market as well as informing them of protection provided by 
law. 
 
6.8. Insufficient operation of corporate of governance is partly accountable 
for the inefficiency of the Nigerian capital market 
This thesis finds that another reason for the inefficiency of the Nigerian capital market 
is by virtue of the poor practice of corporate governance by Nigerian corporations. 
This is described to hinder the smooth operation of the capital market and hinders it 
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from being efficient.40 This thesis finds that the problem of inadequate operation of 
corporate governance is highlighted by practices such as family dominance/nepotism 
in appointment of board members, managers and directors utilising corporate 
opportunities, and resources for their personal benefit that are practiced by 
corporations in Nigeria.41 Furthermore, this thesis finds that regulation of corporate 
governance is not adequately evident in the Nigerian corporate sphere and although 
there have been attempts to salvage the situation through the enactment of different 
corporate governance codes (2003 and 2011) there still remain corporate failures 
because of the alleged lack of confidence in the market by investors.42 This thesis 
proposed the urgent need to enforce and uphold the provisions of corporate 
governance in the Nigerian corporate sphere. If properly practiced, companies will 
bring such practices to the capital market, thus enhancing investor confidence. 
 
6.9. Final Thoughts 
The importance of the capital market has been emphasised throughout this thesis and 
its role in economic growth is documented by different academics. The Nigerian 
capital market has the propensity to attain great heights if adequately operated, 
managed and regulated. However, attaining these is not an easy or automatic task; 
there is the need to enhance confidence of retail and institutional investors, both local 
and international to invest in the market. In realising this, the system needs to function 
efficiently by adopting best market practices from countries that have strong capital 
markets, enacting impermeable rules and regulations, prescribing adequate 
punishment both custodial and otherwise for erring participants, and most importantly 																																																								
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enforcing these rules and regulations. In relation to enforcement, the judicial system 
has to decide cases timeously, apply penalties adequately, avoid corrupt practices for 
favourable decisions and ensuring that these rules are adhered to. This thesis 
acknowledges the fact that the foregoing may not be easily attainable. However, as 
the discourse in this thesis clearly demonstrates, there is the need for the market to 
start adopting such practices in a bid to compete with its international counterparts as 
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